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The Updated CEP: Is Real Credit Finally Here?

Matthew R. Galeotti, Head of the Criminal Division at the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ), recently delivered a speech at SIFMA’s Anti-Money Laundering and Financial Crimes Conference. Contemporaneously, the DOJ issued a Memo (the Galeotti Memo) entitled Focus, Fairness, and Efficiency in the Fight Against White-Collar Crime. I have explored both in previous blog posts. Today, I want to review the Corporate Enforcement and Voluntary Self-Disclosure Policy (CEP) updates. It provides a roadmap for how companies can earn leniency when they self-report wrongdoing. And in an increasingly unforgiving regulatory landscape, that roadmap is worth its weight in gold.

Under the CEP, a company that voluntarily self-discloses, fully cooperates, and timely remediates can qualify for a declination of prosecution, provided there are no aggravating circumstances. This is the reaffirmation of a multi-year DOJ effort to garner more self-disclosures. It gives compliance professionals something real to bring to the C-suite: if we invest in robust compliance and proactively address issues, we can avoid criminal prosecution altogether.

What if aggravating factors exist, such as senior-level involvement or prior misconduct? If the company cooperates and remediates in good faith, the policy still provides for reduced penalties, non-prosecution agreements, and shorter resolution terms. In other words, the DOJ offers a “near miss” safety net for companies that fall short of full eligibility but act responsibly.

The takeaway is clear: Compliance is not just a cost center but a value driver. The CEP recognizes that companies should be rewarded for coming forward, cooperating, and fixing problems. That means compliance professionals must build systems that detect misconduct early, encourage internal reporting, and enable swift action. When a crisis hits, your response will not just shape your company’s future; it may be the difference between a decline and a prosecution.

Voluntary Self-Disclosure

The DOJ’s Criminal Division strongly encourages companies to voluntarily self-disclose potential misconduct as early as possible, even before completing an internal investigation. To qualify under the CEP, a disclosure must meet several key criteria: it must be made to the Criminal Division (or in good faith to another DOJ component involved in the resolution), concern previously unknown misconduct, not be required by any existing legal obligation, and occur before any imminent threat of disclosure or government investigation arises. Additionally, the disclosure must be made within a “reasonably prompt” timeframe, with the company bearing the burden of proving timeliness.

The DOJ proposes a limited exception for the new Corporate Whistleblower Awards Pilot Program. Suppose a whistleblower reports misconduct internally and to the DOJ. In that case, a company may still qualify for the presumption of declination, but only if it self-discloses to the DOJ within 120 days of the internal report and meets all other voluntary disclosure conditions.

This guidance underscores the urgency and importance of real-time reporting mechanisms, strong internal controls, and rapid compliance response protocols. Timely self-disclosure is not just encouraged; it is now a strategic imperative in mitigating enforcement risk.

What is Full Cooperation?

To earn full cooperation credit under the CEP, a company must go beyond the general requirements of the Principles of Federal Prosecution of Business Organizations (Justice Manual 9-28.000) and meet six key obligations:

  1. Disclosure of All Relevant Facts: A company must share all non-privileged, relevant facts it knows, including facts about individuals responsible for the misconduct, regardless of their rank, whether internal or external to the company.
  2. Timely and Specific Information Sharing: This includes facts obtained through any internal investigation, updates during that investigation, and specific attributions of facts to sources. The company must also clearly identify all involved parties.
  3. Proactive Cooperation: Companies must voluntarily disclose relevant facts, even if prosecutors do not specifically request them. They are also expected to alert the DOJ to any avenues of obtaining evidence not in the company’s possession but known to them.
  4. Preservation and Disclosure of Documents: Relevant documents, including overseas ones, must be preserved, collected, and produced. Companies must detail such documents’ origin, custodians, and locations; facilitate third-party productions; and provide necessary translations. The company must prove the restriction if foreign law prevents disclosure and suggest viable alternatives.
  5. De-confliction: Companies must avoid actions that might interfere with DOJ investigations. If requested, they must delay certain investigative steps, such as employee interviews, for a narrowly tailored period to protect DOJ priorities.
  6. Availability of Individuals for Interviews: Subject to constitutional protections, companies must make current and former employees (including those overseas) available for DOJ interviews and facilitate third-party interviews where possible.

These standards ensure that cooperation is meaningful, timely, and valuable to the DOJ’s efforts, rewarding companies that truly support investigations with favorable outcomes under the CEP.

