Categories
FCPA Compliance Report

Oracle FCPA Enforcement Action

In this episode, I take on a solo pod to discuss and consider the Oracle FCPA enforcement action brought by the Securities and Exchange Commission.

Key areas we discuss on this podcast are:

  • Background facts.
  • Same facts in same country?
  • Failure of a paper program.
  • The need for data analytics.
  • Where is the DOJ?
  • What are the lesson learned going forward?

 Resources

For a White Paper on the Oracle FCPE enforcement action, email tfox@tfoxlaw.com

Categories
Compliance Into the Weeds

The Oracle FCPA Enforcement Action

Compliance into the Weeds is the only weekly podcast that takes a deep dive into a compliance-related topic, literally going into the weeds to more fully explore a subject. In this episode, we look at the recently announced SEC Foreign Corrupt Practices Act enforcement action involving Oracle. Highlights include:

  1. Recidivist behavior in some countries with similar schemes.
  2. Policy, procedure, and internal controls failures.
  3. Why no monitor.
  4. Compliance programs lessons learned.
  5. What about the DOJ?

 Resources

Matt in Radical Compliance

Tom in the FCPA Compliance and Ethics Blog

  1. Background
  2. The Schemes in Action
  3. Parking in India
  4. The Comeback and DOJ
  5. What it all means
Categories
Blog

Oracle: FCPA Recidivist Part 2 – Schemes in Action

Oracle Corporation now joins the ignominious group of Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) recidivists. Last week, in a Press Release, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) announced an enforcement action which required Oracle to pay more than $23 million to resolve charges that it violated the FCPA when “subsidiaries in Turkey, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), and India created and used slush funds to bribe foreign officials in return for business between 2014 and 2019.” The recidivist label comes from the sad fact that the SEC sanctioned Oracle in connection with the creation of slush funds.

In 2012, Oracle resolved charges relating to the creation of millions of dollars of side funds by Oracle India, which created the risk that those funds could be used for illicit purposes. This means we have a company using the same scheme, in the same country only two years after the resolution of another FCPA violation. Yesterday, I laid out the broad parameters of the bribery schemes so that compliance professionals could study them in detail to determine if they need to review their programs. Today, we consider the schemes as they were used in the three countries identified in the SEC Order as Turkey, UAE and India.

Turkey

According to the SEC Order, there were three types of bribery schemes in Turkey; the VAD Accounts, the 112 Project and the SSI Deals. Under the VAD Accounts, as discussed yesterday, “Oracle Turkey employees routinely used the slush funds to pay for the travel and accommodation expenses of end-user customers, including foreign officials, to attend annual technology conferences in Turkey and the United States, including Oracle’s own annual technology conference.” These slush funds “were also used to pay for the travel and accommodation expenses of foreign officials’ spouses and children, as well as for side trips to Los Angeles and Napa Valley.”

All of this means that Oracle Turkey was not only engaging in bribery and corruption during the time from the 2012 enforcement action, but carried it on for seven years after the conclusion of the 2012 enforcement action. It was also done with the full knowledge and support of the Turkey country manager. Finally, since at least 2007, it was well known that payment for the travel and accommodation expenses of foreign officials’ spouses and children, as well as payment for side trips made by foreign officials was clear FCPA violation.

112 Project involved an attempt by Oracle Turkey to win a lucrative contract with Turkey’s Ministry of Interior (“MOI”) related to the ongoing creation of an emergency call system for Turkish citizens, the “112 Project”; hence the internal Oracle terminology. 112 Project was designed to appear as a business trip to Oracle’s home office (then in California) related to Oracle’s bid on the project. However, it turned out the trip was a sham to hide boondoggle travel for four MOI officials. The alleged business meeting at the corporate headquarters lasted only 15 minutes and for the rest of the week, the Turkey Sales Representative entertained the MOI officials in Los Angeles and Napa Valley and then took them to a “theme park” (I wonder what ‘theme park’ there could be in the greater Los Angeles area?) Once again, this type of sham travel has long been identified as FCPA violative.

