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Innovation in Compliance

The Salus Blueprint: Episode 7 – Show Me That It Works

What questions might a leader face on a difficult morning? In this special podcast series, Marc Duncan, Bridget Lee-Young, and Scott Pickett of Salus Solutions explain one useful idea for a variety of corporate professionals, such as corporate risk and compliance leaders and anti-bribery and corruption professionals, and then demonstrate how that idea changes a decision. This podcast is also for police and fire chiefs, emergency managers, finance and operations executives, CEOs, boards, and leaders of commercial, public, and private organizations. Over the next 4 weeks, we will be running this special series.

In Episode 7, we look at testing evidence and updating crisis communications. Today, the panel discusses what constitutes evidence that backup crisis communications and other continuity capabilities work, using Riverbend’s after-hours test failure to show how checkbox compliance misses single points of failure. They emphasize that evidence comes from current, repeatable testing (e.g., night dispatchers reaching drivers with the main system off) with documented date/time, participants, and outcomes, and that older tests with different staff or vendors are history, not evidence. The group highlights the need to test backups and “back up for the backup” frequently, set review cadence by policy (often annually) while also triggering earlier reviews when risks, people, suppliers, sites, missions, threats, or incidents change, and establish “par values” for critical areas. They cite an export-control shipping failure to stress that critical updates require confirmation beyond a single email, vendor coordination, and verification. They describe SALIS tools as a documented loop (intel/assessment/decisions/ops) that builds a defensible, board-ready path from information to tested action.

Key highlights:

  1. “What would count as evidence that Riverbend’s backup communications actually work?”
  2. “How is a test result different from a policy document, a training attendance list, or a completed purchase order?”
  3. “What should an exercise capture about failure conditions, time to respond, who was reached, and what still did not work?”
  4. “How do risk and compliance leaders show management and the board an honest picture without drowning them in metrics?”
  5. “When an exercise uncovers a new gap, how do you assign correction and verify the correction worked?”
  6. “What new information should flow back into SalINTEL, SalTHIRA, SalCAPA, and SalOPS?”
  7. “How often should an organization reconsider a capability when people, suppliers, conditions, or mission requirements change?”
  8. “How would a public-safety leader and a CFO assess the same test result from their different responsibilities?”

Questions for Our Listeners: If your board asked tomorrow for the full path from warning to tested action, could you show it—or would the evidence be scattered across people and systems? In the final episode, we reconnect the whole cycle and show where to start.

About Salus Solutions: “Salus helps organizations understand what matters, make informed protective decisions, and carry them into action. SalCAPA is the method and coordination environment that connects those steps.”

Salus Solutions sponsors this podcast series.

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AI Today in 5

AI Today in 5: November 17, 2026, The Rethinking Fraud and Cybersecurity Edition

Welcome to AI Today in 5, the newest addition to the Compliance Podcast Network. Each day, Tom Fox will bring you 5 AI stories to start your day. Sit back, enjoy a cup of morning coffee, and listen to AI Today in 5. All from the Compliance Podcast Network. Each day, we consider five stories from the business world on compliance, ethics, risk management, leadership, or general interest in AI.

Top AI stories include:

  1. Why agents fail inside firms built for humans. (FinTechGlobal)
  2. CA AG sues OpenAI for ‘misleading the public.’ (WSJ)
  3. Bolstering AI-driven compliance. (dealroom)
  4. AI and misrepresenting real estate listings. (HousingWire)
  5. Banks rethinking fraud and cybersecurity together. (BankInfoSecurity)

My first work of general non-fiction is now out: Deluge Before Dawn, the story of the 2025 flood in Kerr County, Texas, which killed 119 people and devastated a county. It is a story of tragedy, heartbreak, survival, and resilience.

It is available on the following sites:

Amazon.com

Stoney Creek Publishing

Barnes and Noble

Texas A&M University Press

Bookshop.org

Google.Books

Walmart

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Daily Compliance News

Daily Compliance News: November 17, 2026, The Air of Corruption Edition

Welcome to the Daily Compliance News. Each day, Tom Fox, the Voice of Compliance, brings you compliance-related stories to start your day. Sit back, enjoy a cup of morning coffee, and listen in to the Daily Compliance News. All from the Compliance Podcast Network. Each day, we cover four stories from the business world, compliance, ethics, risk management, leadership, or general interest for compliance professionals.

