Nvidia Part 2: How a Board Should Investigate Its CEO

Yesterday we examined Nvidia’s board structure, conflict-of-interest rules, and the challenge of managing CEO risk. Those arrangements face their most demanding test when directors must investigate the executive who leads the business. The next question is how the board turns its oversight authority into a credible process: who directs the inquiry, who controls the evidence, how investigators and witnesses are protected, and what happens if the findings require action against the CEO. Even with Jensen Huang’s resignation as CEO of Nvidia, these questions remain critical for every organization. Today I want to look at the decisions that make an internal investigation independent, fair, and capable of producing a defensible result.

A credible allegation involving the chief executive requires directors to make consequential decisions before they know all the facts. They must preserve evidence, identify conflicts, protect participants, and keep the business operating. Each decision can strengthen the investigation or make it harder to trust. But it all starts with your investigative counsel. A serious problem or issue requires seriously good investigative counsel. This almost always means someone outside your regular counsel, who will be seen as truly independent.

At Nvidia, the board announced an independent investigation on November 8 into reports that CEO Jensen Huang had been targeted by foreign intelligence, followed by the retention of Joon H. Kim and Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz on November 10. Reuters reported that no timetable or commitment to publish findings had been announced. Reuters also said it could not independently verify the intelligence allegation, which China denies. That allegation remains unverified; the investigation’s existence does not establish it. The governance lesson is immediate. Directors should design an inquiry that tests competing explanations and supports whatever response the evidence warrants.

Give the committee authority to act.

When allegations concern the CEO, a special committee of directors can establish a clear line of accountability outside the executive’s management structure. An existing committee may be suitable if its members have the independence, capacity, and authority the matter requires.

The board should adopt a written resolution specifying the committee’s mandate. It should authorize access to relevant records and employees, independent advisers, and adequate funding. It should also distinguish authority to investigate and report findings from authority to impose discipline, change leadership, or authorize disclosures. Those powers must fit applicable law and the company’s governing documents. Markel and Murray emphasize documenting that delegation and clarifying whether the committee decides or recommends.

For the CCO, the operational question is straightforward: if investigators encounter resistance from the CEO’s office, who can resolve it? A committee that must obtain the subject’s approval for access, spending, or interviews has an avoidable weakness. Establish an escalation route and require prompt notice of material interference.

Examine independence in the specific matter.

Independence requires examination of the relationships relevant to the inquiry. Directors should disclose financial ties, significant personal relationships, prior advice, and participation in decisions investigators may review. A director who approved a disputed transaction may be an important witness even if otherwise qualified to serve independently.

Delaware cases show why that assessment matters. In Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado, the court required scrutiny of a special litigation committee’s independence, good faith, and investigative basis when the corporation sought to terminate a derivative lawsuit. In In re Oracle Corp. Derivative Litigation, substantial university connections among committee members and defendants prevented the committee from meeting its independence burden. (We should also note that the Financial Times (FT) has reported that Nvidia has no director and officer insurance coverage.)

These decisions address special litigation committees in shareholder litigation. Their procedures do not automatically govern every internal investigation. The practical lesson is nevertheless useful: evaluate the actual relationships, document the reasoning, and reassess membership if the inquiry reaches a director’s own conduct.

Select counsel who can challenge the client.

The committee should select counsel with relevant investigative experience and the capacity to pursue difficult evidence. It should examine the firm’s relationships with the CEO, directors, important counterparties, and the conduct under review. Prior involvement in advising on disputed events deserves particular attention.

American Bar Association, Model Rules of Professional Conduct, Rule 1.7(a)–(b), Conflict of Interest: Current Clients addresses concurrent conflicts, including circumstances where other responsibilities or personal interests may materially limit representation. Counsel must apply the governing jurisdiction’s rules. Directors should also consider whether a proposed engagement would command confidence even where a conflict might be legally waivable.

The engagement letter should identify the client, reporting arrangements, scope, and control of legal advice. If the committee is the client, counsel should report to that committee. The CEO should have separate personal advice where needed. Investigators should not leave anyone believing that the same lawyer is simultaneously protecting every participant’s interests. A firm’s reputation matters. The committee’s willingness to hear unwelcome advice matters just as much.

Define the business questions and preserve the evidence.

A useful scope converts an allegation into questions investigators can answer. For a hypothetical undisclosed executive relationship involving a customer, those questions could include:

  • Was disclosure required, and what was actually disclosed? Have there been other or similar relationships?
  • Did the relationship affect pricing, approvals, access, or other business decisions?
  • Was confidential information accessed or shared outside authorized channels?
  • What did management and directors know, and how did they respond?
  • Were company statements consistent with the information available when they were made?

These are investigative questions, not findings about Nvidia.

The plan should identify relevant periods, people, transactions, records, and jurisdictions. It should permit expansion when evidence supports it and require reasons for material exclusions. In their article, Porter and Garcha stressed that an investigation should evolve as facts emerge while remaining proportionate to the issue.

Preservation must begin promptly. Identify relevant email, messaging platforms, calendars, transaction records, access logs, and business communications on personal devices. Suspend relevant routine deletion where appropriate and verify that collection instructions were implemented. Access and collection must respect applicable privacy, employment, and cross-border requirements.

The U.S. Department of Justice’s Evaluation of Corporate Compliance Programs (ECCP) specifically examines whether business communications can be preserved and accessed, including messages on personal devices and applications. A preservation notice has limited value if the relevant messages continue disappearing.