Finally, there were the SSI Deals. These involved the same Turkish Sales Representative as in 112 Project and directed cash bribes to officials at Turkey’s Social Security Institute (“SSI”). This corrupt sales representative had the temerity to maintain a spreadsheet tracking how much potential margin he could create from a discount request six months before he finalized a deal with the SSI in 2016. To fund the bribe payments, he used the VAR Program we previously detailed which claimed a discount was needed to beat the competition. However, the bid was a sole source bid limited to Oracle products.

In another corrupt transaction, once again the same Turkey Sales Representative used another VAR to create a slush fund for SSI officials related to a database infrastructure order. His spreadsheet showed an excessive margin of approximately $1.1 million, only a portion of which was used to purchase legitimate products such as software licenses.

UAE

Using the rather amazing code name of ‘Wallets”, Oracle UAE employees paid for the travel and accommodation expenses of end customers, including foreign officials, to attend Oracle’s annual technology conference in violation of Oracle’s internal policies. As noted in the Order, in 2018 and 2019, an Oracle UAE sales account manager paid approximately $130,000 in bribes to the State-Owned Enterprise’s (SOE) Chief Technology Officer (CTO) to obtain six different contracts over this period. The first three bribes were funded “through an excessive discount and paid through another entity (“UAE Entity”) that was not an Oracle approved VAR for public sector transactions and whose sole purpose was to make the bribe payments. For the final three deals, the UAE Entity was the actual entity that contracted with the UAE SOE despite the fact that Oracle’s deal documents represented an Oracle approved partner as the VAR for the deal.”

India

In perhaps the most incredulous scheme, Oracle India sales employees used an excessive discount scheme for a transaction which was owned by the Indian Ministry of Railways. Oracle India claimed a discount was needed based on competition but “the Indian SOE’s publicly available procurement website indicated that Oracle India faced no competition because it had mandated the use of Oracle products for the project.” Once again, a spreadsheet was made that indicated $67,000 was the “buffer” available to potentially make payments to a specific SOE official. A total of approximately $330,000 was made available for payments and another $62,000 was paid to an entity controlled by the sales employees responsible for the transaction.

Please join me tomorrow where I look back at the 2012 Oracle FCPA enforcement action to see what, if anything, Oracle learned from that sordid tale.

Categories
Daily Compliance News

August 3, 2022 the Bringing Corruption Back edition

In today’s edition of Daily Compliance News:

  • Trump allies seek to reinstitute patronage to the civil service. (Politico)
  • Corruption in the Italian judiciary. (GAB)
  • Of wildfires and compliance. (WSJ)
  • Bribery allegation against Rick Pitino. (com)
Categories
The Corruption Files

How Corruption Happens in Tech

Thomas Fox and Michael DeBernardis discuss the inner workings of bribery in the tech industry, specifically cases involving HP, Microsoft, and Panasonic, the DOJ and SEC driving home the benefits of voluntary disclosure and their response to future cases, and how companies can practice due diligence even within internal controls.

Key points discussed in the episode:

✔️ Thomas Fox gives a brief background on the cases involving HP, Microsoft, and Panasonic.

✔️ Michael DeBernardis lays out the DOJ and SEC’s investigative process, with a focus on the benefits of voluntary disclosure. Data analytics has also been tossed in the forefront as Microsoft pioneered the transparency of looking into their distributor models and has now been added to compliance guidelines.

✔️ Petty cash has been proven to be an aspect worth examining as HP’s bribery case revolved around the lack of controls. HP’s schemes in Germany and Mexico also emphasized why training your team – whether contractual or full-time – should be trained to handle high-risk situations.

✔️ Internal and compliance controls must be interconnected. Otherwise, wrongdoers will find loopholes and take advantage of them. Making sales to a foreign government also means putting a target on your back.

