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From the Editor's Desk

From the Editor’s Desk – September and October, 2023 in Compliance Week

Welcome to From the Editor’s Desk, a podcast where co-hosts Tom Fox and Kyle Brasseur, EIC at Compliance Week, unpack some of the top stories that have appeared in Compliance Week over the past month, look at top compliance stories upcoming for the next month, talk some sports and generally try to solve the world’s problems.

Tom Fox and Kyle Brasseur are back. In this edition, they discuss the importance of robust compliance programs and proactive disclosures that must be balanced in today’s complex regulatory landscape. Tom underscores the significance of effective compliance measures and the innovative use of data analytics in enhancing compliance programs. He advocates for companies to prioritize these aspects to mitigate risks and improve their overall compliance posture. On the other hand, Brasseur emphasizes the need for companies to take proactive measures and implement effective compliance programs, citing a case where a bank’s failure to heed warnings resulted in a hefty financial penalty. He stresses that companies cannot afford to wait for regulatory action or assume that things will change in their favor. Join Tom Fox and Kyle Brasseur on this episode of the From the Editor’s Desk podcast as they delve deeper into this critical topic.

Highlights Include:

  • FCPA Settlement: Innovative Data Analytics Compliance
  • Deutsche Bank Affiliate’s Climate Disclosure Settlement
  • Shinhan Bank’s Lack of Compliance Program
  • Anti-Money Laundering Landscape in Europe
  • AI’s Impact on Compliance Landscape
  • Compliance Insights: Unveiling the CCO’s Perspective
  • NFL season to date
  • MLB playoffs are here
  • Dame Lillard trade and it’s fallout

 Resources:

Kyle Brasseur on LinkedIn

Compliance Week

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Albemarle FCPA Enforcement Action: Part 3 – The Comeback

Last week, Albemarle Corporation (Albemarle) agreed to pay more than $218 million to resolve investigations by the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) and the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) into violations of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) stemming from Albemarle’s participation in corrupt schemes to pay bribes to government officials in multiple foreign countries.

According to a Non-Prosecution Agreement (NPA) with the DOJ, between 2009 and 2017, Albemarle, through its third-party sales agents and subsidiary employees, conspired to pay bribes to government officials to obtain and retain chemical catalyst business with state-owned oil refineries in Vietnam, Indonesia, and India. According to the SEC Administrative Order (Order), the bribery schemes extended into China and the UAE. Today, we consider the company’s conduct, which allowed it to receive such an outstanding reduction, leading to the significantly lower final penalty under the new Corporate Enforcement Policy.

Untimely Self-Disclosure

One of the interesting factors in this matter is that Albemarle voluntarily disclosed to the DOJ the illegal conduct at issue. However, NPA noted that “the disclosure was not “reasonably prompt” as defined in the Criminal Division Corporate Enforcement and Voluntary Self-Disclosure Policy and the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines.” As further laid out in the NPA, Albemarle learned of allegations regarding possible misconduct in Vietnam approximately 16 months before disclosing it to the DOJ. After that, “an internal investigation, the Company gathered evidence demonstrating the potential misconduct at least approximately nine months prior to the disclosure. The Company took remedial action and continued to investigate other potential issues. In January 2018, the Company disclosed to the Fraud Section misconduct relating to four separate geographies, including Vietnam.”

This meant the self-disclosure “was not within a reasonably prompt time after becoming aware of the misconduct in Vietnam,” and it means that Albemarle did not meet the standard for voluntary self-disclosure under the Criminal Division Corporate Enforcement and Voluntary Self-Disclosure Policy. Nevertheless, the DOJ “gave significant weight, in evaluating the appropriate disposition of this matter—including the appropriate form of the resolution and the reduction for cooperation and remediation—to the Company’s voluntary, even if untimely, disclosure of the misconduct.” The NPA stated that the company received credit for its “voluntarily disclosing the conduct that forms the basis for this Agreement before it came to the attention of the Offices.” 