Top stories include:

  • Human judgment or AI? (FT)
  • Will Nvidia Board go inside or outside? (Bloomberg)
  • First shareholder claim filed against Nvidia Directors. (Complaint)
  • Pence says Trump Administration has ‘an air of corruption’. (NBC)

My first work of general non-fiction is now out: Deluge Before Dawn, the story of the 2025 flood in Kerr County, Texas, which killed 119 people and devastated a county. It is a story of tragedy, heartbreak, survival, and resilience.

It is available on the following sites:

Amazon.com

Stoney Creek Publishing

Barnes and Noble

Texas A&M University Press

Bookshop.org

Google.Books

Walmart

Categories
Blog

Nvidia: Part 1 – Corporate Governance at Nvidia and the Challenge of CEO Risk

Corporate governance becomes most consequential when a board must examine the conduct of the executive most closely associated with the company’s success. Directors need reliable information, the authority to act, and the willingness to follow evidence wherever it leads. The compliance program must support that work even when asking the next question could put someone’s career at risk.

In a LinkedIn post, Mary Shirley framed the issue directly:

You may not have had a well-known CEO being romantically involved with a suspected spy on your bingo card this year, but is CEO risk on your radar? CEO risks are notoriously difficult to manage and, unfortunately, seemingly perennial.

At Nvidia, the confirmed developments warrant serious governance attention. On November 8, Jensen Huang acknowledged infidelity, and the board announced an independent investigation. Reports in The New York Times (NYT) and the Financial Times (FT) identify the other person as Alice Huang (no relation), who is formerly associated with Nvidia customer Megaspeed, and report an alleged intelligence connection to China. Slate also reported that Nvidia’s stock has been slumping since the disclosure and that Huang’s relationship “even shaped [US] foreign policy.”

What Nvidia disclosed about its board

Nvidia’s 2026 proxy statement identifies Stephen C. Neal as independent lead director and explains that Nvidia operated without a board chair at that time. (Harvey C. Jones was named its first board chair on November 12.) Its audit, compensation, and nominating and corporate governance committees are composed of independent directors. Neal could place risk matters before the board and convene independent directors.

These arrangements provide mechanisms for oversight. Their effectiveness depends on how directors use them. Can they obtain information directly from compliance, legal, security, and internal audit? Can they authorize an inquiry without management limiting its scope? Can they hear unwelcome information in a setting where employees feel safe providing it?

Reuters’ November 10 analysis describes scrutiny of the board’s longstanding relationships and its ability to investigate Huang independently. Tenure alone does not establish compromised independence. The relevant inquiry is whether a director can assess the particular matter objectively, including any prior involvement in the decisions under review. A board should document that assessment when selecting an investigation committee.

The code must work when disclosure does not

Nvidia’s Code of Conduct identifies personal relationships as potential conflicts. It directs employees to avoid actual or potential conflicts, remove themselves from affected decisions, and seek guidance concerning perceived or actual conflicts.

Those provisions establish a useful starting point. Operating effectiveness requires a way to identify a conflict when the person involved does not volunteer it. As Shirley observes: “However robust your disclosure program is, conflicts of interest are not necessarily going to be proactively reported.”

For the CCO, that means testing how the organization handles exceptions, unusual customer access, and decisions involving personal relationships. Annual certifications should be supported by targeted questions and channels for others to raise concerns. Review should remain proportionate to the business risk and respect legitimate privacy interests.

A personal relationship becomes a governance concern when it could affect business judgment, access to information, use of company resources, treatment of employees, or the accuracy of corporate statements. The control should identify that connection and assign responsibility for managing it.

The board must also know who receives a disclosure about the CEO. Routing it exclusively through executives whose authority or careers depend on that CEO can undermine confidence in the process. A clear path to an independent director or appropriate committee should exist before a crisis.

Related person disclosures require a separate analysis

Nvidia’s 2026 proxy statement describes review by the nominating and corporate governance committee. It discloses employment and compensation involving Huang’s children and a director’s son, including safeguards concerning compensation decisions. Those disclosures illustrate a process for identifying and reviewing relationships. They do not establish wrongdoing.