✔️ Thomas Fox goes into detail about Panasonic’s case regarding corrupt agents, Microsoft’s move towards transaction monitoring, and HP’s suspicious commission discounts coinciding with the Parker Drilling case.

✔️ The DOJ has now provided clear guidance for compliance. Companies are now encouraged to fully disclose their transactions to benefit them in terms of credibility and reduced total penalties.

✔️ Greatly improving their responses, the DOJ has understood the value of cooperation and voluntary disclosure and widened its body of FCPA cases, making it easier for lawyers to counsel companies in preventing future issues from happening.

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Do you have a podcast (or do you want to)? Join the only network dedicated to compliance, risk management, and business ethics, the Compliance Podcast Network. For more information, contact Tom Fox at tfox@tfoxlaw.com.

Categories
Blog

Glencore Resolution: Part II – The FCPA Action

Last week, the Attorney General and a host of other Department of Justice (DOJ) officials announced the settlement of a massive Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) and market manipulation case against Glencore plc (Glencore). Over the next several blog posts, I will be reviewing the matter and mining it for lessons learned for the compliance community. Today, in Part II, we consider the bribes paid by Glencore in violation of the FCPA.
The case involved massive bribery and corruption perpetrated by Glencore in multiple countries by multiple subsidiaries, involving multiple executives at the highest levels of the company. The resolution with the DOJ imposed $429 million in criminal penalties and forfeiture of $272 million. According to the FCPA Blog (who as usual broke the story for the compliance community), “as part of the U.S. resolution, a subsidiary of Glencore also agreed to plead guilty and pay $485.6 million to resolve market manipulation investigations by the DOJ and the Commodity Futures Trading Commission. After crediting about $166 million of that payment to amounts to be paid in the UK and possibly other countries, penalties assessed in the United States will be just over $1 billion.”
According to the Information,  Glencore engaged in a conspiracy for over a decade to pay more than $100 million to third-party intermediaries, while intending that a significant portion of these payments would be used to pay bribes to officials in several countries including Nigeria, Cameroon, Ivory Coast, Equatorial Guinea, Brazil, Venezuela, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC).
According to the DOJ Press Release, “Between approximately 2007 and 2018, Glencore and its subsidiaries caused approximately $79.6 million in payments to be made to intermediary companies in order to secure improper advantages to obtain and retain business with state-owned and state-controlled entities in West Africa, including Nigeria, Cameroon, Ivory Coast, and Equatorial Guinea. Glencore concealed the bribe payments by entering into sham consulting agreements, paying inflated invoices, and using intermediary companies to make corrupt payments to foreign officials.”
Nigeria
In Nigeria, Glencore and its UK subsidiaries entered into multiple agreements to purchase crude oil and refined petroleum products from Nigeria’s state-owned and state-controlled oil company. Glencore and its subsidiaries engaged two intermediaries to pursue business opportunities and other improper business advantages, including the award of crude oil contracts, while knowing that the intermediaries would make bribe payments to Nigerian government officials to obtain such business. In Nigeria alone, Glencore and its subsidiaries paid more than $52 million to the intermediaries, intending that those funds be used, at least in part, to pay bribes to Nigerian officials.
