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Monaco Memo: A Jolt for Compliance: Part 1 – Introduction

Last week saw the announcement of two significant and related releases of information from the Department of Justice (DOJ) around Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) enforcement and corporate compliance programs. They were the Monaco Memo and a Speech by Assistant Attorney General Kenneth A. Polite made at the University of Texas Law School. Every compliance professional should study them both.

Over the next several days, I will be blogging about each of them and other DOJ announcements. I will also have a series of podcasts about different aspects of the releases with a variety of guests including Affiliated Monitors, Inc. (AMI) founder Vin DiCianni, Morrison & Foerster LLP (MoFo) partner James Koukios and my Compliance into the Weeds co-host, Matt Kelly. The Memo is broken down into four main sections: I. Guidance on Individual Accountability; II. Guidance on Corporate Accountability; III. Independent Compliance Monitorships; and IV. Commitment to Transparency in Corporate Criminal Enforcement. Today I want to introduce each release and try to place it into the overall context of DOJ communications to the compliance community, compliance professionals and Chief Compliance Officers (CCOs).

The Monaco Memo builds on many of the topics first articulated by Deputy Attorney General (DAG) Lisa Monaco last October in a speech to the ABA White Collar Bar conference. Koukios said he had two major reactions to the Monaco Memo. First, “I think it’s great when the department puts out a Memo like this, that lays out very clearly.” It sets out the DOJ expectations which Koukios believes the DOJ strives to do for the corporate compliance professional and the white-collar defense bar, which they have done so in an iterative matter. From releases of documents such as the Phillips Memo, to the FCPA Corporate Enforcement Policy to the Evaluation of Corporate Compliance Program and its Update. He added, “I think this is another one of those really helpful memos that sets out the factors that the DOJ will consider.”

He sees the Monaco Memo going further by delineating the implications of the factors it sets out.  He went on to note, “I think that there is a lot more in this Memo than there have been in some other, more recent memos.” Moreover, it lays out multiple changes at both “a high level and at the more granular level as well.” Koukios concluded, “I think it’s a very impactful Memo that practitioners’ compliance officers and other people dealing with this space really should spend time reading and understanding.”

I visited with DiCianni on the Independent Compliance Monitorships component. DiCianni believes the Monaco Memo is both further clarification and further guidance for line prosecutors when they are considering whether or not to put a monitor in place. Echoing Koukios in this section of the Memo, he noted that it lays out both broad goals and guidelines and then drills down into specific requirements in a way “we’ve  never seen before.” Further, while many of the factors “are really quite interesting there are not really anything new and from the monitors perspectives.” And while we have seen these factors in a disparate manner, in disparate places, “here they are in writing.” Once again this echoed something Koukios told me, that perhaps the greatest significance is that the Memo sets down all of these matters in writing which leads to a blueprint for DOJ thinking and a roadmap for anyone who finds themselves in an FCPA investigation or enforcement action.

I see the Monaco Memo and the Speech as complimentary releases which drive home several key changes in DOJ enforcement. Perhaps changes is too strong, but they these announcements make clear the DOJ is dedicated to individual accountability and prosecution. Corporations will have to reorient their approach to investigations and sharing of information with the DOJ to this new approach. Next the DOJ is strongly shifting the burden in the investigatory and negotiation phases to make clear the company must come forward with evidence to support lower fines and penalties and greater discounts, particularly in the area of individual financial penalties and incentives, i.e., clawbacks. Finally, the Monaco Memo lays out not simply how to avoid a monitor but a program of proactive monitoring which can lead to the prevention of a crime before the FCPA is violation.

The Memo itself said that the DOJ had established the Corporate Crime Advisory Group (“CCAG”)  to evaluate and recommend further guidance and consideration after the Monaco Speech from October 2021. This CCAG included leaders and experienced prosecutors from “components of the Department that handle corporate criminal matters: the Criminal Division; the Antitrust Division; the Executive Office of United States” to both evaluate and provide “revisions and reforms to enhance our approach to corporate crime, provide additional clarity on what constitutes cooperation by a corporation, and strengthen the tools our attorneys have to prosecute responsible individuals and companies.”

The DOJ review considered input from “a broad cross-section of individuals and entities with relevant expertise and representing diverse perspectives, including public interest groups, consumer advocacy organizations, experts in corporate ethics and compliance, representatives from the academic community, audit committee members, in-house attorneys, and individuals who previously served as corporate monitors, as well as members of the business community and defense bar.”