Internal conflict reporting and public securities disclosures serve different purposes. SEC Regulation S-K Item 404 generally addresses company transactions exceeding $120,000 in which a related person has a direct or indirect material interest, subject to its definitions and exceptions. A personal relationship does not automatically satisfy those conditions.

Boards therefore need separate analyses: whether a relationship requires internal disclosure and mitigation; whether a transaction requires committee approval; and whether applicable securities rules require public disclosure. Other disclosure obligations may also matter. A conclusion under one test should not silently become the answer to all three.

The difficulty with CEO internal investigations

On November 10, Nvidia’s independent directors announced that they had retained Joon H. Kim and Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz to conduct the investigation. The appointment established who would lead the legal work. Its credibility will depend on the authority, access, and cooperation available to the investigators. Reuters reported on November 11 that Nvidia had not announced a timetable or said whether it would make the findings public. As of this writing, no investigation report has been released.

This matter raises several challenges that deserve attention and potential lessons for compliance professionals.

First, the CEO’s influence may shape the evidence investigators receive. Employees can be reluctant to question an executive who controls assignments, promotions, or access to important work. Investigators should test whether witnesses feel free to speak and whether relevant records can be collected without unnecessary management filtering. This is a foreseeable challenge in CEO investigations, not a finding that Nvidia employees have withheld information.

Shirley identifies a related warning sign: “Individuals who have stopped accepting feedback and surrounded themselves with yes people? Even harder to control for.” Her observation concerns executive risk generally. It should prompt investigators to examine how dissent and escalation work, without presuming that it describes Huang or Nvidia’s culture. Indeed, Huang’s biographer, Stephen Witt, writing in the NYT, said of Huang, “When you contradicted him, even over the most trivial matter, it was like lighting a fuse. Stick to your position, and soon he exploded, screaming at you for your idiocy. A harangue from Mr. Huang could last an hour or more; his executive staff appeared genuinely afraid of him.”

Second, the investigation may need to examine the company’s response as well as the underlying conduct. A sound scope could include what was disclosed internally, how conflicts were evaluated, who approved relevant business decisions, and the factual basis for public statements. If directors or advisers participated in those decisions, their roles may themselves require examination. The committee must be able to expand the inquiry when evidence warrants it.

Third, important evidence may be outside the company’s control. Records could sit with customers, intermediaries, or individuals abroad. Intelligence allegations introduce a further difficulty: private investigators may lack access to classified information or the government’s underlying sources. Counsel should distinguish facts they established, matters they could not resolve, and issues outside their access. Failing to substantiate an allegation does not disprove it.

Fourth, leadership continuity can complicate judgment. The board’s November 8 statement expressed confidence in Huang when it announced its inquiry, a point also covered by the WSJ also covered. That creates a practical need to show the investigation remains open to findings that require restrictions, remediation, or a leadership change. Directors should assess interim safeguards and delegation options while preserving fair treatment for everyone involved.

Finally, the investigation needs a defensible record. The Department of Justice’s (DOJ’s) Evaluation of Corporate Compliance Programs (ECCP) asks whether investigations are independent, appropriately scoped, properly conducted, and documented, and whether findings lead to action. For a CEO inquiry, the committee should document its mandate, information requests, material limitations, decisions, and reasons for any scope changes. Counsel should address privilege and external reporting from the outset.

A respected law firm can bring experience and rigor. The board must provide the conditions that allow those capabilities to work.

Protect the people doing the compliance work

Shirley also emphasizes direct communication between the CCO and the board, employment protection, and the principle that non-retaliation must extend to people performing compliance work in good faith. That principle has immediate operational consequences. A CCO needs a route to independent directors when an investigation encounters resistance, consistent with the ECCP’s discussion of compliance autonomy and direct board access. Witnesses need confidence that cooperation will not lead to exclusion from projects, adverse evaluations, or other career consequences. Investigators need protection when their findings are inconvenient.

Nvidia’s public code already prohibits retaliation against people who report concerns or cooperate with investigations in good faith. The board’s task is to ensure that the protection operates in practice, including after interviews end.

