Deputy Attorney General (DAG) Lisa O. Monaco gave a Keynote Address at ABA’s 36th National Institute on White Collar Crime last week (Monaco Speech). Her remarks were noted by many commentators, including on Compliance Into the Weeds where Matt Kelly and myself took a deep dive into her speech in a rare emergency podcast. Her remarks reframed a discussion about this Department of Justice’s (DOJ) priorities on white collar criminal enforcement, including under the Foreign Corrupt Practices (FCPA). Her remarks should be studied by every compliance professional as they portend a very large change in the way the DOJ and potentially other agencies enforce the FCPA. This has significant implications for every Chief Compliance Officer (CCO), compliance professional and corporate compliance programs.
Today, I am going to take up the third change announced by Monaco, the use of corporate monitors. I asked Affiliated Monitors Inc., (AMI) founder Vin DiCianni for his thoughts around the remarks on monitors. He said, “For Affiliated Monitors this refreshed approach by DAG Monaco highlights the seriousness which businesses must place on the investment in their programs and in addressing what has for some been a negative experience with a monitor. For those who might be the subject of a monitorship, DAG Monaco recognized that the negativity that has sometimes surrounded monitorships as being punitive, should be seen in a different light bringing value, pointing a way forward and as a solution which has had great success in resolving matters.”
In 2021, we have seen several enforcement actions which seemed quite well suited for monitors.Of course, the DOJ recently announced that some companies have been failing to live up to their settlement resolutions and have proposed the extension of current monitorships. Monaco echoed this sentiment stating, “Recently, two different multinational corporations separately announced that each had received a breach notification from the Justice Department.”
Monaco’s remarks may well have been tailored to these 2021 FCPA resolutions and companies in breach of their settlement obligations when she stated, “In recent years, some have suggested that monitors would be the exception and not the rule. To the extent that prior Justice Department guidance [Benczkowski Memorandum] suggested that monitorships are disfavored or are the exception, I am rescinding that guidance. Instead, I am making clear that the department is free to require the imposition of independent monitors whenever it is appropriate to do so in order to satisfy our prosecutors that a company is living up to its compliance and disclosure obligations under the DPA or NPA. Of course, the decision to use monitors must also include consideration of how the monitorship is administered and the standards by which monitors are expected to do their work. And the selection of monitors will continue to be accomplished in a fashion that eliminates even the perception of favoritism. The department will study how we select corporate monitors, including whether to standardize our selection process across the divisions and offices.”
Monaco went on to explain several reasons for need for the increased use of monitorships. The first is in the area of recidivist offenders. However, this is beyond simply recidivist FCPA offenders and ties into another part of the Monaco speech. It deals with the DOJ taking into account the full panoply of corporate misconduct which might lead to tax investigations, import control enforcement actions or any anti-trust concerns to resolve any FCPA enforcement action. It all seems to me to be around the issue of trust. Monaco stated, “Stepping back, any resolution with a company involves a significant amount of trust on the part of the government. Trust that a corporation will commit itself to improvement, change its corporate culture, and self-police its activities. But where the basis for that trust is limited or called into question, we have other options. Independent monitors have long been a tool to encourage and verify compliance.” If the DOJ cannot trust you to follow the law in some areas, it may not trust you to fulfill your compliance obligations under a FCPA resolution.
Earlier in her speech Monaco talked at length on the importance of corporate culture. She noted, “But corporate culture matters. A corporate culture that fails to hold individuals accountable, or fails to invest in compliance — or worse, that thumbs its nose at compliance — leads to bad results. Let me also be clear: a company can fulfill its fiduciary duty to shareholders and maintain a commitment to compliance and lawfulness. In fact, companies serve their shareholders when they proactively put in place compliance functions and spend resources anticipating problems. They do so both by avoiding regulatory actions in the first place and receiving credit from the government. Conversely, we will ensure the absence of such programs inevitably proves a costly omission for companies who end up the focus of department investigations.”