The Memo itself is designed to “promote consistency across the Department” by applying it  Department-wide. Some announcements establish the first-ever DOJ-wide policies on certain areas of corporate crime, “such as guidance on evaluating a corporation’s compensation plans; others supplement and clarify existing guidance. The policies set forth in this Memorandum, as well as additional guidance on subjects like cooperation, will be incorporated into the Justice Manual through forthcoming revisions, including new sections on independent corporate monitors.”

I hope you will join me tomorrow where I look at individual accountability and internal investigations.

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Daily Compliance News

September 16, 2022 the DOJ Brings Clarity Edition

In today’s edition of Daily Compliance News:

  • DOJ announces changes to enhance cooperation. (NYT)
  • Legalized pot spawned a wave of corruption in CA. (LATimes)
  • Can ‘the Merge’ save crypto? (NYT)
  • Can the company deny promotion to the bearded man? (WaPo)
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All Things Investigations

All Things Investigations: Episode 11 – The GC Role in CCO Certification with Mike Huneke

 

Welcome to the Hughes Hubbard Anti-Corruption and Internal Investigations Practice Group’s Podcast, All Things Investigations. In this podcast, host Tom Fox and returning guest Mike Huneke of the Hughes Hubbard Anti-Corruption & Internal Investigations Practice Group, highlight some of the key legal issues in white collar investigations, locally and internationally.

 

 

Mike Huneke is a partner in the firm’s Washington office. Among many other things, Mike advises clients on the navigation and resolution of multi-jurisdictional criminal or Multilateral Development Bank (MDB) anti-corruption investigations, assisting companies subject to post-resolution monitorships or other commitments, and designing and executing risk-based strategies for due diligence on third parties.

 

Key areas we discuss on this podcast are:

  • Explaining the new CCO certification policy the DOJ has released.
  • The DOJ has likely made changes to CCO certification policy due to a significant feeling of mistrust about the adequacy of some companies’ compliance with the terms of settlements.
  • How has the DOJ evolved?
  • Reasonableness is not a factual basis. 
  • Companies with full transparency are unlikely to have conflicts due to the recent changes in CCO certification.
  • What is the role of the monitor?

 

Resources

Hughes Hubbard & Reed website 

Mike Huneke

 

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Daily Compliance News

August 19, 2022 the Back Off Edition

In today’s edition of Daily Compliance News:

  • Razak’s lawyer can’t withdraw. (Bloomberg)
  • DOJ wants other FirstEnergy investigations to ‘back off.’ (Ohio Capital-Journal)
  • JBS shakes up the compliance team. (WSJ)
  • Purpose-driven, then not. (Reuters)
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The Compliance Life

Scott Garland – Becoming a Professional Responsibility Officer

The Compliance Life details the journey to and in the role of a Chief Compliance Officer. How does one come to sit in the CCO chair? What skills does a CCO need to navigate the compliance waters in any company successfully? What are some of the top challenges CCOs have faced, and how did they meet them? These questions and many others will be explored in this new podcast series. Over four episodes each month on The Compliance Life, I visit with one current or former CCO to explore their journey to the CCO chair. This month, I am joined by Scott Garland, Managing Director at AMI. Scott came to AMI from the DOJ, where he held the role of Professional Responsibility Officer. As he described, it was akin to a CCO role for the US Attorney’s Office for Massachusetts.

It was at the US Attorney’s Office for the District of Massachusetts where Garland moved into the Professional Responsibility Officer role. In this role, he was the Office’s primary expert on legal ethics, but his remit extended to constitutional issues and DOJ regulations. Some typical issues he dealt with included conflicts of interest, allegations/findings of lawyer misconduct, dealing with represented parties, handling confidential or privileged information, and liaising with oversight agencies.

Resources

Scott Garland’s Profile on AMI

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Daily Compliance News

August 13, 2022 the Bain Ashamed edition

In today’s edition of Daily Compliance News:

  • Hoskins wins appeal. (Reuters)
  • Bain ashamed of its corrupt work in South Africa. (Bloomberg)
  • Salmon Rushdie attacked in America. (BBC)
  • Classified documents removed from Mar-a-Lago. (WSJ)
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Compliance Into the Weeds

What is a ‘Reasonably Designed’ Compliance Program

Compliance into the Weeds is the only weekly podcast that takes a deep dive into a compliance-related topic, literally going into the weeds to more fully explore a subject. In this episode, we explore the new requirements for CCO certification by considering what is meant by the term ‘reasonably designed’ compliance program. Highlights include:

·      What does ‘reasonably designed’ mean in practice and the eyes of the DOJ?

·      Should the DOJ articulate a standard?

·      Are CCOs certifying under greater risk?

·      What have other thought leaders opined?

·      Does this standard impact ‘effective’ compliance programs?