Shirley’s point about CCO employment contracts merits consideration. Depending on the company and jurisdiction, negotiated terms can clarify reporting access, board involvement in removal, severance, and protections associated with good-faith performance. A contract cannot eliminate retaliation risk or substitute for independent oversight. It can make the consequences of interference more concrete. For a sensitive CEO investigation, independent review of significant employment actions affecting the compliance team and witnesses can help detect retaliation disguised as routine management.

Questions directors and CCOs should answer now

The findings of Nvidia’s investigation remain unknown at this point. Other companies can nevertheless examine their own arrangements without assuming what Nvidia’s investigators will find.

Directors and CCOs should work through five questions:

  1. Who owns CEO risk? Identify the independent director or committee responsible for receiving concerns and deciding how they will be assessed.
  2. How are undisclosed conflicts detected? Test certifications, exception reviews, reporting channels, and follow-up on credible warning signs.
  3. Can investigators obtain the evidence? Establish authority over access, preservation, advisers, and scope, with a process for recording limitations.
  4. Who protects participants? Extend practical non-retaliation safeguards to reporters, witnesses, investigators, and compliance personnel acting in good faith.
  5. Can the board act on uncomfortable findings? Maintain workable delegation and succession options, and document how findings lead to decisions.

Put CEO risk on the next board agenda. Ask the CCO and general counsel to walk directors through a realistic allegation involving the chief executive, from initial report through investigation and remediation. Then test where the process depends on the cooperation of the very person it may need to examine.

In Part 1, we examined Nvidia’s board structure, conflict-of-interest rules, and the challenge of managing CEO risk. Those arrangements face their most demanding test when directors must investigate the executive who leads the business. The next question is how the board turns its oversight authority into a credible process: who directs the inquiry, who controls the evidence, how investigators and witnesses are protected, and what happens if the findings require action against the CEO. Tomorrow in Part 2, we will consider the decisions that make an internal investigation independent, fair, and capable of producing a defensible result.

Categories
Blog

Nvidia Part 2: How a Board Should Investigate Its CEO

Yesterday we examined Nvidia’s board structure, conflict-of-interest rules, and the challenge of managing CEO risk. Those arrangements face their most demanding test when directors must investigate the executive who leads the business. The next question is how the board turns its oversight authority into a credible process: who directs the inquiry, who controls the evidence, how investigators and witnesses are protected, and what happens if the findings require action against the CEO. Even with Jensen Huang’s resignation as CEO of Nvidia, these questions remain critical for every organization. Today I want to look at the decisions that make an internal investigation independent, fair, and capable of producing a defensible result.

A credible allegation involving the chief executive requires directors to make consequential decisions before they know all the facts. They must preserve evidence, identify conflicts, protect participants, and keep the business operating. Each decision can strengthen the investigation or make it harder to trust. But it all starts with your investigative counsel. A serious problem or issue requires seriously good investigative counsel. This almost always means someone outside your regular counsel, who will be seen as truly independent.

At Nvidia, the board announced an independent investigation on November 8 into reports that CEO Jensen Huang had been targeted by foreign intelligence, followed by the retention of Joon H. Kim and Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz on November 10. Reuters reported that no timetable or commitment to publish findings had been announced. Reuters also said it could not independently verify the intelligence allegation, which China denies. That allegation remains unverified; the investigation’s existence does not establish it. The governance lesson is immediate. Directors should design an inquiry that tests competing explanations and supports whatever response the evidence warrants.

Give the committee authority to act.

When allegations concern the CEO, a special committee of directors can establish a clear line of accountability outside the executive’s management structure. An existing committee may be suitable if its members have the independence, capacity, and authority the matter requires.

The board should adopt a written resolution specifying the committee’s mandate. It should authorize access to relevant records and employees, independent advisers, and adequate funding. It should also distinguish authority to investigate and report findings from authority to impose discipline, change leadership, or authorize disclosures. Those powers must fit applicable law and the company’s governing documents. Markel and Murray emphasize documenting that delegation and clarifying whether the committee decides or recommends.

For the CCO, the operational question is straightforward: if investigators encounter resistance from the CEO’s office, who can resolve it? A committee that must obtain the subject’s approval for access, spending, or interviews has an avoidable weakness. Establish an escalation route and require prompt notice of material interference.

Examine independence in the specific matter.