When taken as a whole, Monaco’s speech says that once again, the DOJ wants companies to be good corporate citizens. Moreover, it all starts with culture and flows from there. If a company puts making a quarterly number above all else, that becomes the corporate culture and employees will do whatever is necessary to accomplish this goal. Conversely, if the values of the company are to do business ethically and in compliance, that will be taken into account. This ups the ante for corporations which find themselves in an FCPA investigation or enforcement action.
Join us tomorrow when we consider Monaco’s remarks on corporate culture.
Tag: DOJ
Deputy Attorney General (DAG) Lisa O. Monaco gave a Keynote Address at ABA’s 36th National Institute on White Collar Crime last week (Monaco Speech). Her remarks were noted by many commentators, including on Compliance Into the Weeds where Matt Kelly and myself took a deep dive into her speech in a rare emergency podcast. Her remarks reframed a discussion about this Department of Justice’s (DOJ) priorities on white collar criminal enforcement, including under the Foreign Corrupt Practices (FCPA). Her remarks should be studied by every compliance professional as they portend a very large change in the way the DOJ and potentially other agencies enforce the FCPA. This has significant implications for every Chief Compliance Officer (CCO), compliance professional and corporate compliance programs.
The key changes announced in the Monaco Speech were as follows: (1) “today I am directing the department to restore prior guidance making clear that to be eligible for any cooperation credit, companies must provide the department with all non-privileged information about individuals involved in or responsible for the misconduct at issue. To be clear, a company must identify all individuals involved in the misconduct, regardless of their position, status or seniority.” This portends a return to the strictures of the Yates Memo. (2) “The second change I am announcing today deals with the issue of a company’s prior misconduct and how that affects our decisions about the appropriate corporate resolution. (3) The final change I am announcing today deals with the use of corporate monitors.” This final change is a rejection of the strictures laid out in the Benczkowski Memo regarding the DOJ use of corporate monitorships.
Today, I am going to take up the first change, a reinstitution of the Yates Memo requirement that companies turn over information and evidence of any and all employees involved in the illegal conduct. In her speech, then DAG Sally Yates said the following, “Effective immediately, we have revised our policy guidance to require that if a company wants any credit for cooperation, any credit at all, it must identify all individuals involved in the wrongdoing, regardless of their position, status or seniority in the company and provide all relevant facts about their misconduct. It’s all or nothing. No more picking and choosing what gets disclosed. No more partial credit for cooperation that doesn’t include information about individuals.” This statement ties directly into the first point of the Yates Memo, which has the title “To be eligible for any cooperation credit, corporations must provide to the Department all relevant facts about the individuals involved in corporate misconduct.” The Trump Administration DOJ had relaxed this requirement to those ‘substantially involved”. Monaco said some of the reasons for the change included:
- Such distinctions are confusing in practice and afford companies too much discretion in deciding who should and should not be disclosed to the government.
- Such a limitation also ignores the fact that individuals with a peripheral involvement in misconduct may nonetheless have important information to provide to agents and prosecutors.
- The department’s investigative team is often better situated than company counsel to determine the relevance and culpability of individuals involved in misconduct, even for individuals who may be deemed by a corporation to be less than substantially involved in misconduct.
- To aid this assessment, cooperating companies will now be required to provide the government with all non-privileged information about individual wrongdoing.
What this means in practice is that an internal investigation must focus on individuals from the start of an investigation, regardless of whether the investigation begins civilly or criminally. Moreover, once a case is underway, the inquiry into individual misconduct can and should proceed in tandem with the broader corporate investigation. Delays in the corporate case will no longer suffice as a reason to delay pursuit of the individuals involved. For the CCO or compliance practitioner, this means the entire focus of your investigative protocol must now change. Previously an investigation was to determine how conduct that might have violated the FCPA occurred and then focus on how to remedy it. The first step a CCO or compliance practitioner would take when sufficient evidence was developed would be to fix the problem so that it did not occur going forward. If there were compliance program or internal control weaknesses, they would be immediately fixed so that neither the original perpetrators could continue the conduct but also so others could not take advantage of any such structural weakness.