Significant Cooperation 

The company was credited with significant cooperation with the DOJ during the pendency of its investigation, and the Company received credit for its cooperation with the DOJ investigation. It cooperated with their investigation and demonstrated recognition and affirmative acceptance of responsibility for its criminal conduct. The NPA went on to note that “the Company also received credit for its substantial cooperation and extensive and timely remediation. The company

  1. Promptly providing information obtained through its internal investigation, which allowed the government to preserve and obtain evidence as part of its extensive independent investigation;
  2. made regular and detailed presentations to the Offices;
  3. proactively identifying information previously unknown to the Offices;
  4. met DOJ requests promptly;
  5. voluntarily making foreign-based employees available for interviews in the United States;
  6. collected and produced voluminous relevant documents and translations to the Offices, including documents located outside the United States and
  7. It produced documents to the DOJ from foreign countries in ways that did not implicate foreign data privacy laws.

Extensive Remediation

Albemarle also received credit “because it engaged in extensive and timely remedial measures.” These remedial measures include:

  • The Company started its remediation program based on its internal investigation of the misconduct prior to the DOJ investigation (
  • Albemarle disciplined employees involved in the misconduct, including terminating eleven employees and withholding bonuses from sixteen employees;
  • Albemarle is strengthening its anti-corruption compliance program by investing in compliance resources, expanding its compliance function with experienced and qualified personnel, and taking steps to embed compliance and ethical values at all levels of its business organization;
  • The Company “transformed its business model and risk management process to reduce corruption risk in its operation and to embed compliance in the business, including implementing a go-to-market strategy that resulted in eliminating the use of sales agents throughout the Company, terminating hundreds of other third-party sales representatives, such as distributors and resellers, and shifting to a direct sales business model;
  • The company provides extensive training to its sales team and restructuring compensation and incentives so that compensation is no longer tied to sales amounts;
  • The company used data analytics to monitor and measure its compliance program’s effectiveness and
  • Albemarle engages in continuous testing, monitoring, and improvement of all aspects of its compliance program, beginning almost immediately following the identification of misconduct.

Holdbacks (not Clawbacks)

While the DOJ has made much noise about clawbacks from recalcitrant executives, Albemarle engaged in holdbacks, where they did not pay bonuses to certain employees involved in the conduct or those who had oversight. The NPA stated, “The Company withheld bonuses totaling $763,453 during the course of its internal investigation from employees who engaged in suspected wrongdoing.” The illegal conduct involved those who “(a) had supervisory authority over the employee(s) or business area engaged in the misconduct; and (b) knew of, or were willfully blind to, the misconduct.” The significance of this effort was important as it qualified Albemarle for an additional fine reduction of a dollar-for-dollar credit of the amount of the withheld bonuses under the Criminal Division’s March 2023 Compensation Incentives and Clawbacks Pilot Program.

Culture, Culture, Culture

Albemarle received additional credit or at least did not sustain any enhancement from the DOJ culture analysis. The NPA stated, “The Company has some limited history of prior civil and regulatory actions, including environmental and workplace safety matters, but no prior criminal history.” From this language and other enforcement actions taken since the October 2021 announcement of culture as an item the DOJ would assess, it now appears that civil and regulatory matters, particularly those in the ethics and compliance arena, would not be held against companies.

The Result

All of the above factors led to a significant discount for Albemarle under the Corporate Enforcement Policy. The NPA stated, “Accordingly, after considering (a) through (k) in paragraph 2 above, the Offices have determined that the appropriate resolution of this case is a non-prosecution agreement with the Company; payment by the Company in the amount of a $98,236,547 criminal monetary penalty, which reflects a discount of 45 percent off the bottom of the otherwise-applicable U.S. Sentencing Guidelines fine range and an additional discount of $763,453 under the Pilot Program, and $98,511,669 in forfeiture, which, as described below in paragraph 10, will be credited, in large part, against disgorgement of ill-gotten profits that the Company pays to the SEC in a concurrent resolution.” [emphasis supplied]

In other words, the actions of Albemarle saved it around $90 million in additional fines under the Policy, and this needs to take into account the discounts under the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines as their calculation was not reported in the NPA.

Join us tomorrow to review some of the key lessons learned.

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Albemarle FCPA Enforcement Action: Part 2 – How to Hire Corrupt Agents

Last week, Albemarle Corporation (Albemarle), agreed to pay more than $218 million to resolve investigations by the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) and the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) into violations of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) stemming from Albemarle’s participation in corrupt schemes to pay bribes to government officials in multiple foreign countries.

