Tag: clawbacks

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TD Bank: Part 1 – Money Laundering and the China Syndrome

Last week, representatives of the US government announced one of the largest sets of fines and penalties for failures in anti-money laundering ever laid down. It involved TD Bank N.A. and TD Bank US Holding Company. It was over $3 billion in fines and penalties with a restriction in growth until the company gets its compliance act together. However, it is not the fine nor creative penalty that flags this matter but the underlying facts and raw brazen-ness of the 10th largest bank in the United States to either actively engage in an ongoing criminal enterprise or to willfully disregard specific evidence of criminal activity and failure of basic compliance which makes this enforcement action stand out. Employees from the front-line tellers who took in millions of dollars in cash, right up to the Board of Directors, knew the bank’s conduct was illegal or buried their collective heads so far down into the sand that they could have caused the China Syndrome to self-execute.

The regulators and enforcers in this sordid tale include the Department of Justice (DOJ), the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve Board (FRB), the Treasury Department’s Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC), and Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN). According to a DOJ Press Release, TD Bank N.A. (TDBNA) and its parent company TD Bank US Holding Company (TDBUSH) (together with TDBNA, the Bank) pled guilty today. They agreed to pay over $1.8 billion in penalties to resolve the Department of Justice’s (DOJ) investigation into violations of the Bank Secrecy Act (BSA) and money laundering. Finally, TD Bank’s guilty pleas are part of a coordinated resolution with the FRB, the OCC, and FinCEN. With the additional fines and penalties due to these entities, the total fine and penalty is over $3 billion.

TDBNA pled guilty to conspiring to fail to maintain an anti-money laundering (AML) program that complies with the BSA, failing to file accurate Currency Transaction Reports (CTRs), and money laundering. TDBUSH pleaded guilty to causing TDBNA to fail to maintain an AML program that complies with the BSA and to fail to file accurate CTRs.

To add to all the above, the government put a restriction on TD’s growth until it fully remediates its compliance program because, as noted by Matt Kelly in Radical Compliance,  it specified that “TDBNA’s total assets cannot exceed $434 billion without OCC approval, and that approval will not come until TDBNA completes an extensive transformation of its AML compliance program.” Further, Kelly noted that if “TDBNA does not make progress on those compliance program reforms in a timely manner, OCC can reduce that asset cap by another 7 percent, and keep going until TD gets its compliance act together. In other words, the longer TD drags its feet on implementing compliance reforms, the tighter the leash around its neck will get.”

How did the Bank get to this point, what can it do to resolve this mess, and what are the lessons learned for the compliance professional, corporate executive, and Board of Directors? Additionally, what is the point of punishment? Will foreign entities always come to the US, open branches, and engage in illegal activities, all in the scramble for the all-mighty dollar? Will corporate executives ever be held liable for intentionally looking the other way or burying their heads in the sand? Several blog posts will explore the answers to these questions and more.

What They Said-Merrick Garland

In a rare appearance by Attorney General Merrick Garland to announce the guilty plea, fine, and penalty, he stated, “Today, TD Bank pled guilty to multiple felonies, including conspiring to violate the Bank Secrecy Act and commit money laundering. TD Bank has also agreed to a $1.8 billion criminal penalty. Combined with civil enforcement actions announced today by other agencies, the United States will impose a total [penalty] of approximately $3 billion against TD Bank. TD Bank created an environment that allowed financial crime to flourish. By making its services convenient for criminals, it became one.

Today, TD Bank became the largest bank in U.S. history to plead guilty to Bank Secrecy Act program failures and the first U.S. bank to plead guilty to conspiracy to commit money laundering. This is also the largest-ever penalty under the Bank Secrecy Act and the first time the Justice Department has assessed a daily fine against a bank. As part of the plea agreement, TD Bank will fundamentally restructure its corporate compliance program at its U.S.-based bank, the 10th largest in the United States. The bank has also agreed to impose a three-year monitorship and a five-year term of probation. While the bank has started its remediation, it will continue to remediate and improve its anti-money laundering compliance program to ensure that it operates lawfully and safely.”