Timely and Appropriate Remediation

Under the CEP, timely and appropriate remediation is a non-negotiable component of earning cooperation credit and potentially avoiding prosecution. And for compliance professionals, it is a clarion call to action. First, the company must conduct a root cause analysis, a genuine examination of what went wrong, why, and how to prevent it from happening again. It’s not about blaming a few bad apples but addressing systemic issues that allowed the misconduct to take root. Did a cultural blind spot develop in a high-risk market? Was there a breakdown in oversight or a failure to escalate red flags? The DOJ expects thoughtful answers and corrective action.

Second, the company must demonstrate an effective compliance and ethics program tailored to its risk profile, business model, and resources. That means more than having policies on the books. DOJ evaluators are looking at leadership’s commitment, compliance’s access to the board, compensation tied to ethical performance, and real-time testing of program effectiveness. Box-checking won’t cut it.

Third, accountability is key. Companies must appropriately discipline wrongdoers, including those who failed in their supervisory duties, and ensure they retain and safeguard business records, including communications on personal devices and ephemeral apps.

Finally, remediation includes showing that the company understands the seriousness of the misconduct and is proactively reducing future risk. This is about culture, not cosmetics.

In short, remediation is proof of your values in action. It is the difference between performative compliance and real commitment. Suppose you’re building a credible compliance program in today’s enforcement environment. In that case, remediation must be embedded in your DNA because the DOJ is watching, and your organization’s future may depend on how you respond.

Providing Cooperation Credit

Finally, there is the cooperation credit. Hopefully, we have finally moved past the Kenneth Polite formulation of super, double-secret, undefined “we know it when we see it” cooperation. Cooperation credit here will be earned through demonstrable, high-quality, timely actions. Cooperation is assessed on a sliding scale based on how extensively and effectively a company supports the government’s investigation. Once a company meets the minimum threshold for cooperation, prosecutors evaluate factors such as scope, quantity, quality, timing, and the overall impact of the cooperation provided.

Importantly, cooperation credit starts at zero and increases only with meaningful contributions, and there is no presumption of full credit. The DOJ now distinguishes between cooperation levels by varying the starting point within the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines fine range, and the percentage of fine reduction awarded. Companies that delay cooperation may significantly reduce their potential credit.

Waiver of attorney-client privilege or work product protections is not required to receive cooperation credit. If a company claims its financial condition limits its ability to cooperate, it must provide supporting documentation. The DOJ will carefully evaluate any such claims. Ultimately, the message is clear: to earn meaningful credit, cooperation must be real, proactive, and sustained. But at least it is now defined and not “We know it when we see it.”

Resources:

CRM White Collar Enforcement Plan

Revised CEP

CRM Monitor Memo

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Daily Compliance News

Daily Compliance News: April 30, 2025, The 4 AM Wake-Up Call Edition

Welcome to the Daily Compliance News. Each day, Tom Fox, the Voice of Compliance, brings you compliance-related stories to start your day. Sit back, enjoy morning coffee, and listen to the Daily Compliance News. All, from the Compliance Podcast Network. Each day, we consider four stories from the business world: compliance, ethics, risk management, leadership, or general interest for the compliance professional.

Top stories include:

  • China will support ‘normal’ business relations with US companies. (WSJ)
  • Don’t yell at your staff. (FT)
  • SFO issues corporate cooperation guidance. (SFO Press Release)
  • Waking up at 4 AM gains traction. (WSJ)
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Monaco Memo: A Jolt for Compliance: Part 3 – Cooperation and Compliance Program Evaluation

Today, we continue our exploration of the Monaco Memo by considering the sections relating to the evaluation of cooperation during the pendency of the investigation and the evaluation of a company’s compliance program at the conclusion of the resolution. These portions of the Monaco Memo should be studied intently by every compliance professional as they lay out what the Department of Justice (DOJ) will require to grant discounts under the FCPA Corporate Enforcement Policy.

Evaluation of Cooperation

Cooperation with the DOJ during the pendency of an investigation has always been a critical factor of the overall costs of a Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) resolution since this factor can be added as a discount under the US Sentencing Guidelines and the FCPA Corporate Enforcement Policy. Essentially a company can double dip in discounts with superior cooperation. Indeed, we have seen companies have the fines and penalties increase by tens of millions when they failed to cooperate.