Resources

Matt in Radical Compliance

Categories
The Compliance Life

Scott Garland – To the DOJ and the Computer Crime & Intellectual Property and National Security Unit

The Compliance Life details the journey to and in the role of a Chief Compliance Officer. How does one come to sit in the CCO chair? What skills does a CCO need to navigate the compliance waters in any company successfully? What are some of the top challenges CCOs have faced, and how did they meet them? These questions and many others will be explored in this new podcast series. Over four episodes each month on The Compliance Life, I visit with one current or former CCO to explore their journey to the CCO chair. This month, I am joined by Scott Garland, Managing Director at AMI. Scott came to AMI from the DOJ, where he held the role of Professional Responsibility Officer. As he described, it was akin to a CCO role for the US Attorney’s Office for Massachusetts.

With a knack for understanding technology, relating it to legal issues, and translating it for lawyers, judges, and juries, Garland went to the DOJ, working at Main Justice in Computer Crime & Intellectual Property Section in DC. His work there included criminal investigations and trials, policy analysis, and drafting manuals. From that position, he moved to Boston to the US Attorney’s Office for the District of Massachusetts. He began in the Cybercrime Unit, then National Security Unit, eventually becoming NSU’s Deputy Chief, then Acting Chief of the Unit. Along the way, he picked up a variety of advisory responsibilities: identity theft coordinator, committee on dealing with cooperating witnesses, and grand jury supervisor.

Resources

Scott Garland’s Profile on AMI

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Blog

Would You Buy a New Car From Them? Part 2 – Lessons for Compliance

Over this series, I am reviewing the corruption enforcement action Involving the company formerly known as Chrysler Group LLC, now FCA US LLC (Chrysler or the company herein) which was criminally sentenced to pay a fine of over $96 million and a forfeiture money judgment over $203 million. These amounts were above a previous civil penalty of $310 million. All of this was for designing a vehicle emissions system for the company’s Jeep Grand Cherokee and Ram 1500 that would evade federal emissions standards for diesel vehicles and then lying about it to federal authorities. It was a different type of corruption from a Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) enforcement action but corruption, nonetheless. Today, I want to consider some of the lessons for the anti-corruption compliance professional.

The actions by the company are instructive for what not to do in any corruption investigation. The Plea Agreement specified that the company did not receive credit for self-disclosure as it did not self-disclose its criminal conduct or fraud. The company did receive some cooperation credit for cooperating during the scope of the investigation but did not receive any credit for failures in both taking timely remedial action and for failing to discipline senior executives who were involved in or had knowledge of the criminal action and fraud. (Recall that one executive involved directly in the fraud was with the company until 2020.)

All these actions were very costly to the company in terms of how it was evaluated under the US Sentencing Guidelines. Under Section 8(C)2.5(g)(2) a company can receive credit of up to five (5) points for cooperating in the investigation and affirmatively accepting responsibility for it’s conduct. The company only received a two (2) point discount. Since the Plea Agreement specified the company did cooperate in the investigation, it clearly did not accept responsibility for its conduct. The lack of those three points in discount cost the company somewhere in the estimated range of $20 to $30 million in additional fines and penalties.

The Plea Agreement also specified for the first time the Monaco Doctrine of evaluating past conduct as a part of the overall evaluation of the company. The Plea Agreement detailed that the company had a prior criminal conviction for bribery and corruption under the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) for bribing union officials. However, it is not clear how that worked into the overall fine and penalty except to note that the company paid the maximum under the US Sentencing Guidelines, after credit for the civil penalty.

Additionally, while there is no requirement for a monitor in this resolution of the criminal action, there was a such a requirement in the Consent Decree from the civil action. It mandated an Independent Compliance Auditor for a period of three years from the resolution of the civil matter, which was May 2019.

Lessons Learned

There are multiple lessons for the anti-corruption compliance professional from this enforcement action. Obviously, the need to engage in robust remediation for the matter at issue and your compliance program is critical. Moreover, and once again the Department of Justice (DOJ) criticized a company for tardiness in disciplining those who were involved in the fraud or those who were aware of it. As I noted in Part 1, multiple former company employees were criminally indicted for their conduct in this sordid affair. Yet some of them were with the company until 2019 and 2020 and not all were terminated, some left the company in voluntary separations, which sounds suspiciously like retirements. Such actions could save your organization literally millions of dollars.

One of the clearest, which was not stated in any of the resolution documents, was that every Chief Compliance Officer (CCO) needs to read the newspapers and stay abreast of current events in their industry. It was September 2015 that the Volkswagen (VW) emissions-testing scandal became public. It was by far the largest scandal in emissions-testing and cost VW billions in investigative and remediation costs, fines, penalties, buy-backs, market share loss and reputational damages. To say that anyone at the company was not aware of it is to simply defy belief.