What They Said-Lisa Argentieri

Deputy Assistant Attorney General Nicole M. Argentieri said, “Over the course of a decade, TD Bank placed profits over compliance, prioritizing a “flat cost paradigm” that limited spending across the bank — including on the bank’s anti-money laundering (AML) compliance program, despite growing risks — even while profits soared. The bank knew it had pervasive and systemic deficiencies in its AML program, including a transaction monitoring system that remained stagnant over 10 years despite warnings from regulators, consultants, and even its employees. AML employees joked that the Bank’s failed AML system made TD an “easy target” and a “convenient” bank for bad actors. And they were right. TD’s failed AML compliance program created vulnerabilities that criminals — including TD’s employees — used to launder money through the Bank. All told, three large money laundering networks, two prosecuted by our partners in the District of New Jersey and the third prosecuted in the District of Puerto Rico, laundered over $670 million through TD.

Notably, the Bank did not self-disclose any regulator. Yet after the Bank was notified of the investigation into its conduct, “the Bank provided strong cooperation. For example, TD identified additional misconduct and provided evidence of that misconduct to the department. Some of that evidence helped advance our investigation of individuals, including video surveillance footage TD provided after reviewing hundreds of hours of videotape and materials recovered because TD secured the workplaces of employees involved in misconduct.”

Additionally, and becoming increasingly standard in such resolutions, the culpable entities are engaged in clawbacks. Argentieri noted that the Bank “took steps on its own to hold its employees financially accountable. The Bank clawed back bonuses, including for its CEO and other executives, resulting in a dollar-for-dollar reduction of the Bank’s fine of approximately $2 million.” Yet she emphasized that the Bank’s “resolution marks a first. This is the first time a company has committed to clawing back compensation prospectively. Over the next few months, TD will identify additional compensation it will claw back from its employees. And if the bank is successful during the term of its agreement with the department, the Criminal Division will credit those clawbacks against the fine.”

I will explore this matter in some depth over the next several blog posts. Tomorrow, I will consider how profits over compliance led to disaster.

Resources 

OCC

OCC Press Release

Consent Order 

Civil Money Penalty 

DOJ 

TD Bank US Holding Company Information

TD Bank N.A. Information

TD Bank US Holding Company Plea Agreement and Attachments

TD Bank N.A. Plea Agreement and Attachments

Merrick Garland Remarks

Nicole Argentieri Remarks

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The Boston Consulting Group Declination: A Money Shot for Clawbacks

In a recent development that has garnered significant attention in the compliance community, the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) declined prosecution of Boston Consulting Group, Inc. (BCG) for violations of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA). Despite evidence of bribery involving BCG’s operations in Angola, the decision to forgo prosecution serves as a powerful reminder of the critical role that timely self-disclosure, cooperation, and effective remediation play in navigating the complexities of corporate compliance and, most significantly, clawbacks play in a decision to decline to prosecute. The decision was made public via a letter from the DOJ to BCG.

Between 2011 and 2017, BCG’s Lisbon, Portugal office engaged in a scheme to secure business contracts with Angolan government agencies, including the Ministry of Economy (MINEC) and the National Bank of Angola (BNA). BCG funneled approximately $4.3 million in commissions to an agent with close ties to Angolan government officials. These payments, made through offshore entities, helped BCG secure twelve contracts, resulting in revenues of $22.5 million and profits of $14.424 million.

The misconduct was serious: BCG employees in Portugal were aware of the agent’s ties to government officials and took deliberate steps to conceal the true nature of the agent’s work. This included backdating contracts and falsifying documents to cover up the corrupt activities. Such actions violated the FCPA, which prohibits U.S. companies from engaging in bribery of foreign officials to secure business advantages.

The money shot in this Declination was in the area of clawbacks. In the Wall Street Journal  (WSJ), Dylan Tokar wrote, “The consulting group’s disciplinary actions come amid pressure on companies by Justice Department officials to clawback compensation from employees involved in wrongdoing. Officials have said they want to shift the burden of penalties for corporate misconduct to those most responsible.” Mary Shirley, quoted by Tokar in the same article, noted, “That’s a strong message. While they’re not stated, the actual figures involved for individuals could be quite high.”

In his Radical Compliance piece on the Declination, Matt Kelly emphasized Shirley’s point: “That final point on surrendering equity — wow. That’s a punitive measure with real bite. Not only has BCG damaged the offenders’ future employment prospects by firing them and leaving a black mark on their records, but the loss of equity is a wallop to all their past employment with the firm. I have no idea how much that equity might have been worth, but BCG is a giant and prosperous business, so it’s entirely possible those offenders just lost millions of dollars.”

