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Compliance Into the Weeds

Compliance into the Weeds: The BCG Declination – Key Insights for Compliance

The award winning, Compliance into the Weeds is the only weekly podcast which takes a deep dive into a compliance related topic, literally going into the weeds to more fully explore a subject. Looking for some hard-hitting insights on compliance? Look no further than Compliance into the Weeds!

In this episode, Tom Fox and Matt Kelly take a deep dive into the recent Department of Justice (DOJ) declination for the Boston Consulting Group (BCG).

They highlight why this case garnered significant attention and dissect the substantive actions BCG took to avoid prosecution, including firing implicated employees and forcing equity forfeiture. The duo also explores the seven factors that led to the declination, such as timely self-reporting, full cooperation, and improved compliance measures. The episode provides a comprehensive analysis of the BCG case, offering crucial takeaways for compliance officers on how to handle potential corruption issues and DOJ expectations.

Key Highlights:

  • Overview of the Boston Consulting Group Declination
  • DOJ’s Factors for Declination
  • Full Cooperation, Timely Self-Disclosure and Employee Consequences
  • Remediation Efforts and Compliance Improvements

Resources:

Matt in Radical Compliance

Tom in the FCPA Compliance and Ethics Blog

Tom 

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Blog

Albemarle FCPA Enforcement Action: Part 3 – The Comeback

Last week, Albemarle Corporation (Albemarle) agreed to pay more than $218 million to resolve investigations by the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) and the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) into violations of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) stemming from Albemarle’s participation in corrupt schemes to pay bribes to government officials in multiple foreign countries.

According to a Non-Prosecution Agreement (NPA) with the DOJ, between 2009 and 2017, Albemarle, through its third-party sales agents and subsidiary employees, conspired to pay bribes to government officials to obtain and retain chemical catalyst business with state-owned oil refineries in Vietnam, Indonesia, and India. According to the SEC Administrative Order (Order), the bribery schemes extended into China and the UAE. Today, we consider the company’s conduct, which allowed it to receive such an outstanding reduction, leading to the significantly lower final penalty under the new Corporate Enforcement Policy.

Untimely Self-Disclosure

One of the interesting factors in this matter is that Albemarle voluntarily disclosed to the DOJ the illegal conduct at issue. However, NPA noted that “the disclosure was not “reasonably prompt” as defined in the Criminal Division Corporate Enforcement and Voluntary Self-Disclosure Policy and the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines.” As further laid out in the NPA, Albemarle learned of allegations regarding possible misconduct in Vietnam approximately 16 months before disclosing it to the DOJ. After that, “an internal investigation, the Company gathered evidence demonstrating the potential misconduct at least approximately nine months prior to the disclosure. The Company took remedial action and continued to investigate other potential issues. In January 2018, the Company disclosed to the Fraud Section misconduct relating to four separate geographies, including Vietnam.”

This meant the self-disclosure “was not within a reasonably prompt time after becoming aware of the misconduct in Vietnam,” and it means that Albemarle did not meet the standard for voluntary self-disclosure under the Criminal Division Corporate Enforcement and Voluntary Self-Disclosure Policy. Nevertheless, the DOJ “gave significant weight, in evaluating the appropriate disposition of this matter—including the appropriate form of the resolution and the reduction for cooperation and remediation—to the Company’s voluntary, even if untimely, disclosure of the misconduct.” The NPA stated that the company received credit for its “voluntarily disclosing the conduct that forms the basis for this Agreement before it came to the attention of the Offices.” 

Significant Cooperation 

The company was credited with significant cooperation with the DOJ during the pendency of its investigation, and the Company received credit for its cooperation with the DOJ investigation. It cooperated with their investigation and demonstrated recognition and affirmative acceptance of responsibility for its criminal conduct. The NPA went on to note that “the Company also received credit for its substantial cooperation and extensive and timely remediation. The company

  1. Promptly providing information obtained through its internal investigation, which allowed the government to preserve and obtain evidence as part of its extensive independent investigation;
  2. made regular and detailed presentations to the Offices;
  3. proactively identifying information previously unknown to the Offices;
  4. met DOJ requests promptly;
  5. voluntarily making foreign-based employees available for interviews in the United States;
  6. collected and produced voluminous relevant documents and translations to the Offices, including documents located outside the United States and
  7. It produced documents to the DOJ from foreign countries in ways that did not implicate foreign data privacy laws.

