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Profit Sharing as Bribery: The Honeywell FCPA Enforcement Action: Part 2 – The King and Bribery Schemes

To close out 2022 in Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) enforcement actions, the Department of Justice (DOJ) and Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) announced settlements of FCPA enforcement actions with Honeywell UOP, a US-based subsidiary of Honeywell International Inc. For its actions, Honeywell agreed to a criminal penalty of about $79 million, with the DOJ crediting up to $39.6 million of the criminal penalty for Honeywell’s payments to authorities in Brazil in related proceedings. The company agreed to pay the SEC $81.5 million in disgorgement and prejudgment interest and the SEC provided for an offset of up to $38.7 million for payments to Brazilian authorities. Yesterday we laid out the broad outlines of the enforcement action. Today, I want to take a deep dive into the bribery schemes.

Bribery Schemes

 1. Brazil and Petrobras

Honeywell’s culture was so corrupt in 2010, when the facts around this matter began, that the business unit dealing with Petrobras could openly lie to the corporate compliance function. As stated in the Deferred Prosecution Agreement (DPA), “On or about May 27, 2010, two Honeywell UOP employees submitted a form requesting that Honeywell’s compliance department approve Brazil Sales Company to serve as Honeywell UOP’s sales agent. To increase the likelihood of receiving internal approvals, the Honeywell UOP employees lied on the request form, stating that Brazil Sales Company had been “known to” Honeywell UOP and a Honeywell UOP employee for two years, when, in fact, the companies had no common history and the Honeywell UOP employee had no prior knowledge of Brazil Sales Company.”

Let’s unpack this for a minute. This is a statement in the DPA, and it speaks to not only how poorly the compliance function was thought of internally but a sales function that openly used lying, cheating and fraud as part of their business practices. But not all blame lies with the business unit as where was the corporate compliance function in their trust but verify role? Apparently non-existent. When you wed a business strategy based on corruption and fraud both internally and externally, you can see where this was headed. By 2010, the corruption rot in Petrobras was well-known literally across the globe and there is no way that the Honeywell compliance function did not know doing business with Petrobras was not high risk.

It was at this early junction that the profit-sharing focus as the basis for the bribe payment was structured, “Honeywell Employee 1 and Intermediary 2 offered to pay Petrobras Official 1 one percent of the expected revenue from the Premium Refinery Contract, or approximately $4 million, in exchange for Petrobras Official 1 using his influence to help Honeywell UOP win the contract. They agreed to use a portion of Brazil Sales Company’s expected three-percent sales commission (approximately $12 million) from Honeywell UOP to pay the $4 million bribe. They also agreed that the remaining $8 million from the sales commission paid to Brazil Sales Company would be divided equally between the Intermediary 1 and Intermediary 2.”

Profit sharing with a cap was the basis for the bribe payment. Capitalism at its finest, only topped by the code name given to the corrupt Petrobras employee, the King. The King provided inside information to Honeywell on pricing and terms which the company used to bring in their bid so it would be the winning bid and Honeywell’s profit sharing with the King could commence.

Just how corrupt (or even more charitably inept) was Honeywell during this time frame? Consider the payment mechanisms outlined in the SEC Order. From 2011 to 2014, the Honeywell “employee responsible for processing the Brazil Agent’s commission payments calculated the Brazil Agent’s commission using numbers from UOP’s invoice and neither asked for nor included an invoice from the Brazil Agent before forwarding the payment request to Honeywell’s accounting group. The payment requests lacked relevant information and when the Brazil Agent changed his company’s name and wanted the commission payments routed to a Swiss bank account in the new company’s name, she forwarded the payment requests without question.” Honeywell was paying from US to Swiss bank accounts to parties with no reported due diligence or even contracts with Honeywell. This was not the compliance function making the payments but corporate accounts payable. Just how big an internal controls failure was this?

3. Algeria and Sonatrach

 This bribery scheme involved Honeywell Belgium and the well-known corrupt third-party agent Unaoil. In 2011, Honeywell Belgium hired Unaoil to help facilitate its relationship with Sonatrach. According to the SEC Order, right out of the box, Unaoil officials received “a panicked phone call from the HPS [Honeywell Belgium] Regional GM asking him to make a pass-through payment to a group of people in Europe who purportedly had helped Honeywell Belgium secure a contract with Sonatrach.” Things only got worse from there for Honeywell Belgium. Unaoil, “on behalf of Honeywell Belgium, paid the Sonatrach official $50,000 from a Swiss bank account and an additional $25,000 from the same Swiss bank account on December 28, 2011.”