Given the severity of the misconduct, the DOJ’s decision to decline prosecution may seem surprising at first glance. However, more conduct was conducted by BSG after discovering the illegal conduct, which led to this superior result. The decline reveals that BCG’s response to finding the potential FCPA violation was exemplary, and equally importantly, it aligned with the DOJ’s Corporate Enforcement and Voluntary Self-Disclosure Policy. These factors included:

  • Timely and Voluntary Self-Disclosure: In a 2014 email, BCG uncovered evidence of the potential FCPA violation and promptly disclosed the misconduct to the DOJ. This proactive step is crucial in the DOJ’s assessment of whether to pursue prosecution, as it demonstrates the company’s commitment to transparency and accountability.
  • Full and Proactive Cooperation: BCG did not merely disclose the misconduct; the company fully cooperated with the DOJ’s investigation. This included providing all relevant facts, including information about the individuals involved in the bribery scheme. Cooperation of this magnitude significantly mitigates the risk of prosecution, as it aids the government in its investigation and potential prosecutions of individuals responsible for the wrongdoing.
  • Comprehensive Remediation: BCG’s response to the misconduct was swift and decisive. The company terminated the personnel involved, imposed compensation-based penalties, and required implicated partners to forfeit their equity in the company. BCG also denied these individuals the financial transitions typically accorded to departing employees, underscoring the seriousness of the misconduct.
  • Significant Compliance Improvements: Beyond addressing the immediate issue, BCG substantially enhanced its compliance program and internal controls. These improvements included formalized employee training, vendor and client screening protocols, and the establishment of local and global risk committees. Such measures demonstrate BCG’s commitment to preventing future misconduct and fostering a culture of compliance.
  • Absence of Aggravating Factors: The DOJ’s decision was also influenced by the absence of certain aggravating factors, such as executive management’s involvement in the misconduct, significant profit relative to the company’s size, or a history of criminal recidivism. These factors often weigh heavily in the decision to prosecute, but in BCG’s case, their absence worked in the company’s favor.
  • Disgorgement of Ill-Gotten Gains: BCG agreed to disgorge $14.424 million, representing the profits from the contracts secured through the corrupt scheme. This financial penalty further reinforced BCG’s commitment to addressing the consequences of its actions and aligning with legal and ethical standards.

The BCG case offers several critical lessons for compliance professionals. First and foremost, the importance of timely and voluntary self-disclosure cannot be overstated. When a company discovers potential misconduct, promptly bringing it to the authorities’ attention can significantly influence the outcome, potentially leading to a declination of prosecution.

Full cooperation with government investigations is essential. Compliance teams must be prepared to provide all relevant information, facilitate interviews, and support the investigation process. This cooperation demonstrates the company’s commitment to addressing the issue and helps build a collaborative relationship with the authorities.

Remediation is another crucial aspect. Companies must swiftly and meaningfully address the root causes of misconduct, including holding individuals accountable and implementing robust compliance measures to prevent future violations. A strong compliance program, reinforced by ongoing training and risk assessment, is vital in demonstrating a company’s commitment to ethical business practices.

Finally, the BCG case underscores the importance of avoiding aggravating factors. Companies should strive to cultivate a culture of integrity from the top down, ensuring compliance is embedded in every aspect of the organization. By doing so, they can reduce the likelihood of misconduct occurring in the first place and mitigate the impact if it does.

The DOJ’s decision to decline BCG’s prosecution is a powerful reminder of the value of self-disclosure, cooperation, and remediation in corporate compliance. For compliance professionals, the BCG case highlights the critical role they play in guiding their organizations through complex legal and ethical challenges. By fostering a culture of compliance, responding proactively to potential issues, and working closely with authorities, companies can navigate the difficult terrain of regulatory enforcement while upholding their commitment to ethical business practices.

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Compliance Tip of the Day

Compliance Tip of the Day: Clawbacks

Welcome to “Compliance Tip of the Day,” the podcast where we bring you daily insights and practical advice on navigating the ever-evolving landscape of compliance and regulatory requirements.

Whether you’re a seasoned compliance professional or just starting your journey, our aim is to provide you with bite-sized, actionable tips to help you stay on top of your compliance game.

Join us as we explore the latest industry trends, share best practices, and demystify complex compliance issues to keep your organization on the right side of the law.

Tune in daily for your dose of compliance wisdom, and let’s make compliance a little less daunting, one tip at a time.

In today’s episode,  we discuss the role of clawbacks in both a comp system and a compliance regime.

For more information on the Ethico ROI Calculator and a free White Paper on the ROI of Compliance, click here.