Extensive Remediation

Albemarle also received credit “because it engaged in extensive and timely remedial measures.” These remedial measures include:

  • The Company started its remediation program based on its internal investigation of the misconduct prior to the DOJ investigation (
  • Albemarle disciplined employees involved in the misconduct, including terminating eleven employees and withholding bonuses from sixteen employees;
  • Albemarle is strengthening its anti-corruption compliance program by investing in compliance resources, expanding its compliance function with experienced and qualified personnel, and taking steps to embed compliance and ethical values at all levels of its business organization;
  • The Company “transformed its business model and risk management process to reduce corruption risk in its operation and to embed compliance in the business, including implementing a go-to-market strategy that resulted in eliminating the use of sales agents throughout the Company, terminating hundreds of other third-party sales representatives, such as distributors and resellers, and shifting to a direct sales business model;
  • The company provides extensive training to its sales team and restructuring compensation and incentives so that compensation is no longer tied to sales amounts;
  • The company used data analytics to monitor and measure its compliance program’s effectiveness and
  • Albemarle engages in continuous testing, monitoring, and improvement of all aspects of its compliance program, beginning almost immediately following the identification of misconduct.

Holdbacks (not Clawbacks)

While the DOJ has made much noise about clawbacks from recalcitrant executives, Albemarle engaged in holdbacks, where they did not pay bonuses to certain employees involved in the conduct or those who had oversight. The NPA stated, “The Company withheld bonuses totaling $763,453 during the course of its internal investigation from employees who engaged in suspected wrongdoing.” The illegal conduct involved those who “(a) had supervisory authority over the employee(s) or business area engaged in the misconduct; and (b) knew of, or were willfully blind to, the misconduct.” The significance of this effort was important as it qualified Albemarle for an additional fine reduction of a dollar-for-dollar credit of the amount of the withheld bonuses under the Criminal Division’s March 2023 Compensation Incentives and Clawbacks Pilot Program.

Culture, Culture, Culture

Albemarle received additional credit or at least did not sustain any enhancement from the DOJ culture analysis. The NPA stated, “The Company has some limited history of prior civil and regulatory actions, including environmental and workplace safety matters, but no prior criminal history.” From this language and other enforcement actions taken since the October 2021 announcement of culture as an item the DOJ would assess, it now appears that civil and regulatory matters, particularly those in the ethics and compliance arena, would not be held against companies.

The Result

All of the above factors led to a significant discount for Albemarle under the Corporate Enforcement Policy. The NPA stated, “Accordingly, after considering (a) through (k) in paragraph 2 above, the Offices have determined that the appropriate resolution of this case is a non-prosecution agreement with the Company; payment by the Company in the amount of a $98,236,547 criminal monetary penalty, which reflects a discount of 45 percent off the bottom of the otherwise-applicable U.S. Sentencing Guidelines fine range and an additional discount of $763,453 under the Pilot Program, and $98,511,669 in forfeiture, which, as described below in paragraph 10, will be credited, in large part, against disgorgement of ill-gotten profits that the Company pays to the SEC in a concurrent resolution.” [emphasis supplied]

In other words, the actions of Albemarle saved it around $90 million in additional fines under the Policy, and this needs to take into account the discounts under the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines as their calculation was not reported in the NPA.

Join us tomorrow to review some of the key lessons learned.

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Blog

Phillips FCPA Enforcement Action: Lessons Learned – Part 3

We conclude our exploration of the Koninklijke Philips N.V. (Philips) Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) enforcement action involving the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), for Phillips actions in China and its Chinese subsidiary, Phillips China. As set out in the SEC Order, Philips was order to “pay disgorgement of $41,126,170, prejudgment interest of $6,047,633, and a civil monetary penalty of $15,000,000” for a total fine and penalty of $62 million. Yesterday we considered the bribery schemes employed by Phillips China. After having reviewed the facts and Order we look at some lessons learned.

Distributors Under the FCPA

This is the third recent FCPA enforcement action involving distributors, following Oracle and Microsoft. Along with those cases, Phillips drives home the message that distributors are a risk under the FCPA. Oracle got into FCPA hot water regarding distributor discounts and marketing reimbursement. Microsoft came to OFAC grief as it did not know to whom its distributors were doing business as some distributors were selling to sanctioned entities. While distributors may not seem to be as high a risk commissioned sales agents, they do present a risk, which must be assessed and then managed with ongoing monitoring and improvements as appropriate. None of these steps were apparent from this FCPA enforcement action or found in the Order.