According to a Non-Prosecution Agreement (NPA) with the DOJ, between 2009 and 2017, Albemarle, through its third-party sales agents and subsidiary employees, conspired to pay bribes to government officials to obtain and retain chemical catalyst business with state-owned oil refineries in Vietnam, Indonesia, and India. According to the SEC Administrative Order (Order), the bribery schemes extended into China and the UAE.

 Vietnam-His Friends

The company sales model in Vietnam included using third-party agents. The initial commission rate for the corrupt agent in question was 4.25%. However, according to the NPA, quite quickly, the corrupt agent said he needed an increase in the commission rate from 4.25 percent to “4.25% + 4% extra,” which would be used to “settle down” PetroVietnam officials and to “contribute to his friends.” Internally, the company’s Vietnam sales team “sent this information – including Vietnam Intermediary’s warning that “if ALB could not provide such extra 4% commission,” Albemarle’s competitor that had the business before Albemarle “will be kept in BSR still” – to four Albemarle sales employees who were pursuing the Company’s first business in Vietnam.”

The corrupt sales agent kept pushing for an increase in the commission rate. He next emailed “Albemarle Vietnam Sales Representative, stating, “I have received a strong message from our friend that the total commission must be fixed [sic] at 7%” and that it did not matter how the commission was allocated; only the total amount, adding, “Please find the way to add to somewhere.” The corrupt agent then tried to move the commission rate up to 10%. Finally, the Albemarle Regional Sales Director emailed the corporate VP in Europe with the following, “it is clear that ash problem is more a way to keep great attention from Albemarle and [Albemarle’s competitor].” In his response, the Albemarle vice president wrote, “If [an Albemarle global business director] agrees to pay that amount of money (which I would never do), then I will not object,” but cautioned that “if just commission increases and job for us remains the same then you have an issue…” The NPA stated, “Albemarle ultimately agreed to increase Vietnam Intermediary Company’s commission from 4.25 percent to 6.5 percent.” 

Indonesia-The Big Boss

In Indonesia, another third-party agent was used. According to the NPA, “In or around 2012, following a change in leadership at Pertamina, Albemarle engaged Indonesia Intermediary Company to act as its local agent in return for four percent commission on sales to Pertamina. According to an Albemarle memorandum, Albemarle decided to replace its third-party agent in Indonesia at the “strong[] request[]” of Pertamina Official, the “big boss” of Pertamina, because the president of the new third-party agent was a close friend of Pertamina Official, despite the fact that the third-party agent was a small company and posed a “medium” risk.”

In or around November or December 2012, the corrupt Indonesian agent “paid bribes to Pertamina officials to obtain samples of a competitor’s product, which Albemarle used to craft its bids and improve its product.” The company’s Senior Sales Manager learned about these bribes “but did not report this to Albemarle’s compliance function and did not consider terminating Albemarle’s relationship with Indonesia Intermediary Company.”

Then, in February 2013, the corrupt agent asked Albemarle to increase its commission from 4% to 10% so the agent “could pay bribes to Pertamina officials. The request was made during a meeting at Albemarle’s Singapore office and was attended by, among others, a close relative of Pertamina Official, who purportedly was a director of Indonesia Intermediary Company.

In response to the request at the meeting, Albemarle personnel told Indonesia Intermediary Company that they refused to increase the commission and that no bribes should be paid per Albemarle policy, but maintained its relationship with Indonesia Intermediary Company and never reported the conversation to Albemarle legal, compliance, or supervisory personnel. Albemarle Senior Sales Manager was aware that Indonesia Intermediary Company paid “tips” to Pertamina officials, but directed that such category not be listed in expenses.” Most ominously, the NPA concluded, “Albemarle continued to receive inside information on the bidding process from Indonesia Intermediary Company.

India-On the Holiday List

In India, the company used another corrupt agent to illegally “retain catalyst business with India’s state-owned oil company, IOCL, by avoiding Albemarle being blacklisted. This agent “which had no prior relationship or contact with Albemarle, sent a “most urgent” email to Albemarle Regional Sales Manager stating that it was aware that Albemarle had been sent a letter from IOCL asking why Albemarle should not be “sent on Holiday list. You may be required to supply six months of catalyst-free of cost.” India Intermediary further stated in the email that “[w]e can definitely help you to come out of this situation and get the orders for you in the refineries.”