To check out The Compliance Handbook, 5th edition, click here.

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FCPA Survival Guide

FCPA Survival Guide – Step 6 – Clawbacks and Holdbacks

How can you survive an FCPA enforcement action? In this special podcast series, Tom Fox and Nick Gallo lay out the Top 10 things you can do to reduce your overall fine and penalty, perhaps down to a full declination. All of the actions you can take come from recent DOJ prosecutions under the FCPA and speeches from DOJ representatives. This podcast, sponsored by Ethico, is the companion series to the book The FCPA Survival Guide: Surviving and Thriving a Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Enforcement Action. Today, we discuss the importance of using clawbacks and holdbacks.

In episode six of the FCPA Survival Guide, Tom Fox and Nick Gallo delve into the relatively new DOJ enforcement strategies: clawbacks and holdbacks. They discuss how these financial disincentives, formalized in the 2023 Monaco memo, aim to promote corporate compliance. The conversation highlights practical examples from companies like SAP and Albemarle, which implemented these strategies and received substantial credits from the DOJ. Nick emphasizes the importance and effectiveness of financial disincentives in driving behavior change and maintaining corporate integrity. The episode explores how these methods can operationalize compliance at all organizational levels.

Key Highlights and Issues

  • Understanding Holdbacks and Clawbacks
  • DOJ’s Pilot Program and Case Studies
  • The Impact of Financial Incentives
  • Corporate Responsibility and Individual Accountability
  • Employee Awareness and Compliance Culture
  • Balancing Positive and Negative Incentives

Resources:

Nick Gallo on LinkedIn

Ethico

The FCPA Survival Guide: Surviving and Thriving a Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Enforcement Action

Tom

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Facebook

YouTube

Twitter

LinkedIn

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Compliance Tip of the Day

Compliance Tip of the Day: Compensation Incentives and Clawbacks

Welcome to “Compliance Tip of the Day,” the podcast where we bring you daily insights and practical advice on navigating the ever-evolving landscape of compliance and regulatory requirements.

Whether you’re a seasoned compliance professional or just starting your journey, our aim is to provide you with bite-sized, actionable tips to help you stay on top of your compliance game.

Join us as we explore the latest industry trends, share best practices, and demystify complex compliance issues to keep your organization on the right side of the law.

Tune in daily for your dose of compliance wisdom, and let’s make compliance a little less daunting, one tip at a time.

In this episode, we consider what the DOJ has done in terms of emphasizing financial incentives and penalties for compliance.

 

For more information on the Ethico ROI Calculator and a free White Paper on the ROI of Compliance, click here.

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Compliance Week Conference Podcast

Compliance Week 2024 Speaker Preview Podcasts – Jonathan Rusch on Clawbacks and Holdbacks

In the Compliance Week 2024 Speaker Preview Podcasts episode, Jonathan Rusch discusses his panel at Compliance Week 2024, “Clawbacks, Incentives, and Remediation.” Some of the issues he will discuss in this podcast and his presentation are:

  • DOJ emphasizes clawbacks in remediation
  • The additional role of holdbacks
  • Learn about cutting-edge topics at Compliance Week 2024

I hope you can join me at Compliance Week 2024. This year’s event will be held April 2-4 at The Westin Washington, DC, Downtown. The line-up for this year’s event is first-rate, with some of the top ethics and compliance practitioners around.

Gain insights and make connections at the industry’s premier cross-industry national compliance event, offering knowledge-packed, accredited sessions and take-home advice from the most influential leaders in the compliance community. Back for its 19th year, join 500+ compliance, ethics, legal, and audit professionals who gather to benchmark best practices and gain the latest tactics and strategies to enhance their compliance programs. Compliance, ethics, legal, and audit professionals will gather safely face-to-face to benchmark best practices and gain the latest tactics and strategies to enhance their compliance programs, among many others, to:

  • Network with your peers, including C-suite executives, legal professionals, HR leaders, and ethics and compliance visionaries.
  • Hear from 80+ respected cross-industry practitioners, including CEOs, CCOs, regulators, federal officials, and practitioners, to help inform and shape the strategic direction of your enterprise risk management program.
  • Hear directly from panels on leadership, fraud detection, confronting regulatory change, abiding by cross-border rules and regulations, and the always-favorite fireside chats.
  • Bring actionable takeaways from various session types, including cyber, AI, Compliance, Board obligations, data-driven compliance, and many others, to your program for you to listen, learn, and share.
  • Compliance Week aims to arm you with information, strategy, and tactics to transform your organization and career by connecting ethics to business performance through process augmentation and data visualization.