As noted yesterday, Philips in 2013 had agreed to “enhanced an anti-corruption training program that includes a certification process and a variety of training applications to ensure broad-based reach and effectiveness.” Whatever this training was, it does not seem to have reached China. Effective training is about communications, engagement and demonstrable implementation of the training messaging going forward. Once again Philips China did not seem as if that communications about not engaging in bribery and corruption was taken into its business operations.

Recidivist Behavior Under 2023 Corporate Enforcement Policy

As noted yesterday, in a May 10, 2023 Press Release,  Phillips announced that “The U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) has closed its parallel inquiry into these matters” and the company intoned that it “fully cooperated with the SEC and DOJ.” Philips also reported that the FCPA matter had “previously been disclosed in Philips’ Annual Reports 2019 through 2022.”

There has been no statement by the Department of Justice (DOJ) regarding Philips. Further there has been no declination regarding Philips publicly announced by the DOJ. Given the strong statement about recidivists by Deputy Attorney General Lisa Monaco in announcing the Monaco Doctrine last September and the need for speed referenced by Kenneth Polite in announcing changes to the Corporate Enforcement Policy in January 2023; one might have expected some statement from the DOJ.

If the DOJ really wants companies to step forward and self-disclose, it would seem that Philips would be a good example to use. Apparently there was not self-disclosure, not extraordinary cooperation and no compliance with the 2013 SEC Order concluding the first Philips FCPA enforcement action. In other words, all the requirements for a company to obtain the significant credit under the 2023 Updated Corporate Enforcement Policy. If you add in Philip’s prior FCPA enforcement action into the mix, it would certainly appear that Phillips’ culture of compliance was lacking, at least along the lines of that aspect of the Monaco Doctrine.

Lessons Learned

With Phillips filing out the trio of recent distributor enforcement actions, it is clear that companies need to start paying more attention to the distributor sales model as a source of risk. Of course, robust due diligence screening is a must but it is only a starting point. Companies need to monitor the relationship after the contract is signed. The Philips FCPA enforcement action points toward the need for robust data analytics particularly around special price discounts with distributors creating excessive distributor margins which could be used to fund improper payments to employees of state-owned enterprises or governmental officials. A data analysis would quickly and efficiently show any special discount or discount beyond the standard range given to distributors. Moreover, regional discounts could be taken into account easily using the data analytics approach.

Additionally the maintenance of adequate books, records, and accounts concerning special price discounts to demonstrate that the discounts were supported by adequate documentation to ensure their business justification and management’s approval of them. This basic step also acts as a basic compliance internal control so that there can not only be oversight of the proposed distributors and any discounts but also creates a documented audit trail if a regulator ever comes knocking.

At this point there is perhaps some head-scratching about the final resolution, if any, regarding Philips given the state of the record as laid out by the Order. However it is clear there are significant lessons for the compliance professional from the Phillips enforcement action around distributors. I hope that at some point there is greater clarity under the 2023 Corporate Enforcement Policy update.

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FCPA Compliance Report

James Koukios on the Monaco Memo

In this special 5 part podcast series, I am taking a deep five into the Monaco Memo and analyzing it from a variety of angles. In this episode of the FCPA Compliance Report, I am joined by fan-fav James Koukios, a partner at MoFo. James is a former member of the FCPA Unit, and in this podcast, we take a deep dive into the Monaco Memo. Some of the highlights include:

  1. Issues involving individual accountability.
  2. Burden shifting on communications devices and timeliness of self-disclosing and reporting.
  3. How does the Monaco Memo lay out DOJ expectations?
  4. Monaco Memo at 30,000 ft and ground level…
  5. Tweaks to the Yates Memo formulation.
  6. New requirements to the FCPA Corporate Enforcement Policy
  7. Will the incentives be enough?

 Resources

James Koukios on MoFo

Tom 5-Part blog post series in the FCPA Compliance and Ethics Blog

  1. A Jolt for Compliance
  2. Timely Self-Disclosure
  3. Corporate Compliance Programs
  4. Monitors
  5. Polite Speech

Monaco Memo