The reinstitution of this requirement by DAG Monaco demonstrates that the DOJ expects you to bring them information about all individuals who can be prosecuted going forward. Monaco’s remarks also demonstrate the DOJ expects you to turn over your own employees. This means DOJ want companies to give up senior executives involved in illegal conduct. As Yates said back in 2015 “We’re not going to be accepting a company’s cooperation when they just offer up the vice president in charge of going to jail.” One of the difficulties around the FCPA requirement for a criminal prosecution or intent. How do you determine intent in a manner where senior executives may never have been involved directly in a transaction? Does this mean insufficient tone at the top will somehow morph into intent for a FCPA prosecution? It appears that the DOJ is either no longer comfortable in companies and their counsel making this decision or wants to take over this assessment.
In addition to these prongs, I found point three from Monaco very interesting. The DOJ has been criticized by commentators and even the bench for the turning over of the internal investigation process to companies and their hired law firms. This prong 3 may be a way for the DOJ to respond to these critiques. It should be the DOJ which makes the assessment of potential culpability and potential enforcement, not internal investigators. It bears reiterating Monaco on this point, “The department’s investigative team is often better situated than company counsel to determine the relevance and culpability of individuals involved in misconduct, even for individuals who may be deemed by a corporation to be less than substantially involved in misconduct.”
Whatever the reason for the change, the Biden Administration is rejecting the light touch of the prior administration as led by former DAG Rod Rosenstein and later Brian Benczkowski. It appears this could be the first step to try and beef up FCPA individual enforcement and drive home the message that this administration is serious about the fight against international corruption. There were other developments from the Monaco Speech that I will take up in subsequent blogs this week.
Where I end up this week in this series, I do not yet know. Every time I read the speech, I see new angles for exploration. However, I promise that next up I will look at the rejection of the Benczkowski Memo’s default position that no monitorship would be used in FCPA enforcement actions or settlements.
In today’s edition of Daily Compliance News:
- When a dysfunctional culture turns deadly.(WSJ)
- DOJ changes enforcement posture. (Compliance into the Weeds)
- More trouble for the SFO. (Ethixbase)
- Did Trump SPAC deal skirt laws? (NYT)
Compliance into the Weeds is the only weekly podcast which takes a deep dive into a compliance related topic, literally going into the weeds to more fully explore a subject. Today, Matt and Tom have a rare emergency podcast on DAG Lisa Monaco’s speech to the ABA White Collar Institute on some very significant change to white collar, including FCPA enforcement. Some of the issues we consider are:
- Return to the Yates Memo.
- Disavowal of the Benczkowski Memo.
- Change in the FCPA Corporate Enforcement Policy?
- Whither recidivists?
- New enforcement tools coming?
- New review of DPAs and NPAs?
Resources
Matt in Radical Compliance, Justice Dept. Unveils Big Compliance Shifts
Text of DAG Monaco Speech
Last week, Credit Suisse Group AG settled a massive fraud action involving a non-existent Mozambiquan tuna boat fleet. While Texans have long had a fond place in their hearts for our convicted con man Billy Sol Estes, who defrauded the US federal government out of millions with his tales of nonexistent fertilizer tanks, faked mortgages and bogus cotton-acreage allotments; Billy Sol Estes was a piker compared to the bankers at Credit Suisse, the bank itself and the thoroughly corrupt politician running the country of Mozambique in creating and selling a loan package eventually totaling some $850 million for tuna boats that never existed. Over the next few blogs, I will be looking at the Credit Suisse enforcement action which involved the Department of Justice (DOJ), Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and UK Financial Conduct Authority (FCA).