Thereafter, Honeywell Belgium and Unaoil agreed to a commission structure of 4.5% for contracts landed by Unaoil with Sonatrach with an amount not to exceed $500,000. While no such work was delivered by Unaoil, it billed Honeywell Belgium a lump sum of $300,000 which was approved internally and paid by finance and “falsely recorded as a sales commission. Through a series of intermediary transfers, the Monaco Agent used a portion of the money from Honeywell Belgium to repay the Consultant who had paid the $75,000 in bribe payments to the Sonatrach official. The series of intermediary transfers involved multiple U.S. correspondent banks located in New York. The Monaco Agent admitted that it recorded the payments with internal codes the Monaco Agent sometimes used for bribe payments.”

Join me tomorrow where I conclude with some lessons learned from this final FCPA enforcement action from 2022.

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Corruption, Crime and Compliance

Episode 248 – Deep Dive into the GOL Brazil FCPA Settlement

The Department of Justice and the Securities and Exchange Commission reached a $41 million settlement with GOL Linhas Aéreas Inteligentes S.A. (“GOL”) to resolve criminal and civil foreign bribery charges. GOL entered into a three-year deferred prosecution agreement (“DPA”) with the DOJ in exchange for payment of a $17 million criminal penalty. DOJ credited $1.7 million of that penalty against a $3.4 million fine that GOL agreed to pay law enforcement authorities in Brazil to resolve charges in Brazil. In a separate resolution, GOL agreed to pay the SEC $24.5 million over two years. The SEC’s initial settlement calculation was for $70 million, but it was reduced to $24.5 million based on GOL’s financial condition. Michael Volkov reviews the DOJ and SEC FCPA settlement actions in this episode.

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Daily Compliance News

August 27, 2022 the Please Don’t Let Me be Misunderstood edition

In today’s edition of Daily Compliance News:

  • Steinmetz-I am misunderstood. (TimesofIsrael)
  • Convicted of corruption, Lula promises to fight corruption. (Reuters)
  • What is ‘The Merge’? (NYT)
  • SEC deletes Trump-era attempt to cut back on whistleblower awards. (WSJ)
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All Things Investigations

All Things Investigations: Episode 8 – ABC Enforcement in Mexico and Brazil with Diego Duran and Salim Saud

 

Welcome to the Hughes Hubbard Anti-Corruption and Internal Investigations Practice Group’s Podcast, All Things Investigations. In this podcast, host Tom Fox and Diego Duran and Salim Saud of the Hughes Hubbard Anti-Corruption & Internal Investigations Practice Group highlight some of the key legal issues involved in white collar and other investigations, both domestically and internationally. 

 

 

Diego Duran is a Hughes Hubbard partner and criminal defense attorney licensed to practice in some parts of the US and Mexico, where he spent several years working for one of its top boutique law firms. Salim Saud is an attorney and partner based in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, at Saud Advogados, in association with Hughes Hubbard. He specializes in anti-corruption and is also the coordinator of the Anti-Corruption Compliance practice at FGV.

Key areas we discuss on this podcast are:

  • The Mexican administration’s approach to anti-corruption investigation and enforcement.
  • Corporate criminal liability is a fairly recent concept in Mexican law.
  • Mexico’s National Digital Platform is anticipated to be a centralized database designed to host and process information about federal and state officials.
  • Brazil has two systems for anti-corruption enforcement; one is led by the CGU and AGU, and the other is led by the NPF.
  • Assessing the impact of COVID-19 on Brazilian anti-bribery and anti-corruption investigation and enforcement efforts. 
  • Highlights of Brazil’s recent regulations surrounding their anti-corruption law, the Clean Companies Act.

Resources

Hughes Hubbard & Reed website 

Diego Duran on LinkedIn

Salim Saud on LinkedIn

 

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Daily Compliance News

June 24, 2022 the Never the Same Edition


In today’s edition of Daily Compliance News:

  • DOJ creates unit with corporate expertise. (WSJ)
  • Nikola founder faces new fraud charges. (Reuters)
  • Why business after Ukraine will never be the same. (CCI)
  • Mexico and Brazil fall behind on ABC efforts. (BBC)
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Blog