What is most striking about reading the Information is how mundane the actions of Glencore were in this massive bribery and corruption scheme. The scheme itself went on for over 10 years and was directly supported by executives at the highest levels of the company. The schemes involved the creation of sham third parties which used sham contracts to make sham payments that were designed to be paid as bribes to corrupt Nigerian officials. Although not clear from the Information, it appears that one entity, identified as ‘West African Intermediary Company’, was engaged to identify corruption Nigerian officials to bribe. They were called ‘business opportunities.’
Illegal payments were made to access oilfields and to purchase crude oil itself. Often the latter was done by undervaluing the pricing for a cargo of crude oil or outright bribery to get the crude oil itself. Bribe payments were called “newspapers or journals or pages”. Another scheme was called the ‘Swap Agreement’ where money was funneled to the West African Intermediary Company who would then resell the crude oil to Glencore UK subsidiaries for distribution throughout the UK and beyond. Payments were made though US banks (thereby creating US and FCPA jurisdiction) disguised as campaign contributions and hidden in Switzerland and Cyprus banks.
Cameroon, Ivory Coast and Equatorial Guinea
In Cameroon, Ivory Coast and Equatorial Guinea, Glencore paid over $27 million in bribes over a multi-year period. The same basic bribery schemes, sham third parties, contracts and payments, were used involving the West African Intermediary Company to pay bribes to corrupt government officials. However, there was an interesting wrinkle for bribes paid in these countries which was the maintenance of a “Cash Desk” in both London and Baar, Switzerland. From these offices cash payments were made to officials in these countries.
Democratic Republic of Congo
In the DRC, Glencore admitted that it conspired to corruptly offer and pay approximately $27.5 million to third parties, while intending for a portion of the payments to be used as bribes to DRC officials to secure improper business advantages. The improper business advantages were around audits required of Glencore’s mining operations in the country. When Glencore received an audit notice from the DRC government, the company would simply pay a bribe to have the audit notice quashed and no audit would occur. Additionally, Glencore paid a straight $500,000 to have a corrupt judge wrongfully dismiss a lawsuit against the company. The bribe was paid through a corrupt lawyer, who falsely billed the company for $500,000 worth of never-delivered legal services and then used the monies to pay the bribe.
Brazil and Venezuela
Glencore also admitted to bribery of officials in Brazil and Venezuela. In Brazil, the bribes were paid in the heyday of Petróleo Brasileiro S.A. (Petrobras) before Operation Car Wash blew the lid off the corrupt culture of Brazil’s national energy concern. The primary scheme in Brazil was to overpay for crude oil from Petrobras in terms of a “price that included a built-in delta” which represented the bribe amount. Here a corruption agent was used to facilitate this bribe and all communications were through personal email accounts that somehow eluded oversight or employer monitoring. Once again payments were made through US banks adding to the US jurisdiction. In Venezuela, the scheme was a bit different as the goal was not the obtaining of crude but late payments due Glencore from Petróleos de Venezuela, S.A. (PdVSA) and demurrage fees as well. Bribes were paid to PdVSA officials to secure out of line payments.
Tomorrow we will consider the Commodity Price Manipulation Case.