US Attorney Breon Peace for the Eastern District of New York, noted, in the DOJ Press Release, “Over the course of several years, Credit Suisse, through its subsidiary in the United Kingdom, engaged in a global criminal conspiracy to defraud investors, including investors in the United States, by failing to disclose material information to investors, including millions of dollars in kickbacks to its bankers and a high risk of corruption, in connection with an $850 million fraudulent loan to a Mozambique state-owned entity.” According to Anita B. Bandy, Associate Director of the SEC’s Division of Enforcement, speaking in the SEC Press Release, “Credit Suisse provided investors with incomplete and misleading disclosures despite being uniquely positioned to understand the full extent of Mozambique’s mounting debt and serious risk of default based on its prior lending arrangements. Fraud was also a consequence of the bank’s significant lapses in internal accounting controls and repeated failure to respond to corruption risks.”
This enforcement action scorched the tattered reputation of the Swiss banking giant. Three Credit Suisse employees had previously pled guilty to receiving kickbacks as a part of the fraud. The FCA noted in its Press Release, “The contractor secretly paid significant kickbacks, estimated at over US$50 million, to members of Credit Suisse’s deal team, including two Managing Directors, in order to secure the loans at more favourable terms. While those Credit Suisse employees took steps to deliberately conceal the kickbacks, warning signs of potential corruption should have been clear to Credit Suisse’s control functions and senior committees. Time and again there was insufficient challenge within Credit Suisse, or scrutiny and inquiry in the face of important risk factors and warnings. The Republic of Mozambique has subsequently claimed that the minimum total of bribes paid in respect of the two loans is around US$137 million.”
The overall settlement was for a total of $475 million paid to the DOJ, SEC and FCA and an additional forgiveness of $200 million in debt held by Credit Suisse against the country of Mozambique, which the FCA took into account in determining its financial penalty. The Bank also agreed to a methodology to calculate proximate fraud loss for victims of its criminal conduct; the amount of restitution payable to victims will be determined at a future proceeding. The DOJ Press Release also noted that “Switzerland’s Financial Market Supervisory Authority (FINMA) also engaged in an enforcement action, which includes the appointment of an independent third-party to review the implementation and effectiveness of compliance measures for business conducted in financially weak and high-risk countries, subject to FINMA’s administrative process.” This means the bank will be up for a very high-profile monitorship.
Relatedly, the SEC Order stated the monies paid to the SEC under its profit disgorgement penalty “will be distributed to harmed investors, if feasible through a Fair Fund. The Commission will hold funds paid pursuant to paragraph IV.B [in the Order] in an account at the United States Treasury pending a decision whether the Commission in its discretion will seek to distribute funds. If a distribution is determined feasible and the Commission makes a distribution, upon approval of the distribution final accounting by the Commission, any amounts remaining that are infeasible to return to investors.”
Credit Suisse also agreed to resolve its case with the FCA, qualifying it for a 30% discount in the overall penalty. Without the debt relief and this discount, the FCA would have imposed a significantly larger financial penalty.” However, the conduct of Credit Suisse with the US enforcement agencies was certainly suboptimal. The DOJ noted that the bank failed to voluntarily disclose the conduct to the department, the overall the nature and seriousness of the offense, which included the involvement of bankers up to the Managing Director level. Moreover, “Credit Suisse received only partial credit for its cooperation with the department’s investigation because it significantly delayed producing relevant evidence. Accordingly, the total penalty reflects a 15% reduction off the bottom of the applicable U.S. Sentencing Guidelines range.”
There is a lot to unpack in this matter and I will be doing so in the next several blogs. Moreover, there is much for the compliance practitioner to digest from the case. From some of the basics like due diligence, to internal controls, the lines of defense and an overall risk management protocol, this case has quite a bit to offer. All I can say is that if Billy Sol Estes were around, he sure would be looking at Credit Suisse and its toxic culture as a way to defraud an entire new set of investors out of a pile of money.
Join us tomorrow as we look at due diligence in international deal making.