Recidivist Tenaris FCPA Resolution

Yet another Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) recidivist was announced last week as the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) announced that Tenaris SA would pay more than $78 million to resolve charges of FCPA violations in connection with a bribery scheme involving its Brazilian subsidiary. Back in 2011, Tenaris entered into a Non-Prosecution Agreement  (NPA) with the Department of Justice (DOJ) and a Deferred Prosecution Agreement (DPA) with the SEC as a result of alleged bribes the company paid to obtain business from a state-owned entity in Uzbekistan. Interestingly even though the company had received sanction from both the DOJ and SEC, there was nothing in the Cease and Desist Order (Order) which indicated that Ternaris self-disclosed this additional FCPA violation nor anything to indicate why it was not uncovered until many years after the bribery scheme was implemented and executed.
Background
According to the SEC Press Release, “the resolution with Tenaris is the result of an alleged bribe scheme involving agents and employees of its Brazilian subsidiary to obtain and retain business from the Brazil state-owned entity Petrobras. Specifically, the order finds that between 2008 and 2013, approximately $10.4 million in bribes was paid to a Brazilian government official in connection with the bidding process at Petrobras. The bribes were funded on behalf of Tenaris’ Brazilian subsidiary by companies affiliated with Tenaris’ controlling shareholder.”
Charles Cain, Chief of the SEC Enforcement Division’s FCPA Unit, said of the resolution, “Tenaris failed for many years to implement sufficient internal accounting controls throughout its business operations despite known corruptions risks. This failure created the environment in which bribes were facilitated through a constellation of companies associated with its controlling shareholder.”
The Bribery Scheme
The bribery scheme was created to create a business opportunity for Tenaris’ operating subsidiary in Brazil, Confab Industrial S.A. (Confab). The bribery scheme was created with a corrupt Petrobras official who “would use his authority to influence Petrobras to forgo an international tender process for certain contracts for pipes and tubes, thereby favoring Confab, by continuing its status as the only domestic supplier, and allowing direct negotiations with it. Confab would benefit through the elimination of international competitors which may have submitted lower bids and forced Confab to lower its price, if not lose the contract altogether.” In exchange the corrupt Petrobras official received “approximately 0.5% of Confab’s revenue from these contracts” which amounted to some $10 million in illegal payments.
The bribery scheme was effectuated through the formation of Uruguayan-domiciled shell company and creation of a  bank account in its name, where bribery payments were deposited. During the relevant period, the bribes were paid into Uruguayan Company’s bank account for the benefit of Government Official. The funding for the bribes came from another Tenaris affiliated company, San Faustin SA, which had bank accounts in the US and elsewhere which funded the bribe. To hide the payments in the Tenaris books and records, fake contracts were executed between Uruguayan Company and the shell company in which payments were made to the Uruguayan Company “for purported past and future consultancy and advisory services that Uruguayan Company performed.” All of this was done with the knowledge of “a senior Confab employee about the bribe scheme including about the timing of bribe payments being deposited into the Uruguayan Company bank account.”
Thoughts
This matter really is a head scratcher. The first thing that jumps out is the time of the bribery scheme, which was 2008-2013. This overlaps the time frame from the 2011 NPA and DPA, which was for conduct from 2007-2010. Although the conduct at issues in those resolutions was centered on bribery and corruption in Central Asia and not Brazil and South America. It is more than difficult to understand how this bribery scheme was not uncovered when the company went through an allegedly comprehensive FCPA investigation for those resolutions.
Even more troubling is that the company continued engaging in bribery and corruption right through the signing of those settlements and the reporting periods set out in both; for two years under both the DPA and NPA. Under both agreements, Tenaris was to turn over evidence of any additional FCPA violations. Obviously Tenaris did not uncover the additional illegal actions, it certainly appears they did not look very diligently either.
Perhaps one answer is found in the undertakings section of the Order which states “During a two-year term as set forth below, Respondent shall report to the Commission staff periodically, at no less than six-month intervals, the status of its remediation and implementation of compliance measures related to the effectiveness of the anti-corruption policies, procedures, practices, internal accounting controls, recordkeeping, and financing reporting processes particularly as to preventing the use of unaccounted funds for illicit purposes to benefit Tenaris, including the use of funds available to Tenaris’ officers, directors, employees and/or agents as a result of their dual affiliation with Tenaris and San Faustin and related entities.” [emphasis supplied]
This sounds suspiciously like a slush fund was operating which allowed Tenaris’ officers, directors, employees and/or agents to make payments across different (but related) entities. Such payments could be easy to disguise and hard to trace. This might be a reason why Tenaris itself did not uncover the illegal payments and why it did not self-disclose to the SEC. This is also something that every Chief Compliance Officer (CCO) needs be on the lookout for your organization.
Tenaris is required to provide two separate follow-up reviews to the SEC. These reviews are to incorporate “comments provided by the Commission staff on the previous report, to further monitor and assess whether the policies and procedures of Respondent are reasonably designed to detect and prevent violations of the FCPA and other applicable anti-corruption laws (the Follow-up Reports).” Additionally, Tenaris is required to “undertake a final review to further monitor and assess the operation of its FCPA and anti-corruption compliance program and whether Respondent’s policies and procedures are reasonably designed to detect and prevent violations of the FCPA and other applicable anti-corruption laws.”  One can only hope Tenaris will be more thorough under this requirement in the Order than it was under the prior NPA or DPA.
Where did the information which led to this recidivist Order derive? Obviously Brazilian prosecutors is one good guess. Another clue is found in the SEC Press Release which stated, “The SEC appreciates the assistance of the Superintendencia del Mercado de Valores (SMV) in Panama, the Brazilian Federal Prosecution Service, and the Procura della Repubblica presso il Tribunale di Milano, Italy.” Panama makes sense as a home of one of the Ternaris family of shell companies.  but note the inclusion of prosecutors from Italy as well.
We can only hope that Tenaris does not become the first three time recipient of a FCPA enforcement action.