Categories
Blog

Glencore FCPA Resolution, Part I-Introduction

“The rule of law requires that there not be one rule for the powerful and another for the powerless; one rule for the rich and another for the poor.  The Justice Department will continue to bring to bear its resources on these types of cases, no matter the company and no matter the individual.” That was Attorney General Merrick B. Garland, who announced the resolution of an enforcement action involving Glencore plc and related entities.
When Attorney General Merrick Garland has a Press Conference to announce a settlement you know it is significant. We were certainly treated to that last week when the AG and a host of other Department of Justice (DOJ) officials announced the settlement of a massive Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) and market manipulation case against Glencore plc. (Glencore). Over the next several blog posts, I will be reviewing the matter and mining it for lessons learned for the compliance community. Today, in Part I, we review and announcement and basic facts of the matter.
The case involved massive bribery and corruption perpetrated by Glencore in multiple countries by multiple subsidiaries, involving multiple executives at the highest levels of the company. As stated in the DOJ Press Release, “Glencore, acting through its employees and agents, engaged in a conspiracy for over a decade to pay more than $100 million to third-party intermediaries, while intending that a significant portion of these payments would be used to pay bribes to officials in several countries, including Nigeria, Cameroon, Ivory Coast, Equatorial Guinea, Brazil, Venezuela, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC).”
The resolution with the DOJ imposed $429 million in criminal penalties and forfeiture of $272 million. According to the FCPA Blog (who as usually broke the story for the compliance community), “as part of the U.S. resolution, a subsidiary of Glencore also agreed to plead guilty and pay $485.6 million to resolve market manipulation investigations by the DOJ and the Commodity Futures Trading Commission. After crediting about $166 million of that payment to amounts to be paid in the UK and possibly other countries, penalties assessed in the United States will be just over $1 billion.”
As was noted by U.S. Attorney Damian Williams, “The scope of this criminal bribery scheme is staggering.  Glencore paid bribes to secure oil contracts.  Glencore paid bribes to avoid government audits.  Glencore bribed judges to make lawsuits disappear.  At bottom, Glencore paid bribes to make money—hundreds of millions of dollars.  And it did so with the approval, and even encouragement, of its top executives.  The criminal charges filed against Glencore in the Southern District of New York are another step in making clear that no one – not even multinational corporations—is above the law.”
Assistant Attorney General Kenneth A. Polite, Jr. said that “Glencore’s guilty pleas demonstrate the Department’s commitment to holding accountable those who profit by manipulating our financial markets and engaging in corrupt schemes around the world.  In the foreign bribery case, Glencore International A.G. and its subsidiaries bribed corrupt intermediaries and foreign officials in seven countries for over a decade. In the commodity price manipulation scheme, Glencore Ltd. undermined public confidence by creating the false appearance of supply and demand to manipulate oil prices.”
U.S. Attorney Vanessa Roberts Avery said: “Glencore’s market price manipulation threatened not just financial harm, but undermined participants’ faith in the commodities markets’ fair and efficient function that we all rely on.  This guilty plea, and the substantial financial penalty incurred, is an appropriate consequence for Glencore’s criminal conduct, and we are pleased that Glencore has agreed to cooperate in any ongoing investigations and prosecutions relating to their misconduct, and to strengthen its compliance program company-wide.  I thank both our partners at the U.S. Postal Inspection Service for their hard work and dedication in investigating this sophisticated set of facts and unraveling this scheme, and the Fraud Section, with whom we look forward to continuing our fruitful partnership of prosecuting complex financial and corporate criminal cases.
FBI Assistant Director Luis Quesada added, the “guilty pleas by Glencore entities show that there is no place for corruption and fraud in international markets.  Glencore engaged in long-running bribery and price manipulation conspiracies, ultimately costing the company over a billion dollars in fines. The FBI and our law enforcement partners will continue to investigate criminal financial activities and work to restore the public’s trust in the marketplace.”
The matter also involved enforcement actions in multiple countries. In the UK, Glencore also had “charges brought against it by the U.K.’s Serious Fraud Office (SFO) and reached separate parallel resolutions with the Brazilian Ministério Público Federal (MPF) and the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC). Under the terms of the plea agreement, the department has agreed to credit the company over $256 million in payments that it makes to the CFTC, to the Court in the U.K. as well as to authorities in Switzerland, in the event that the company reaches a resolution with Swiss authorities within one year.”
SFO Director Lisa Osofsky, said in a Press Release, “This significant investigation, which the Serious Fraud Office has brought to court in less than three years, is the result of our expertise, our tenacity and the strength of our partnership with the US and other jurisdictions. “We won’t stop fighting serious fraud, bribery and corruption, and we look forward to the next steps in this major prosecution.”
Interestingly, the plea agreement requires Glencore to retain two compliance monitors for three years. This is a very significant development, which ties to the DAG Lisa Monaco speech from October 2021. We will consider the implications as well in greater detail.
Tomorrow we will consider the bribery schemes.