Independence requires examination of the relationships relevant to the inquiry. Directors should disclose financial ties, significant personal relationships, prior advice, and participation in decisions investigators may review. A director who approved a disputed transaction may be an important witness even if otherwise qualified to serve independently.

Delaware cases show why that assessment matters. In Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado, the court required scrutiny of a special litigation committee’s independence, good faith, and investigative basis when the corporation sought to terminate a derivative lawsuit. In In re Oracle Corp. Derivative Litigation, substantial university connections among committee members and defendants prevented the committee from meeting its independence burden. (We should also note that the Financial Times (FT) has reported that Nvidia has no director and officer insurance coverage.)

These decisions address special litigation committees in shareholder litigation. Their procedures do not automatically govern every internal investigation. The practical lesson is nevertheless useful: evaluate the actual relationships, document the reasoning, and reassess membership if the inquiry reaches a director’s own conduct.

Select counsel who can challenge the client.

The committee should select counsel with relevant investigative experience and the capacity to pursue difficult evidence. It should examine the firm’s relationships with the CEO, directors, important counterparties, and the conduct under review. Prior involvement in advising on disputed events deserves particular attention.

American Bar Association, Model Rules of Professional Conduct, Rule 1.7(a)–(b), Conflict of Interest: Current Clients addresses concurrent conflicts, including circumstances where other responsibilities or personal interests may materially limit representation. Counsel must apply the governing jurisdiction’s rules. Directors should also consider whether a proposed engagement would command confidence even where a conflict might be legally waivable.

The engagement letter should identify the client, reporting arrangements, scope, and control of legal advice. If the committee is the client, counsel should report to that committee. The CEO should have separate personal advice where needed. Investigators should not leave anyone believing that the same lawyer is simultaneously protecting every participant’s interests. A firm’s reputation matters. The committee’s willingness to hear unwelcome advice matters just as much.

Define the business questions and preserve the evidence.

A useful scope converts an allegation into questions investigators can answer. For a hypothetical undisclosed executive relationship involving a customer, those questions could include:

  • Was disclosure required, and what was actually disclosed? Have there been other or similar relationships?
  • Did the relationship affect pricing, approvals, access, or other business decisions?
  • Was confidential information accessed or shared outside authorized channels?
  • What did management and directors know, and how did they respond?
  • Were company statements consistent with the information available when they were made?

These are investigative questions, not findings about Nvidia.

The plan should identify relevant periods, people, transactions, records, and jurisdictions. It should permit expansion when evidence supports it and require reasons for material exclusions. In their article, Porter and Garcha stressed that an investigation should evolve as facts emerge while remaining proportionate to the issue.

Preservation must begin promptly. Identify relevant email, messaging platforms, calendars, transaction records, access logs, and business communications on personal devices. Suspend relevant routine deletion where appropriate and verify that collection instructions were implemented. Access and collection must respect applicable privacy, employment, and cross-border requirements.

The U.S. Department of Justice’s Evaluation of Corporate Compliance Programs (ECCP) specifically examines whether business communications can be preserved and accessed, including messages on personal devices and applications. A preservation notice has limited value if the relevant messages continue disappearing.

Where foreign parties or government agencies hold important evidence, record what was requested and what remained unavailable. Private counsel may be able to assess information access and corporate decisions without resolving every intelligence question. The conclusions must reflect those limits.

Manage privilege from the beginning.

The legal purpose of the investigation, its client, and the handling of communications should be established at the outset. A privilege label alone cannot supply protection.

In Upjohn Co. v. United States, the Supreme Court protected qualifying employee communications made to corporate counsel to obtain legal advice. It distinguished those communications from the underlying facts, which do not become privileged merely because someone tells them to a lawyer.

Before interviews, counsel should explain whom they represent, why they are gathering information, who controls any applicable privilege, and that information may be disclosed by the authorized client. The witness should understand that investigating counsel is not their personal lawyer. American Bar Association Model Rules of Professional Conduct, Rule 1.13(f), Organization as Client, specifically addresses explaining the client’s identity when organizational and individual interests are adverse.

Counsel should establish appropriate distribution controls and assess privilege and work-product protection separately under applicable law. Decisions about sharing material with the full board, auditors, insurers, regulators, or the public need legal review. Confidentiality instructions must preserve lawful reporting rights.