Where foreign parties or government agencies hold important evidence, record what was requested and what remained unavailable. Private counsel may be able to assess information access and corporate decisions without resolving every intelligence question. The conclusions must reflect those limits.

Manage privilege from the beginning.

The legal purpose of the investigation, its client, and the handling of communications should be established at the outset. A privilege label alone cannot supply protection.

In Upjohn Co. v. United States, the Supreme Court protected qualifying employee communications made to corporate counsel to obtain legal advice. It distinguished those communications from the underlying facts, which do not become privileged merely because someone tells them to a lawyer.

Before interviews, counsel should explain whom they represent, why they are gathering information, who controls any applicable privilege, and that information may be disclosed by the authorized client. The witness should understand that investigating counsel is not their personal lawyer. American Bar Association Model Rules of Professional Conduct, Rule 1.13(f), Organization as Client, specifically addresses explaining the client’s identity when organizational and individual interests are adverse.

Counsel should establish appropriate distribution controls and assess privilege and work-product protection separately under applicable law. Decisions about sharing material with the full board, auditors, insurers, regulators, or the public need legal review. Confidentiality instructions must preserve lawful reporting rights.

Government cooperation also requires careful distinctions. Under DOJ Justice Manual § 9-28.720, Cooperation: Disclosing the Relevant Facts, cooperation credit is not conditioned on waiving privilege or work-product protection; disclosure of relevant facts is the central consideration. Directors should understand the implications before authorizing a report or presentation outside the protected relationship.

Protect witnesses and give the CEO a fair opportunity to respond.

Mary Shirley’s observation in the LinkedIn Post applies throughout the investigation: protection must extend to compliance personnel and others who participate in good faith. The committee should provide a confidential route for reporting interference and arrange independent review of significant employment actions affecting participants. A witness may fear losing a promotion or being excluded from important work long before anyone threatens dismissal. Follow-up should continue after interviews conclude.

Fairness also requires testing evidence that contradicts the allegation. Investigators should distinguish firsthand knowledge from inference, probe inconsistencies, and give the CEO a meaningful opportunity to address material concerns. Counsel should determine interview sequencing and what information can appropriately be shared. The board should expect a reasoned assessment of credibility and competing explanations. Neither executive status nor public criticism should decide the outcome.

Make interim leadership a deliberate decision.

A CEO investigation creates two simultaneous responsibilities: protect the inquiry and maintain business continuity. The board should assess whether the executive’s continued responsibilities create an unacceptable risk of interference, retaliation, further harm, or conflicted decisions. (Once again, Jensen Huang himself answered that question by resigning.) Depending on the facts, safeguards could include recusal from particular transactions, temporary reassignment of approval authority, restrictions on contact about the investigation, or administrative leave.

Document the reasons, the person responsible for implementation, and the conditions that would trigger reassessment. Interim measures should be proportionate and should not be presented as findings of wrongdoing.

If leave or another leadership change becomes necessary, directors should already know who can act, what authority that person holds, and which customer, employee, financing, or regulatory relationships require attention. A successor’s availability should not determine what investigators can find. The CEO should remain able to obtain advice and respond to allegations while the committee controls the investigation.

Document decisions and turn findings into action

The ECCP also asks whether investigations are independent, appropriately scoped, properly conducted, and documented, and whether findings produce an accountable response. Those questions give directors a useful test of the process.

The record should explain committee selection, recusals, scope changes, significant evidence gaps, interim safeguards, and the basis for conclusions. Minutes should capture decisions and reasons, with counsel advising on how to handle privileged legal advice. Volume is a poor substitute for a clear explanation of judgment.

The final assessment should distinguish supported findings from unresolved questions and allegations the evidence did not substantiate. It should identify control failures separately from individual responsibility. A process can require improvement even when an allegation against a particular executive is not established.

Directors should assign each corrective action an owner, deadline, and method for testing completion. Decide what must be reported externally and what can appropriately be communicated to employees and shareholders. Public descriptions should accurately state the inquiry’s scope and conclusions. A narrow investigation should not produce a sweeping public assurance.

Questions for the board and CCO

Before the first substantive committee meeting, directors should be able to answer five questions:

  1. Can the committee act independently? Confirm its membership, delegated powers, funding, and escalation route.
  2. Can counsel pursue adverse evidence? Resolve conflicts and establish who controls instructions and legal advice.
  3. Can the inquiry reach the relevant facts? Verify preservation, access, scope, and a process for documenting limitations.
  4. Can people participate safely? Protect witnesses and investigators while giving the CEO a fair opportunity to respond.
  5. Can the business implement the result? Prepare interim leadership options and assign responsibility for remediation.

The CCO should bring the board a practical exercise: a credible allegation involving the CEO, a critical witness who reports to that CEO, and relevant messages held outside corporate email. Ask directors to identify who makes each decision and where the process could stall. The exercise is complete when the company has resolved those weaknesses and tested whether the revised arrangements work.

Today we examined how a board can investigate its CEO with independence, fairness, and a defensible record. Tomorrow in Blog Post 3 we turn to a related question: what can the public record establish about corporate influence on U.S. chip export policy? For boards and CCOs, the task is to distinguish legitimate advocacy, potential conflicts, and evidence of improper influence. We will examine how export controls are developed, where company input enters the process, and what lobbying disclosures, agency records, congressional testimony, and reliable reporting reveal. Where the record is silent, we will say so. Policy access alone cannot establish why a government decision was made.

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