Categories
Blog

Cookies, Chocolates and IP: The Stericycle FCPA Enforcement Action – Part II

Earlier this week, the Department of Justice (DOJ) and Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) announced a Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) enforcement action, involving the waste management company, Stericycle, Inc. (Stericycle). According to the Information and Deferred Prosecution Agreement(DPA), Stericycle entered into a three-year DPA. The company was charged with two counts of conspiracy to violate (1) the anti-bribery provision of the FCPA, and (2) the FCPA’s books and records provision. Under the DPA, Stericycle agreed to a criminal penalty of $52.5 million of which the DOJ agreed to credit up to one-third of the criminal penalty against fines the company pays to authorities in Brazil in related proceedings. According to the SEC Cease and Desist Order (Order), Stericycle violated the anti-bribery, books and records, and internal accounting controls provisions of the FCPA and agreed to pay approximately $28.2 million in disgorgement and prejudgment interest. The SEC Order also provided for an offset of up to approximately $4.2 million of any disgorgement paid to Brazilian authorities. In today’s post we will consider the bribery schemes.
The Problem
According to the Order, Stericycle got into FCPA hot water when it initially entered the Latin America market in 1997 and then rapidly expanded through the acquisition of many local businesses in Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico. Stericycle operated through wholly-owned subsidiaries in Brazil (“Stericycle Brazil”), Mexico (“Stericycle Mexico”), and Argentina (“Stericycle Argentina”). The prior local business owners continued to run the operations in each country. Each country had an executive team that reported to, among others, a former Stericycle executive responsible for all of Latin America (the “LatAm Executive”). The LatAm Executive reported directly to executives at Stericycle’s corporate headquarters. If all of this sounds familiar to readers of this blog, it was this similar fact pattern which brought the UK company WPP to FCPA grief as well.
Moreover, as the company grew in Latin America through acquisition, it failed to implement even the most basic internal controls for compliance. The Order noted, “the accounting processes and systems remained mostly decentralized with neither uniformity nor proper oversight, resulting in internal control deficiencies.” To top it all off, “Stericycle had no centralized compliance department and failed to implement its FCPA policies or procedures prior to 2016.” Clearly compliance was not something that was of the least interest to the company and it clearly contributed to an overall culture of corruption as a business practice. Finally, the corporate office, in the form of the LatAm Executive, “signed and transmitted numerous sub-certification letters in which they falsely stated that they were not aware of any actual or potential material event in their region, including any actual or alleged violation of any applicable law.”
The Bribery Schemes
The bribe payments were allegedly hidden through the use of code words for bribery. ‘Little pieces of chocolate in Brazil’, ‘IP’ or incentive payments in Argentina and ‘cookies’ in Mexico. In Brazil, the bribes paid were usually a percentage of the contract value, although occasionally it was a simple fixed fee. The DPA noted, “as part of the scheme, Stericycle Brazil employees agreed upon bribe payments in return for receiving payment priority on certain invoices owed under contracts with government agencies; the bribe payments were typically a percentage of the invoice amount owed or a fixed amount. The entire Brazilian business unit was apparently in on the scam as Stericycle Brazil sales employees, who used the cash to make bribe payments to government officials in different regions.” But it was not the BD folks who were running this bribery, as the “Stericycle Brazil finance employees prepared bank orders in the names of the Stericycle Brazil sales employees, who would retrieve the money from the bank and deliver the cash funds—often through an intermediary—to government officials associated with government customers.”