The Regional Sales Manager then sent an email to the company VP, “copying four others at Albemarle, regarding “IOCL developments” and multiple consultants who had contacted Albemarle to offer “assistance to influence and get in contact with higher level to discuss on a non-official basis.” The corrupt agent knew “much detail” and as “more aggressive” and noted that India Intermediary Company “do[es] confirm, no bribing and we can put that in the agreement.”

The Regional Sales Manager stated that the company held discussions with IOCL but at each stage was “blocked by top” and that this may have been because IOCL “want us to use [sic] consultant.” He further stated that to date, IOCL had not accepted Albemarle’s “‘reasonable’ arguments” and that “indications are mostly that they will put us on the holiday list. As I see it, the time has come to consider using a consultant seriously, and if so, it must be done very fast.”

This section of the NPA dryly concluded, “Notwithstanding multiple red flags, Albemarle entered into a consulting contract with India Intermediary Company, effective July 15, 2009, signed by Albemarle Vice President. Following the engagement of India Intermediary Company, Albemarle was not put on the “holiday list” by IOCL.”

China-a Thorny Uncle

In China, the company hired yet another corrupt agent based on the recommendation of an official from China State-Owned Customer. According to the SEC Order, “Emails among Albemarle Subsidiary personnel described a senior official at China State-Owned Customer as the “uncle” of China Agent’s principal, a situation they recognized was “thorny.” Neither China Agent nor Albemarle Subsidiary personnel identified China Agent’s Principal or reported the possible familial connection to China Official in the due diligence questionnaire or other documents submitted to Albemarle compliance personnel conducting due diligence on China Agent. However, Albemarle compliance department’s due diligence revealed that China Agent had no website and was authorized to do business only a few weeks before China Agent’s Principal first met with Albemarle personnel.”

UAE-Close Friends of the (Royal) Family

In the UAE, in violation of company policy, due diligence was conducted on UAE agents only after entering sales agency agreements with the agent, including an addendum increasing its commission. The UAE Agent had close and well-publicized ties to the UAE government and royal family, contrary to the UAE Agent’s representations in its due diligence questionnaire. Although certain company personnel in the Middle East and the Netherlands knew of the UAE Agent’s involvement, they did not inform Albemarle Legal or Compliance personnel of the relationship, and no due diligence was conducted on the UAE Agent. He provided no discernable services other than conveying confidential tender evaluations and competitors’ bids obtained from the refinery and the EPC firm.

In addition to commissions that Albemarle paid to the UAE Agent, the company paid the UAE Agent an “undefined “administrative charge” equal to ten percent of its invoices for customs clearance and other non-sales services. These undocumented charges fell outside the scope of Albemarle’s agreement with the UAE Agent. Albemarle’s system of internal accounting controls provided inadequate assurances that payments to UAE agents were used for legitimate services. Moreover, Albemarle Netherlands and Albemarle Middle East, whose books and records were consolidated into Albemarle’s financial statements, lacked support for payments to UAE Agent that were recorded as legitimate commissions and business expenses.”

I have gone through all these miss-steps, prevarications, neglected red flags, and outright leadership and compliance failures to follow the most basic internal company compliance policies to show how and why these actions occurred. They present the compliance professional with numerous data points to pressure test your compliance regime.

Join us tomorrow, where we take a deep dive into actions taken by Albemarle to remediate, cooperate, and obtain the fines and penalties.

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Albemarle FCPA Enforcement Action: Part 1 – Background

Last week, Albemarle Corporation (Albemarle), a publicly traded specialty chemicals manufacturing company headquartered in North Carolina, agreed to pay more than $218 million to resolve investigations by the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) and the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) into violations of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) stemming from Albemarle’s participation in corrupt schemes to pay bribes to government officials in multiple foreign countries.

According to the DOJ Press Release, between 2009 and 2017, Albemarle, through its third-party sales agents and subsidiary employees, conspired to pay bribes to government officials to obtain and retain chemical catalyst business with state-owned oil refineries in Vietnam, Indonesia, and India. Albemarle illegally obtained profits of approximately $98.5 million as a result of the scheme.