I hope you can join me at the event. For information on the event, click here. As an extra benefit to listeners of this podcast, Compliance Week is offering a $200 discount on the registration price. Enter the discount code TFOX2024 for $200 off.

The Compliance Podcast Network produces the Compliance Week 2024 Preview Podcast series. Compliance Week sponsors this series.

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Blog

Ten Top Lessons from Recent FCPA Settlements – Lesson No. 6, Clawbacks and Holdbacks

Over the past 15 months, the Department of Justice (DOJ) and Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) have made clear, through three Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) enforcement actions and speeches, their priorities in investigations, remediations, and best practices compliance programs. Every compliance professional should study each of these enforcement actions closely for the lessons learned and direct communications from the DOJ. They should guide not simply your actions should you find yourself in an investigation but also how you should think about priorities.

The three FCPA enforcement actions are ABB from December 2022, Albemarle from November 2023, and SAP from January 2024. Taken together, they point out a clear path for the company that finds itself in an investigation: using extensive remediation to avoid a monitor. They also provide insight for the compliance professional into what the DOJ expects in an ongoing best practices compliance program.

Over a series of blog posts, I will lay out what I believe are the Top Ten lessons from these enforcement actions for compliance professionals who find themselves in an enforcement action. Today we continue  with Number 6, Clawbacks and Holdbacks. These strategies are relatively new to the DOJ’s arsenal, and they want companies to employ them in enforcement actions. While the DOJ and SEC have long made clear that they view monetary structure for incentive compensation, as far back as the FCPA Resource Guide, 1st edition (2012), they did not focus as intensely on the disincentive side of the equation. Prior to the Monaco Memo, clawbacks had not been generally seen as a necessary part of a compliance program.

This began to change in the Monaco Memo. It is now unequivocally required by the DOJ and listed as a crucial area of DOJ inquiry in the 2023 Evaluation of Corporate Compliance Programs. Moreover, having such a penalty in place is also seen as part of an excellent corporate culture, which not only penalizes those who engage in unethical behavior in violation of a company’s policies and procedures but will also “promote compliant behavior and emphasize the corporation’s commitment to its compliance programs and its culture.”

The DOJ was told to look into whether companies have “clawback” clauses in their pay agreements and whether “as soon as the company found out about the misconduct, the company has, as much as possible, taken affirmative steps to carry out such agreements and clawback compensation previously paid to current or former executives whose actions or omissions led to or contributed to the criminal conduct at issue.”

The Monaco Memo directed “to develop further guidance by the end of the year on how to reward corporations that develop and apply compensation clawback policies, including how to shift the burden of corporate financial penalties away from shareholders—who in many cases do not have a role in misconduct—onto those more directly responsible.” This clause is an effort by the DOJ to keep companies from shielding recalcitrant executives from the consequences of their own illegal and unethical conduct.

However, the Monaco Memo clarified that it is not simply having a written policy and procedure. If warranted, there must be corporate action under the clawback policy and procedure. In the Albemarle and SAP enforcement actions, the DOJ evaluated the companies’ actions, “Following the corporation’s discovery of misconduct, a corporation has, to the extent possible, taken affirmative steps to execute on such agreements and clawback compensation previously paid to current or former executives whose actions or omissions resulted in or contributed to the criminal conduct at issue.”

Albemarle

Albemarle went in a different direction—not clawbacks, but holdbacks. While the DOJ has made much noise about clawbacks from recalcitrant executives, Albemarle engaged in holdbacks, where they did not pay bonuses to certain employees involved in the conduct or those who had oversight. The NPA stated, “The company withheld bonuses totaling $763,453 during the course of its internal investigation from employees who engaged in suspected wrongdoing.” The illegal conduct involved those who “(a) had supervisory authority over the employee(s) or business area engaged in the misconduct; and (b) knew of, or were willfully blind to, the misconduct.” The significance of this effort was vital as it qualified Albemarle for an additional fine reduction of a dollar-for-dollar credit of the amount of the withheld bonuses under the Criminal Division’s March 2023 Compensation Incentives and Clawbacks Pilot Program. 