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Life with GDPR

André Paris on the Brazilian GDPR


Tom Fox returns for another episode of Life with GDPR. This week, Jonathan Armstrong is on assignment, so we are joined by our colleague André Paris, a Brazilian Privacy and Compliance Consultant, Professor, and Lawyer. Andre is the author of the book “Ethics and Transparency – A Path to Compliance.” He is a specialist in building a Corporate Culture based on Ethics, Transparency, and Respect, with experience in Corporate Risk Analysis and Management and Protecting Corporate Reputation and Crisis Management. He is also an enthusiast of building a more ethical and transparent business environment.
In this episode, we take up the Brazilian national GDPR-like data privacy law.  Some of the issues we consider include:
1.     What is Brazilian law?
2.     Who does it apply to?
3.     What does a compliance program look like?

 Resources

Check out Andre’s book, ETHICS & TRANSPARENCY: A Path To Compliance.

André Paris on LinkedIn

Categories
FCPA Compliance Report

From the Unthinkable to a Culture of Compliance- Lucas Bianchinni on Environmental Compliance in Brazil


In this special podcast series, I visit with lawyers from Azevedo Sette in Sao Paulo. The lawyers and topics include: Isabel Franco on a CarWash changed a culture, Lucas Bianchinni on environmental regulation in Brazil, Glaucia Ferreira on the Clean Companies Act, Luiz Salles on recent Brazilian corruption enforcement actions and Ingrid Santos & Guiliana Boniha on the hottest topic in Brazil: Me Too and sexual/moral harassment. In this second episode, I visit with Lucas Bianchinni about the current state of environmental regulation, enforcement and compliance in Brazil.

  1. With the country’s size and scope in mind, what is the framework for environmental regulation in Brazil, in both criminal and civil?
  2. What are best practices in complying with Brazilian environmental regulations?
  3. Why everything starts with a risk assessment?
  4. What is the risk management process for environmental compliance?
  5. What should US or other non-Brazilian companies expect in the environmental regulatory process?
  6. Many of our listeners are aware of several very high-profile environmental disasters in Brazil. What are some of the lessons from these recent Brazilian cases?

This podcast is sponsored by the law firm of Azevdo Sette. To learn more about this firm, visit its website, for resources, expert guidance and support.

Categories
FCPA Compliance Report

André H. Paris on the Brazilian Compliance Scene

In the Episode, I visit with André H. Paris, a Brazilian Compliance Consultant and Lawyer. He is a specialist in building a Corporate Culture based on Ethics, Transparency and Respect. Paris has experience in Corporate Risk Analysis and Management, as well as in Protecting Corporate Reputation and Crisis Management. He is also quite enthusiastic on building a more ethical and transparent business environment. Paris is the author of the recently released book Compliance – Ethics and Transparency as the Way Forward.  I met Paris at a compliance conference in Brazil last year. I am always interested in the views on compliance from practitioners outside the US, most particularly those who have written on the subject. He came on to the podcast to discuss his book and the current compliance scene in Brazil. Some of the highlights include:

  • Due to the numerous corruption scandals, many Brazilian companies have experienced an extreme reputation crisis.
  • Companies have suffered substantial reputational bumps, including loss of market value, frequent presence on police pages, destroyed careers and thousands of jobs down the drain, as well as a profound brand disruption.
  • Paris believes that many of these risks should never have been taken, seeking results at any cost.
  • One of the challenges is helping the market to understand the need and value of compliance.
  • Additionally, many companies are trying to catch by creating internal structures focused on this compliance.
  • Compliance needs to be further studied and deepened. Paris believes there is the need for constant updating.
  • While the book deals with the main themes of corporate compliance, Paris both in the podcast and in his book does not shy away from expressing his opinions on topics that are often considered controversial.

Resources
To purchase a copy of  Compliance – Ethics and Transparency as the Way Forward (in Portuguese) click here
André Paris LinkedIn Profile