What They Said

Acting Assistant Attorney General Nicole M. Argentieri of the Justice Department’s Criminal Division said, “Albemarle earned nearly $100 million by participating in schemes to pay bribes to government officials in multiple countries. As today’s announcement makes clear, the Justice Department will work tirelessly with our partners in the ongoing fight against international corruption. Today’s resolution also demonstrates the real benefits that companies can receive if they self-disclose misconduct, substantially cooperate, and extensively remediate.”

U.S. Attorney Dena J. King for the Western District of North Carolina said, “Corruption has no borders, but neither does justice. Companies are expected to adhere to the same ethical and legal standards whether they are doing business on U.S. soil or overseas. Albemarle’s eventual voluntary disclosure of fraud and subsequent efforts to remedy its business practices abroad is a step in the right direction for the company. Above all, today’s announcement underscores our commitment to fight corruption affecting the United States no matter where it occurs.”

IRS-CI Chief Jim Lee said, “The $218 million resolution announced today reflects IRS Criminal Investigation (IRS-CI) special agents’ commitment to working with our law enforcement partners to expose and disrupt organizations engaged in unscrupulous business practices aggressively. Thanks to our domestic and international law enforcement partners, we’ve ensured Albemarle will be held accountable for their misdeeds.”

Charles Cain, Chief of the SEC Enforcement Division’s FCPA Unit, said in an SEC Press Release, “Despite repeated and glaring bribery-related red flags, Albemarle failed for many years to implement sufficient internal accounting controls relevant to the use of agents by its global refining solutions business to make sales to state-owned customers around the world. This failure set the stage for wide-ranging misconduct.”

The Bribery Schemes

The bribery schemes were in multiple countries and varied in execution. The DOJ said, “In Vietnam, Albemarle corruptly obtained contracts at two state-owned oil refineries through an intermediary sales agent who requested increased commissions to pay bribes to Vietnam officials and to structure tender requirements to favor Albemarle. In Indonesia, Albemarle used a third-party intermediary to corruptly obtain catalyst business with Indonesia’s state-owned oil company, even after that third-party intermediary had informed Albemarle that it was necessary to pay bribes to Indonesian officials to obtain business. In India, Albemarle used a third-party intermediary to corruptly retain catalyst business with India’s state-owned oil company by avoiding Albemarle being blacklisted.”

The SEC said, “According to the SEC’s Order, despite significant red flags, Albemarle used agents from at least 2009 through 2017 that paid bribes to obtain sales of refinery catalysts to public-sector oil refineries in Vietnam, India, and Indonesia and private-sector oil refineries in India.” The SEC went on to note that “Albemarle violated the FCPA’s recordkeeping requirements and failed to devise and maintain a sufficient system of internal accounting controls to provide reasonable assurances that payments made to agents in Vietnam, Indonesia, India, China, and the United Arab Emirates were for legitimate services.”

The Penalties

According to the FCPA Blog, Albemarle agreed to pay the “DOJ and SEC $218 million in penalties and disgorgement to resolve FCPA offenses related to bribing government officials at state-owned oil refineries around the world.” With regard to the DOJ, Albemarle entered into a three-year non-prosecution agreement (NPA) to pay a penalty of approximately $98.2 million and administrative forfeiture of approximately $98.5 million.

This DOJ penalty included a reduction of $763,453 under Part II of the Criminal Division’s March 2023 Compensation Incentives and Clawbacks Pilot Program for bonuses that the company withheld from qualifying employees. Additionally, Albemarle agreed to pay approximately $103.6 million in disgorgement and prejudgment interest as part of the resolution of the SEC’s parallel investigation. The DOJ credited approximately $81.9 million of the forfeiture to be paid to the Department against disgorgement Albemarle has agreed to pay to the SEC.

According to the SEC, “Albemarle consented to the SEC’s Order finding that it violated the anti-bribery, recordkeeping, and internal accounting controls provisions of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. Albemarle has agreed to cease and desist from committing or causing any future violations of these provisions and to pay disgorgement of more than $81.8 million plus prejudgment interest of more than $21.7 million, totaling more than $103.6 million.”

Join us tomorrow, where we take a deep dive into the bribery schemes.