SAP

SAP had extensive holdbacks as well. The DPA noted SAP withheld bonuses totaling $109,141 during the course of its internal investigation from employees who engaged in suspected wrongdoing in connection with the conduct under investigation, or who both (a) had supervisory authority over the employee(s) or business area engaged in the misconduct and (b) knew of, or were willfully blind to, the misconduct, and further engaged in substantial litigation to defend its withholding from those employees, which qualified SAP for an additional fine reduction in the amount of the withheld bonuses under the DOJ’s Compensation Incentives and Clawbacks Pilot Program.

The DOJ has given significant credit to both Albemarle and SAP for their holdbacks, and we would expect them to continue to do so. If your organization has not instituted a Clawback/Holdback Policy, now is the time to do so rather than wait until you are in the middle of an investigation or enforcement action. Also, remember that the DOJ gives a dollar-for-dollar credit on any settlement where the company engaged in either clawbacks or holdbacks.

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The SAP FCPA Enforcement Action-Part 3: The Comeback

This week we are taking a deep dive into the SAP Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) enforcement action. In it, SAP agreed to pay the Department of Justice (DOJ) and Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) approximately $222 million in penalties and disgorgement. SAP also entered into a three-year Deferred Prosecution Agreement (DPA) with the DOJ. Given the multi-year (2014-2022) length of the various bribery and corruption schemes and worldwide geographic scope, the amounts paid in bribes and benefits garnered by SAP from their corruption; one might charitably wonder how SAP was able to reap such a positive outcome of only a fine and penalty totaling $222 million. We will explore that question today.

Extensive Cooperation

The starting point for this analysis is the DOJ DPA. The first key point to note is there was no self-disclosure by SAP. As the DPA noted, SAP only began to cooperate after investigative reports were made public in 2017 in South Africa about SAP’s bribery and corruption program. However from this point forward SAP moved to extensively cooperate. The DAP noted SAP “immediately beginning to cooperate after South African investigative reports made public allegations of the South Africa-related misconduct in 2017 and providing regular, prompt, and detailed updates to the Fraud Section and the Office regarding factual information obtained through its own internal investigation, which allowed the government to preserve and obtain evidence as part of its independent investigation…”

This cooperation included producing relevant documents and other information to the Fraud Section “from multiple foreign countries expeditiously, while navigating foreign data privacy and related laws;” SAP “voluntarily making Company officers and employees available for interviews;”  and took “significant affirmative steps to facilitate interviews while addressing witness security concerns”; interestingly SAP was required to resolve potential deconfliction issues between the its own internal investigation and the investigation being conducted by the DOJ. The company promptly collected, analyzed, and organized “voluminous information, including complex financial information.” It translated “voluminous foreign language documents to facilitate and expedite review by the Fraud Section and the Office.” Most interestingly, the DPA repored that SAP imaged “the phones of relevant custodians at the beginning of the Company’s internal investigation, thus preserving relevant and highly probative business communications sent on mobile messaging applications.”

The Remediation

The DPA reported extensive remediation by SAP as well and the information provided in the DPA is instructive for every compliance professional. The DPA noted that SAP engaged in the following remedial steps.

  1. Conducted a root cause analysis of the underlying conduct then remediating those root causes through enhancement of its compliance program;
  2. Conducted a gap analysis of internal controls, remediating those found lacking;
  3. Undertook a “comprehensive risk assessment focusing on high-risk areas and controls around payment processes and enhancing its regular compliance risk assessment process”;
  4. SAP documented its use of a “comprehensive operational and compliance data” into its risk assessments;
  5. SAP eliminating “its third-party sales commission model globally, and prohibiting all sales commissions for public sector contracts in high-risk markets”;
  6. “Significantly increasing the budget, resources, and expertise devoted to compliance;”
  7. Restructuring its Offices of Ethics and Compliance to ensure adequate stature, independence, autonomy, and access to executive leadership;
  8. Enhanced its code of conduct and policies and procedures regarding gifts, hospitality, and the use of third parties;
  9. Enhancing its reporting, investigations and consequence management processes;
  10. Adjusting compensation incentives to align with compliance objectives and reduce corruption risk;
  11. Enhanced and expanding compliance monitoring and audit programs, planning, and resources, including developing a well-resourced team devoted to audits of third-party partners and suppliers;
  12. Expanded its data analytics capabilities to cover over 150 countries, including all high-risk countries globally; and
  13. Disciplined “any and all” employees involved in the misconduct.