But it did not even stop there. According to the Order, in 2012, “Stericycle Brazil executives formed a sham third-party vendor that purportedly provided accounts receivable collection services to Stericycle Brazil, which were never provided. Rather, the sham third-party vendor issued false invoices that Stericycle Brazil used to support the bribe payments in its books and records. Each month, Stericycle Brazil finance employees estimated the amount of cash withdrawals attributable to the bribe payments. At the end of the month, Stericycle Brazil finance employees requested false invoices from the sham third-party vendor in the amount of the preceding month’s estimated cash withdrawals used for bribes. These invoices for purported debt collection services concealed the true purpose of the payments. The invoiced amounts were recorded in Stericycle’s general ledger, and the cash withdrawals appeared in company bank statements. In 2015, a Stericycle Brazil executive formed two other sham third-party vendors to continue the same scheme.”
To top it all off, all of the above was documented in company books and records. The finance employees “maintained spreadsheets which identified the government customers receiving bribes and the corresponding amount (either a set percentage of revenue or fixed amount), and the Stericycle Brazil employee responsible for retrieving the cash and delivering the bribe payments either directly or through a third-party intermediary. The spreadsheets contained entries, organized by month and region, of both the total amount of bribes paid and the amounts of the fake invoices used to provide cover for cash withdrawals. The Stericycle Brazil finance employees stored these spreadsheets on Stericycle’s servers, and the Stericycle Brazil executives and the LatAm Executive had knowledge of the payments by, among other things, receiving one or more copies of these spreadsheets.”
Just to reiterate, the finance team was preparing fraudulent money orders for employees to cash to create a pot of money to pay a bribe. Additionally, business unit executive themselves created a sham vendor to generate false invoices to also create pots of money to pay bribes, all of which was documented in the company’s books and records. This is not some pedestrian bribery scheme. This is a business unit which has systematized bribery as a business process.
In Mexico, this same basic format was used but with a twist. There was not a sham vendor or vendors. Here the corrupt LatAm Executive formed a joint venture (JV) which the company entered into to form Stericycle Mexico. It was all documented by spreadsheets which “identified invoices from approximately 45 third-party vendors which purported to provide otherwise undocumented consulting and market research services. The spreadsheets linked invoices to payments to government officials, including the name of the customer and calculation of the bribe as a fixed amount or percentage of the customer’s invoice value. Some spreadsheets also detailed the recipient of the bribe and method of delivery (cash versus wire transfer). These spreadsheets were sent to, among others, the LatAm Executive and a Stericycle Mexico executive on Stericycle’s servers.”
In Argentina, the specific method of how the cash was generated to pay the bribes was not report. The DPA noted, the “Argentina Country Management calculated and approved bribe payments, which were typically paid in cash by Stericycle Argentina sales employees. For example, on occasions when a bribe needed to be paid, a Stericycle Argentina sales employee emailed an estimate of the bribe payment, which was typically a percentage of the underlying contract payment. Upon approval of the payment, the Stericycle Argentina sales employee obtained cash from the Stericycle Argentina office in Buenos Aires and subsequently delivered the bribe payment to the foreign official.” These payments were called “alfa” and “alfajores”, a traditional cookie popular in Argentina.
Join us tomorrow where we look at the fallout and then the comeback.