Additional Resources

DOJ- Non-Prosecution Agreement

SEC Order

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Daily Compliance News

Daily Compliance News: October 2, 2023 – The Welcome to October Edition

Welcome to the Daily Compliance News. Each day, Tom Fox, the Voice of Compliance, brings you compliance-related stories to start your day. Sit back, enjoy morning coffee, and listen to the Daily Compliance News. All from the Compliance Podcast Network. Each day, we consider four stories from the business world: compliance, ethics, risk management, leadership, or general interest for the compliance professional.

Stories we are following in today’s edition:

  • Albemarle settles FCPA action.  (FCPA Blog)
  • Shinhan Bank to pay $25MM for ‘compliance problems’. (WSJ)
  • Yet another pre-taliation case, this time DE Shaw pays $10MM. (WSJ)
  • Clear Channel settles FCPA enforcement action. (FCPA Blog)
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31 Days to More Effective Compliance Programs

One Month to More Effective Written Standards: Day 18 – Policies on Extortion Payments

The next area for policies is extortion payments, which not are made illegal under the FCPA. Extortion payments are made for any action which threatens or demands payment for life, liberty, or health. These should be exempted out from your facilitation payments and your compliance program through specific language. You need to do this for a variety of reasons. First and foremost, your employees must understand that the company will support them if they are in any way threatened with harm, with arrest or physical detention, their health/safety is threatened. As a compliance professional, you need to make sure they understand they need to do whatever they have to do to get themselves out of such a situation.
 Some of the situations your employees might face are along the lines of the following:

  • Employees are stopped by police, military or paramilitary personnel, or militia (uniformed or not) at designated or other checkpoints or other places and a payment is demanded as a condition of passage of persons or property;
  • Employees are stopped at the airport by customs or passport control personnel or military personnel and a payment is demanded for entry or exit of persons or property; or
  • Employees are asked by persons claiming to be security personnel, immigration control, or health inspectors to pay for an allegedly required inoculation or other similar procedure.

The key though is that it be properly documented. But more than simply the documentation is that you must specifically list extortion payments in your books and records, so you will not be suspected with hiding them by describing them as something else. The key is to train your employees specifically on the actions to take. In your policy, state that if there is a threat to health, safety or liberty, it is not a facilitation payment but an extortion payment. Make sure that they understand what their rights are and what their obligations are to report it when they come back to the corporate office or their office. Always remember, an extortion payment is not a FCPA violation.

Three key takeaways:

  1. Extortion payments are not illegal under the FCPA.
  2. Was the action an extortion or some other type of situation?
  3. “Document, Document, and Document” your extortion payments, both the financial component and a description of the underlying events.

For more information, check out The Compliance Handbook, 4th edition, here.

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31 Days to More Effective Compliance Programs

One Month to More Effective Written Standards: Day 17 – Policies for Third-Parties

As every compliance practitioner is well aware, third-parties still present the highest risk under the FCPA. The DOJ 2023 ECCP devotes an entire prong to third-party management. It begins with the following: A well-designed compliance program should apply risk-based due diligence to its third-party relationships.  Although the degree of appropriate due diligence may vary based on the size and nature of the company or transaction, prosecutors should assess the extent to which the company has an understanding of the qualifications and associations of third-party partners, including the agents, consultants, and distributors that are commonly used to conceal misconduct, such as the payment of bribes to foreign officials in international business transactions.
This set of queries clearly specifies the DOJ expects an integrated approach that is operationalized throughout the company. This means your compliance program must have a process for the full life cycle of third-party risk management. There are five steps in the life cycle of third-party management: 1) business justification; 2) questionnaire to third-party; 3) due diligence on third-party; 4) compliance terms and conditions, including payment terms; and 5) management and oversight of third parties after contract signing.
I continually give my mantra of compliance, which is “Document, Document, and Document”. Each of the steps you take in the management of your third parties must be documented. Not only must they be documented but they must be stored and managed in a manner that you can retrieve them with relative ease. The management of third parties is absolutely critical in any best practices compliance program.

Three key takeaways:

  1. Use the full five-step process for third-party management.
  2. Make sure you have Business Development involvement and buy-in.
  3. Operationalize all steps going forward by including business unit representatives.

For more information, check out The Compliance Handbook, 4th edition, here.