Obviously, SAP engaged in a wide range of remedial actions. It all started with a root cause analysis. Root Cause analysis was enshrined in the FCPA Resource Guide, 2nd edition as one of the Hallmarks of an Effective Compliance Program. It stated, “The truest measure of an effective compliance program is how it responds to misconduct. Accordingly, for a compliance program to be truly effective, it should have a well-functioning and appropriately funded mechanism for the timely and thorough investigations of any allegations or suspicions of misconduct by the company, its employees, or agents. An effective investigation’s structure will also have an established means of documenting the company’s response, including any disciplinary or remediation measures taken.”

In addition to having a mechanism for responding to the specific incident of misconduct, the company’s compliance program should also integrate lessons learned from any misconduct into the company’s policies, training, and controls on a go-forward basis. To do so, a company will need to analyze the root causes of the misconduct to timely and appropriately remediate those causes to prevent future compliance breaches. This SAP did during its remediation phase.

Equally of interest are the references to data analytics and data driven compliance. SAP not only did so around its third-party program but also expanded its data analytics capabilities to cover over 150 countries, including all high-risk countries globally. The SEC Order also noted that SAP had implemented data analytics to identify and review high- risk transactions and third-party controls. The SAP DPA follows the Albemarle FCPA settlement by noting that data analytics is now used by SAP to measure the compliance program’s effectiveness. This language follows a long line of DOJ pronouncements, starting with the 2020 Update to the Evaluation of Corporate Compliance Programs, about the corporate compliance functions access to all company data; this is the second time it has been called out in a settlement agreement in this manner. Additionally, it appears that by using data analytics, SAP was able to satisfy the DOJ requirement for implementing controls and then effectively testing them throughout the pendency of the DOJ investigation; thereby avoiding a monitor.

Next was the holdback/clawback actions engaged in by SAP. The DPA noted, SAP withheld bonuses totaling $109,141 during the course of its internal investigation from employees who engaged in suspected wrongdoing in connection with the conduct under investigation, or who both (a) had supervisory authority over the employee(s) or business area engaged in the misconduct and (b) knew of, or were willfully blind to, the misconduct, and further engaged in substantial litigation to defend its withholding from those employees, which qualified SAP for an additional fine reduction in the amount of the withheld bonuses under the DOJ’s Compensation Incentives and Clawbacks Pilot Program.

Finally, the DOJ related that SAP had enhanced and has committed to continuing to enhance its compliance program and internal controls, including ensuring that its compliance program satisfied the minimum elements set forth in Attachment C to DPA. Based upon all these factors, including SAP’s remediation and the state of its compliance program, and the Company’s agreement to report to the Fraud Section and the Office as set forth in Attachment D to this Agreement, the DOJ “determined that an independent compliance monitor was unnecessary.”

All-in-all a great result by and for SAP for which the company and its compliance team should take great credit in going forward.

Resources

SEC Order

DOJ DPA

Join us tomorrow where we consider fine and penalties.

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31 Days to More Effective Compliance Programs

31 Days to a More Effective Compliance Program: Day 5 – Kenneth Polite on Clawbacks

Assistant Attorney General Kenneth A. Polite, Jr. began his speech on clawback policy developed by the DOJ to promote “innovative approaches to compensation,” which would “shift the burden of corporate malfeasance away from uninvolved shareholders onto those more directly responsible.” She believes “Companies should ensure that executives and employees are personally invested in promoting compliance,” as “nothing grabs attention or demands personal investment like having skin in the game, through direct and tangible financial incentives.” This led the Criminal Division to “develop guidance, guidance on how to reward corporations with compliance-promoting compensation programs.”

The clawback initiative has two parts. “First, every corporate resolution involving the Criminal Division will now include a requirement that the resolving company develop compliance-promoting criteria within its compensation and bonus system. Second is the creation of a 3-year pilot program under which the “Criminal Division will provide fine reductions to companies who seek to claw back compensation from corporate wrongdoers.”

Three key takeaways:

1. The clawback policy was developed to promote “innovative approaches to compensation.

2. Clawbacks will include those who had supervisory authority over the employees or business area engaged in the misconduct and knew of, or were willfully blind to, the misconduct.