Government cooperation also requires careful distinctions. Under DOJ Justice Manual § 9-28.720, Cooperation: Disclosing the Relevant Facts, cooperation credit is not conditioned on waiving privilege or work-product protection; disclosure of relevant facts is the central consideration. Directors should understand the implications before authorizing a report or presentation outside the protected relationship.

Protect witnesses and give the CEO a fair opportunity to respond.

Mary Shirley’s observation in the LinkedIn Post applies throughout the investigation: protection must extend to compliance personnel and others who participate in good faith. The committee should provide a confidential route for reporting interference and arrange independent review of significant employment actions affecting participants. A witness may fear losing a promotion or being excluded from important work long before anyone threatens dismissal. Follow-up should continue after interviews conclude.

Fairness also requires testing evidence that contradicts the allegation. Investigators should distinguish firsthand knowledge from inference, probe inconsistencies, and give the CEO a meaningful opportunity to address material concerns. Counsel should determine interview sequencing and what information can appropriately be shared. The board should expect a reasoned assessment of credibility and competing explanations. Neither executive status nor public criticism should decide the outcome.

Make interim leadership a deliberate decision.

A CEO investigation creates two simultaneous responsibilities: protect the inquiry and maintain business continuity. The board should assess whether the executive’s continued responsibilities create an unacceptable risk of interference, retaliation, further harm, or conflicted decisions. (Once again, Jensen Huang himself answered that question by resigning.) Depending on the facts, safeguards could include recusal from particular transactions, temporary reassignment of approval authority, restrictions on contact about the investigation, or administrative leave.

Document the reasons, the person responsible for implementation, and the conditions that would trigger reassessment. Interim measures should be proportionate and should not be presented as findings of wrongdoing.

If leave or another leadership change becomes necessary, directors should already know who can act, what authority that person holds, and which customer, employee, financing, or regulatory relationships require attention. A successor’s availability should not determine what investigators can find. The CEO should remain able to obtain advice and respond to allegations while the committee controls the investigation.

Document decisions and turn findings into action

The ECCP also asks whether investigations are independent, appropriately scoped, properly conducted, and documented, and whether findings produce an accountable response. Those questions give directors a useful test of the process.

The record should explain committee selection, recusals, scope changes, significant evidence gaps, interim safeguards, and the basis for conclusions. Minutes should capture decisions and reasons, with counsel advising on how to handle privileged legal advice. Volume is a poor substitute for a clear explanation of judgment.

The final assessment should distinguish supported findings from unresolved questions and allegations the evidence did not substantiate. It should identify control failures separately from individual responsibility. A process can require improvement even when an allegation against a particular executive is not established.

Directors should assign each corrective action an owner, deadline, and method for testing completion. Decide what must be reported externally and what can appropriately be communicated to employees and shareholders. Public descriptions should accurately state the inquiry’s scope and conclusions. A narrow investigation should not produce a sweeping public assurance.

Questions for the board and CCO

Before the first substantive committee meeting, directors should be able to answer five questions:

  1. Can the committee act independently? Confirm its membership, delegated powers, funding, and escalation route.
  2. Can counsel pursue adverse evidence? Resolve conflicts and establish who controls instructions and legal advice.
  3. Can the inquiry reach the relevant facts? Verify preservation, access, scope, and a process for documenting limitations.
  4. Can people participate safely? Protect witnesses and investigators while giving the CEO a fair opportunity to respond.
  5. Can the business implement the result? Prepare interim leadership options and assign responsibility for remediation.

The CCO should bring the board a practical exercise: a credible allegation involving the CEO, a critical witness who reports to that CEO, and relevant messages held outside corporate email. Ask directors to identify who makes each decision and where the process could stall. The exercise is complete when the company has resolved those weaknesses and tested whether the revised arrangements work.

Today we examined how a board can investigate its CEO with independence, fairness, and a defensible record. Tomorrow in Blog Post 3 we turn to a related question: what can the public record establish about corporate influence on U.S. chip export policy? For boards and CCOs, the task is to distinguish legitimate advocacy, potential conflicts, and evidence of improper influence. We will examine how export controls are developed, where company input enters the process, and what lobbying disclosures, agency records, congressional testimony, and reliable reporting reveal. Where the record is silent, we will say so. Policy access alone cannot establish why a government decision was made.