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31 Days to More Effective Compliance Programs

One Month to More Effective Written Standards: Day 16: Policies on Facilitation Payments

From the information provided by the DOJ in Opinion Releases and in enforcement actions, there are several different insights which may be drawn on regarding what should go into your policy on facilitation payments. Do not forget that facilitation payments must be accurately shown on the books and records of your company. In all cases the employee who requested permission to make the facilitation payment must be responsible for obtaining all required approvals and forwarding a copy of the approvals and any other relevant supporting documentation as required, so that the it is recorded as a facilitation expense in the books and records and maintained in a central file. Facilitation payments should not be recorded as consulting fees, entertainment expenses, or other types of expenses that may misrepresent the true nature of the payments.
There may be emergency situations when it will be difficult or impossible for employees to obtain approvals before having to decide whether or not to pay a facilitation payment. If the facilitation payment is made in an emergency, the employee reports the facilitating payment to the compliance department and explains the emergency as soon as practical after making the facilitation payment.

Three key takeaways:

  1. What was the amount of the facilitation payment?
  2. Was the action truly routine?
  3. How high up was the government official who received the facilitation payment? Was his or her decision discretionary?

For more information, check out The Compliance Handbook, 4th edition, here.

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31 Days to More Effective Compliance Programs

One Month to More Effective Written Standards: Day 15 – Enforcement Actions Featuring Facilitation Payments

One of the more confusing areas of the FCPA is in that of facilitation payments. Facilitation payments are small bribes but make no mistake about it, they are bribes. For that reason, many companies feel they are inconsistent with a company culture of doing business ethically and in compliance with laws prohibiting corruption and bribery. Further, the 2020 FCPA Resource Guide specified, “while the payment may qualify as an exception to the FCPA’s anti-bribery provisions, it may violate other laws, both in Foreign Country and elsewhere. In addition, if the payment is not accurately recorded, it could violate the FCPA’s books and records provision.” Additionally, the 2020 FCPA Resource Guide stated, “Whether a payment falls within the exception is not dependent on the size of the payment, though size can be telling, as a large payment is more suggestive of corrupt intent to influence a non-routine governmental action. But, like the FCPA’s anti-bribery provisions more generally, the facilitating payments exception focuses on the purpose of the payment rather than its value.”
In addition to these clear statements about whether the FCPA should continue to allow said bribes; you should also consider the administrative nightmare for any international company. The U.K. Bribery Act does not have any such exception, exemption or defense along the lines of the FCPA facilitation payment exception. This means that even if your company allows facilitation payments, it must exempt out every U.K. Company or subsidiary from the policy. Further, if your company employs any U.K. citizens, they are subject to the U.K. Bribery Act no matter who they work for and where they may work in the world, so they must also be exempted. Finally, if your U.S. Company does business with a U.K. or other company subject to the U.K. Bribery Act, you may be prevented contractually from making facilitation payments while working under that customer’s contract. As I said, an administrative nightmare.

Three key takeaways:

  1. Do not forget the administrative nightmare of facilitation payments for international organizations.
  2. The Kay decision made clear how narrow the “routine government action” exception is.
  3. Facilitation payments will usually be an add-on as they are symptomatic of an ineffective compliance program.

For more information, check out The Compliance Handbook, 4th edition, here.

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31 Days to More Effective Compliance Programs

One Month to More Effective Written Standards: Day 14 – The Problem with Facilitation Payments

The original version of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA), enacted in 1977, contained an exception for payments made to non-US officials who performed duties that were “essentially ministerial or clerical”. In 1988 Congress responded by amending the FCPA under the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act to clarify the scope of the FCPA’s prohibitions on bribery, including the scope of permitted facilitation payments. An expanded definition of “routine governmental action” was included in the final version of the bill, reflecting the intent of Congress that the exceptions apply only to the performance of duties listed in the subcategories of the statute and actions of a similar nature. Congress also meant to make clear that “ordinarily and commonly performed actions”, with respect to permits or licenses, would not include those governmental approvals involving an exercise of discretion by a government official where the actions are the functional equivalent of “obtaining or retaining business for, or with, or directing business to, any person.”

Three key takeaways:

  1. Many companies still struggle with facilitation payments.
  2. What are the five listed purposes for facilitation payments?
  3. The facilitation payment exception is narrowly construed by both the courts and the Justice Department.

For more information, check out The Compliance Handbook, 4th edition, here.