Beyond just the CCO, every Board member was no doubt aware of the VW emissions-testing scandal. Under the current state of the Caremark Doctrine, there may well be a duty to make an inquiry by the Board of auto manufacturers to senior management to investigate if they have been involved in similar conduct. Here we do not know how the scandal got to the attention of the DOJ, but it was clear from the Plea Agreement, it was not from self-disclosure. CCOs and Boards need to be much more proactive when competitors get into trouble about investigating similar products or services which could lead to criminal and civil fines and penalties.

This matter warrants consideration by every CCO in every US public and private company. Every CCO can also use the case as instruction and training for both senior management and their company Board of Directors.

Resources

DOJ Press Release

Information

Plea Agreement

Consent Decree from the civil action

Categories
Blog

Would You Buy a New Car From Them? Part 1 – Background

Corruption comes in all shapes, sizes and forms. It is certainly far beyond bribery made illegal under the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) and UK Bribery Act. I was reminded of this fact this week and the company formerly known as Chrysler Group LLC, now FCA US LLC (Chrysler or the company herein) was criminally sentenced to, according to a Department of Justice (DOJ) Press Release, “pay a fine of $96,145,784; and a forfeiture money judgment of $203,572,892. The court also imposed a three-year term of organizational probation.” About all I can say after reading the Press Release and underlying  Information and  Plea Agreement is that both Lee Iacocca and Walter Chrysler are both turning over in their graves now.

The Plea Agreement detailed a series of corruption so deep and systemic within the organization that it is a wonder anyone ever wanting any type of clean diesel vehicle would ever purchase a Chrysler again (even if it is re-monikered an ‘FCA US LLC’ vehicle). Indeed, the over $300 million criminal assessment was only after a $310 million civil penalty. This means over $600 million in civil and criminal fines and penalties before we even get to pre-resolution investigative costs and post-resolution remediation. If you apply the standard multiplier of pre and post settlement costs of two to five X; you can see the company paid a very large price for its conduct.

The basic facts of the case and actions by Chrysler included deliberately creating a vehicle designed to evade and defeat emissions testing from at least 2010 up to 2017, some two years after the Volkswagen emission testing scandal broke. In addition, Chrysler engineers and others intentionally lied to the US government during the emission certification process. Finally, the conduct of Chrysler after the scandal broke was so forlorn the company did not receive full credit for full cooperation or in accepting full responsibility for its actions.

The underlying facts were as disheartening to read as any I have recently come across. According to the Information, beginning at least as early as 2010, Chrysler developed a new 3.0-liter diesel engine for use in FCA US’s Jeep Grand Cherokee and Ram 1500 vehicles to be sold in the United States. They were marketed as “clean EcoDiesel” vehicles with best-in-class fuel efficiency. However, and to the contrary, the company installed software features and engaged in other deceptive and fraudulent conduct intended to avoid regulatory scrutiny all the while “maintaining features that would make them more attractive to consumers, including with respect to fuel efficiency, service intervals, and performance.”

According to the Information, the company purposely calibrated the emissions control systems on the vehicles to produce less NOx emissions during the federal test procedures, or driving “cycles,” than when the vehicles were being driven by customers under normal driving conditions. But as the Press Release noted, Chrysler took it several steps further as it “engaged in deceptive and fraudulent conduct to conceal the emissions impact and function of the emissions control systems from its U.S. regulators and U.S. customers by (a) submitting false and misleading applications to U.S. regulators to receive authorization to sell the vehicles, (b) making false and misleading representations to U.S. regulators both in person and in response to written requests for information, and (c) making false and misleading representations to consumers” in advertisements and in window labels, including that the vehicles complied with US emissions requirements, had best-in-class fuel efficiency as measured by EPA testing, and were equipped with “clean EcoDiesel engine[s]” that reduced emissions.

A number of those identified in the Plea Agreement have been criminally indicted as well. According to the Press Release, “In the related criminal prosecution, three FCA employees, Emanuele Palma, Sergio Pasini, and Gianluca Sabbioni were indicted for conspiracy to defraud the United States and to violate the Clean Air Act and six counts of violating the Clean Air Act. They await trial.” Of these individuals who were involved, most worked on the corrupt emissions work around beginning as early as 2010 and some were with the company up to 2020.

For reasons not explained in any of the resolution documents, the company avoided the imposition of an external monitor. They do however have a reporting obligation to the DOJ of annual reports on the compliance program required under the Plea Agreement. The reporting is required for three years on a go-forward basis.

Join me tomorrow where I look at some of the lessons learned from this sordid affair for the anti-bribery/anti-corruption compliance professional.