The Monaco Memo acknowledges what a corporation can obtain by stating, “Cooperation can be a mitigating factor, by which a corporation – just like any other subject of a criminal investigation – can gain credit in a case that is appropriate for indictment and prosecution.” Further, “Credit for cooperation takes many forms and is calculated differently based on the degree to which a corporation cooperates with the government’s investigation and the commitment that the corporation demonstrates in doing so. The level of a corporation’s cooperation can affect the form of the resolution, the applicable fine range, and the undertakings involved in the resolution.”

Principal Associate Deputy Attorney General (DAG) Marshall Miller, recently said in a speech, “I trust one thing came through loud and clear: the Department is placing a new and enhanced premium on voluntary self-disclosure.” This is where the timeliness issue becomes so critical. Miller went on to state, “The DAG also provided important guidance on corporate cooperation. The key point I want to highlight relates to timeliness. In building cases against culpable individuals, we have heard one consistent message from our line attorneys: delay is the prosecutor’s enemy — it can lead to a lapse of statutes of limitation, dissipation of evidence, and fading of memories. The Department will expect cooperating companies to produce hot documents or evidence in real time. And your clients can expect that their cooperation will be evaluated with timeliness as a principal factor. Undue or intentional delay in production of documents relating to individual culpability will result in reduction or denial of cooperation credit. Where misconduct has occurred, everyone involved — from prosecutors to outside counsel to corporate leadership — should be “on the clock,” operating with a true sense of urgency.”

Miller fleshed out the Monaco Memo regarding this DOJ expectation when he intoned that the DOJ expects “cooperating companies to produce hot documents or evidence in real time.” Moreover, “The key point I want to highlight relates to timeliness.” This could mean literally when you find a smoking, still hot or even cold gun you had better pick up the phone and call the DOJ. Finally, when it comes to cooperation credit the DOJ will evaluate companies “timeliness as a principal factor.” It cannot be stated any plainer or more simply than that.

Evaluation of Corporate Compliance Programs

Equally important for compliance professionals was the section on evaluating compliance program. The DOJ has presented significant information to the compliance community with the release of the 2019 Evaluation of Corporate Compliance Programs and its 2020 Update. The Monaco Memo recognizes these documents as key components for the DOJ to review compliance programs of companies under investigation. Moreover, although there is no compliance defense to prosecution of illegal conduct, such compliance programs have “a direct and significant impact on the terms of a corporation’s potential resolution with the Department.”

To that end, the Monaco Memo directs prosecutors to “evaluate a corporation’s compliance program as a factor in determining the appropriate terms for a corporate resolution, including whether an independent compliance monitor is warranted. Prosecutors should assess the adequacy and effectiveness of the corporation’s compliance program at two points in time: (1) the time of the offense; and (2) the time of a charging decision. The same criteria should be used in each instance.”

However, the Monaco Memo focused attention on an area given little weight previously in determining the effectiveness of an effective compliance program, that being clawbacks. While compensation, particularly in the form of bonus or other compensation based on positive compliance actions, has long been a part of a best practices compliance program (the carrot) we have not previously seen its equivalent disincentive (the stick).

The Monaco Memo stated, “Corporations can best deter misconduct if they make clear that all individuals who engage in or contribute to criminal misconduct will be held personally accountable. In assessing a compliance program, prosecutors should consider whether the corporation’s compensation agreements, arrangements, and packages (the “compensation systems”) incorporate elements ­ such as compensation clawback provisions – that enable penalties to be levied against current or former employees, executives, or directors whose direct or supervisory actions or omissions contributed to criminal conduct. Since misconduct is often discovered after it has occurred, prosecutors should examine whether compensation systems are crafted in a way that allows for retroactive discipline, including through the use of clawback measures, partial escrowing of compensation, or equivalent arrangements.” This is a change.

Miller expanded on this when he said the DOJ would start with two questions:

  1. Has the company clawed back incentives paid out to employees and supervisors who engaged in or did not stop wrongdoing?
  2. Is the company targeting bonuses to employees and supervisors who set the right tone, make compliance a priority, and build an ethical culture?

Miller went on to add, “What we expect now, in 2022, is that companies will have robust and regularly deployed clawback programs. All too often we see companies scramble to dust off and implement dormant policies once they are in the crosshairs of an investigation. Companies should take note: compensation clawback policies matter, and those policies should be deployed regularly. A paper policy not acted upon will not move the needle — it is really no better than having no policy at all.”

My suggestion is that you develop a clawback policy and write it into the contracts of your senior management going forward.

I hope you will join me tomorrow where I look at guidance around monitors and monitorships.