Categories
Blog

Cookies, Chocolates and IP: The Stericycle FCPA Enforcement Action – Part I

The Department of Justice (DOJ) and Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) announced a Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) enforcement action. To say that the respondent company, Stericycle, Inc. (Stericycle) had a culture of non-compliance throughout its entire Latin American (LATAM) business unit belies those companies which only have a dysfunctional culture. Stericycle had a culture of corruption burned into the DNA of the LATAM business unit which was so thorough that it was documented via bribery spreadsheets and analysis of revenue based on payments of bribes in LATAM.
Yet even with this corrupt culture, Stericycle also demonstrated how a company can take advantage of the discounts available under the FCPA Corporate Enforcement Policy by extensive cooperation and remediation during the pendency of the FCPA investigation, as the criminal penalty reflects a 25% reduction off the bottom of the applicable US Sentencing Guidelines fine range.
The Stericycle enforcement action also provides insights into how the DOJ will implement the remarks made by Lisa Monaco last October on their new approach to FCPA enforcement. Finally, Stericycle agreed to a two-year corporate monitor under both the DOJ and SEC settlements. In short, there is much to unpack from this enforcement action which I will do so over the next few blog posts.
According to the Information and Deferred Prosecution Agreement (DPA), Stericycle entered into a three-year DPA. Stericycle agreed to a criminal Information, which charged the company with two counts of conspiracy to violate (1) the anti-bribery provision of the FCPA, and (2) the FCPA’s books and records provision. Stericycle agreed to a criminal penalty of $52.5 million. According to the DOJ Press Release, the DOJ agreed to credit up to one-third of the criminal penalty against fines the company pays to authorities in Brazil in related proceedings, including an amount of approximately $9.3 million to resolve investigations by the Controladoria-Geral da União (CGU) and the Advocacia-Geral de União (Attorney General’s Office). According to the SEC Press Release, Stericycle consented to the SEC’s cease-and-desist order that it violated the anti-bribery, books and records, and internal accounting controls provisions of the FCPA, and agreed to pay approximately $28.2 million in disgorgement and prejudgment interest. The SEC’s order provides for an offset of up to approximately $4.2 million of any disgorgement paid to Brazilian authorities.
Assistant Attorney General Kenneth A. Polite, Jr. of the Justice Department’s Criminal Division said in the DOJ Press Release, “Stericycle today accepted responsibility for its corrupt business practices in paying millions of dollars in bribes to foreign officials in multiple countries. The company also maintained false books and records to conceal corrupt and improper payments made by its subsidiaries in Brazil, Mexico, and Argentina. Today’s resolution demonstrates the Department of Justice’s continuing commitment to combating corruption and protecting the international marketplace.”
Assistant Director Luis Quesada of the FBI’s Criminal Investigative Division said, “Today’s resolution with Stericycle shows that the FBI and our international law enforcement partners will not allow corruption to permeate domestic or international markets. The consequences of violating the FCPA are clear: Companies that bribe foreign officials for business advantage will be held accountable.” Finally, Eric I. Bustillo, Director of the SEC’s Miami Regional Office, said in the SEC Press Release, “Stericycle rapidly expanded in Latin America without any meaningful oversight or compliance measures, as evidenced by widespread bribery schemes lasting for many years in most of its Latin America operations. Companies in pursuit of global expansion cannot disregard the need for appropriate controls.” Damning words all but they had lessons for the compliance professional from this matter.
As part of the DPA, Stericycle has agreed to continue to cooperate with the department in any ongoing or future criminal investigations relating to this conduct. This could well mean additional criminal charges may be brought against any number of individuals known to the DOJ, as identified in the Information. In Brazil, the following persons, Stericycle LATAM Executives 1 & 2, Stericycle Brazilian Executives 1-3, and Stericycle Argentina Executive 1 were named in the Information. Also interesting was the active assistance of sister anti-corruption enforcement groups in Brazil and Mexico, which were both identified by the DOJ and SEC as helping.
It was also interesting to note that under the DOJ Press Release, it noted that while “Stericycle has taken extensive remedial measures, it has not fully implemented or tested its enhanced compliance program, necessitating the imposition of an independent compliance monitor for a term of two years. Stericycle agreed to continue to enhance its compliance program and to retain an independent compliance monitor for two years, followed by self-reporting to the department for the remainder of the term.”
Regarding the final settlements with the DOJ and SEC; they both agreed to their respective resolutions with Stericycle based on several factors, including, among others, the company’s failure to voluntarily and timely disclose the conduct that triggered the investigation and the nature, seriousness, and pervasiveness of the offense. Although Stericycle did not self-disclose their illegal conduct to the DOJ or SEC, they did receive full credit for cooperation with both the agency investigations and engaged in extensive remedial measures. As noted above, this led to a 25% discount off the range suggested under the Sentencing Guidelines, saving Stericycle between $25 million to $30 million from their final criminal fine.
Finally, the Stericycle FCPA enforcement action is notable for the company’s use of code words to discuss bribery in its routine emails and other business correspondence. While chocolates and incentive payments (IPs) have been used before by other companies, cookies are now added to the bribery lexicon as a moniker for payment bribes.
Join us in our next blog where we consider the bribery schemes.

Categories
Compliance Kitchen

Bribery in Defense Industry


A CEO of a major US government defense contractor is charged with bribery. The Kitchen reviews the DOJ release – drop in for more.