3. How far will the DOJ push companies to move for clawbacks, and how far down the chain will it go?

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Key Compliance Speeches from 2023-Kenneth Polite on Incentives and Consequence Management

Assistant Attorney General Kenneth A. Polite, Jr. began his speech with an interesting aside. It is about the clear tie between poverty and corruption. This is why it is important to prosecute corrupt government officials because their actions keep the people of in such dire economic straits. He stated, “Just as crime recognizes no borders, our efforts to combat it must be equally boundless. We need our partners – both domestic and international – to solve community problems. That is where the Criminal Division thrives.” In the Diaz case there was international cooperation at various levels. Think about that for a moment, the US and Venezuelan governments cooperating on anything, yet they apparently did cooperate on this matter. Polite added that several recent FCPA corporate enforcement matters, “Glencore, ABB, Danske, and Stericycle, among many others, underscore the successes that we’ve shared with our colleagues abroad.”

To be truly effective community problem-solvers, prosecutors must broaden our sense of community by literally ‘spanning the globe’ to fight crime, including bribery and corruption. Polite stated, “Crime does not limit itself by country or region. Corruption’s corrosive effects are global, with the world’s poor often bearing the brunt. Bribery threatens our collective security by undermining the rule of law and providing a breeding ground for other crime and authoritarian rule.”

Clawbacks

The clawback policy was developed to promote “innovative approaches to compensation” which would “shift the burden of corporate malfeasance away from uninvolved shareholders onto those more directly responsible.” She believes “Companies should ensure that executives and employees are personally invested in promoting compliance” as “nothing grabs attention or demands personal investment like having skin in the game, through direct and tangible financial incentives.” This led the Criminal Division to “develop guidance, guidance on how to reward corporations with compliance-promoting compensation programs.”

The clawback Initiative has two parts. “First, every corporate resolution involving the Criminal Division will now include a requirement that the resolving company develop compliance-promoting criteria within its compensation and bonus system. Second is the creation of a 3-year pilot program under which the “Criminal Division will provide fine reductions to companies who seek to claw back compensation from corporate wrongdoers.”

Finally, the DOJ has added some real benefits for companies which follow these prescripts. First is that any company which resolves a FCPA violation will “pay the applicable fine, minus a reserved credit equaling the amount of compensation the company is attempting to claw back from culpable executives and employees.” Additionally, “If the company succeeds and recoups compensation from a responsible employee, the company gets to keep that clawback money — and also doesn’t have to pay the amount it recovered.” Finally, if the company’s efforts at clawbacks are not successful or completed during the pendency of the investigation up to the settlement “the pilot program will also ensure that those who pursue clawbacks in good faith but are unsuccessful are still eligible to receive a fine reduction.” All of these efforts are designed to “shift the burden of corporate wrongdoing away from shareholders, who frequently play no role in the misconduct, onto those directly responsible.” This new emphasis is clearly designed to encourage companies who do not already factor compliance into compensation to retool their programs and get ahead of the curve.

Polite provided more detail on the new clawback initiative. He said, “As to clawbacks: for companies that fully cooperate with our investigation and timely and appropriately remediate the misconduct, they may receive an additional fine reduction if the company has implemented a program to recoup compensation and uses that program. We expect companies that use these programs to address not only employees who engaged in wrongdoing in connection with the conduct under investigation, but also those who had supervisory authority over the employees or business area engaged in the misconduct, and knew of, or were willfully blind to, the misconduct.” (emphasis mine)

Expanding on the benefits for an organization, he stated, “If the company meets these factors and – in good faith – has initiated the process to recover such compensation at the time of resolution, our prosecutors will accord an additional fine reduction equal to the amount of any compensation that is recouped within the resolution term.” Finally, “if a company’s good faith effort is unsuccessful by the time the resolution term ends, our prosecutors will have discretion to accord a fine reduction of up to 25% of the amount of compensation that has been sought.”

Polite did leave room for companies to weigh a variety of factors in bringing a clawback claim. He noted, “We are not trying to incentivize waste. To the contrary, companies should make an assessment about the potential cost to shareholders and prospect of success of clawback litigation, given any applicable laws, and weigh it against the value of recoupment – and proceed in accordance with their stated corporate policies on executive compensation. This Pilot Program will be in effect for three years, allowing us to gather data and assess its effectiveness and also aid other components and offices in considering this important issue.”

Any litigation is always fraught with unknowns, both known and unknown. Given the imbroglio involving the DOJ and Cognizant Technologies Solutions over the DOJ prosecution of former executives, the road to any successful clawback will be fraught with peril. Additionally, it is not clear how far companies or the DOJ will push for clawbacks from “those who had supervisory authority over the employees or business area engaged in the misconduct.” If scope creep comes in it could be a wide group.