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Blog

Day 12 of One Month to More Effective Internal Controls-Board Oversight as an Internal Control

Best practices compliance program. The first in Hallmark No. 1 states, “Within a business organization, compliance begins with the board of directors and senior executives setting the proper tone for the rest of the company.” The second is found under Hallmark No. 3, entitled “Oversight, Autonomy and Resources,” which says the Chief Compliance Officer (CCO) should have “direct access to an organization’s governing authority, such as the board of directors and committees of the board of directors (e.g., the audit committee).” Further, under the US Sentencing Guidelines, the Board must exercise reasonable oversight of the effectiveness of a company’s compliance program. The DOJ Prosecution Standards posed the following queries: (1) Do the Directors exercise independent review of a company’s compliance program? and (2) Are Directors provided sufficient information to enable independent judgment?

The DOJ’s remarks drove home to me the absolute requirement for Board participation in any best practices or even effective anti-corruption compliance program. I believe that a Board must have a corporate compliance program in place and actively oversee that function.

Further, if a company’s business plan includes a high-risk proposition, there should be additional oversight. In other words, there is an affirmative duty to ask tough questions. But it is more than simply having a compliance program in place. The Board must exercise appropriate oversight of the compliance program and the compliance function. The Board must ask hard questions and be fully informed of the company’s overall compliance strategy. Lawyers often speak to and advise Boards on their legal obligations and duties. If a Board’s oversight is part of effective financial controls under Sarbanes Oxley (SOX), that includes effective compliance controls. Failure to do either may result in something far worse than bad governance. It may directly lead to an FCPA violation and could even form the basis of an independent FCPA violation. A company must have a corporate compliance program in place and actively oversee that function. A failure to perform these functions may lead to independent liability of a Board for its failure to perform its allotted tasks in an effective compliance program. Internal controls work together with compliance policies and procedures and are interrelated control mechanisms. There are five general compliance internal controls for a Board or Board subcommittee role for compliance:

  1. Risk Assessment – A Board should assess the compliance risks associated with its business.
  2. Corporate Compliance Policy and Code of Conduct – A Board should have an overall governance document informing the company, its employees, stakeholders, and third parties of the conduct the company expects from an employee. If the company is global/multi-national, this document should be translated into the relevant languages as appropriate.
  3. Implementing Procedures – A Board should determine if the company has a written set of procedures that instructs employees on how to comply with the company’s compliance policy.
  4. Training – There are two levels of Board training. The first should be that the Board has a general understanding of what the FCPA is, and it should also understand its role in an effective compliance program.
  5. Monitor Compliance – A Board should independently test, assess and audit to determine if its compliance policies and procedures are a ‘living and breathing program’ and not just a paper tiger.
  6. There have been recent FCPA enforcement actions where the DOJ and SEC discussed the failure of internal controls as a basis for FCPA liability. With the questions about the Wal-Mart Board of Directors and their failure to act in the face of allegations of bribery and corruption in the company’s Mexico subsidiary, or contrasting failing even to be aware of the allegations, there may soon be an independent basis for an FCPA violation for a Board’s failure to perform its internal controls function in a best practices compliance program. 

Three Key Takeaways:

  1. GTE compliance internal controls are low-hanging fruit. Pick them.
  2. Compliance with internal controls can be both detected and prevented controls.
  3. Good compliance with internal controls is good for business.

Board oversight of your compliance program can act as an internal control if properly documented. For more information on improving your internal controls management process, visit this month’s sponsor Workiva at workiva.com.

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Compliance Into the Weeds

Compliance into the Weeds – Episode 43 – The Linde Declination

On June 16, 2017, the Department of Justice (DOJ) issued a Declination to Linde North American Inc. and Linde Gas North America LLC (collectively “Linde”). This is the first Declination issued by the DOJ in the era of the Trump Administration. For that reason alone, it was instructive and should be studied by the compliance profession. However, the case presented several interesting factors which merit consideration, so we are discussing in depth to present lessons to be learned for the Chief Compliance Officer (CCO) or compliance practitioner.

Lessons Learned

This was yet another Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) action where a company performed insufficient due diligence in the acquisition phase. The timing of the Linde purchase of Spectra Gases and Spectra Gases’ purchase of the income-producing assets is too close in time to be a coincidence. It would certainly appear that Linde purchased Spectra Gases to facilitate its acquisition of the boron column and other assets. If your company is going to make such a multi-step acquisition, you must perform due diligence on all the actors and the assets involved.

The Byzantine corporate structure created for the ownership of the boron column, its operation, and its management contract are clear red flags that any CCO should sniff out immediately. While I am sure the internal corporate excuse for this clear ruse was the ubiquitous ‘tax considerations,’ every such transaction should also be reviewed by compliance. Anytime there is more than one entity to accomplish one task, there is the possibility of fraud. Further, it is unclear how Linde could not have been aware of the company’s ownership interests that it ultimately controlled. It would seem that the company did not even make any inquiries.

Even in 2006, the Republic of Georgia’s reputation for bribery and corruption was quite high. The 2006 Transparency International-Corrupt Perceptions Index (TI-CPI) listed Georgia at 99 out of 176 countries, which warranted red flag scrutiny. Extra care is warranted if you are purchasing an entity in a country with such a well-known affinity for corruption. Perhaps in 2006, Linde did not view the FCPA as something it would deal with in such a situation.

Yet even with all the apparent miss-steps and non-steps of compliance, the company was able to secure a declination from the DOJ. While there may be some additional penalties or sanctions by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) for the failures of internal controls, the result obtained by Linde was certainly superior. The company has met the four pillars under the FCPA Pilot Program through (a) self-disclosure, (b) extraordinary cooperation, (3) full remediation, and (d) profit disgorgement. Interestingly, in this case, the profit disgorgement would have been beyond the five-year limitations for profit disgorgement under the recent Supreme Court decision in Kokesh. If the SEC brings an FCPA enforcement action, additional facts may be recited in any resolution documents.

Nevertheless, kudos are due to Linde and its counsel for obtaining this declination. Every CCO should study it for both the superior result received and underlying facts to see if you face anything similar in the Republic of Georgia or elsewhere.

For a full copy of the Linde Declination, click here

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This Week in FCPA

This Week in FCPA-Episode 56

  • The Kokesh case at the US Supreme Court is significant for SEC enforcement of the FCPA around profit disgorgement. For what it means to the compliance practitioner, see Tom’s piece in the FCPA Compliance & Ethics Blog. For a legal review of the decision, see Miller & Chevalier client alert authored by Saskia Zandieh. Marc Bohn considered the case in the FCPA Blog. Marc and I discuss the case on the FCPA Compliance Report, Episode 332.
  • Trevor McFadden to leave the DOJ for federal bench. See article by Matt Kelly in Radical Compliance. Hui Chen’s contract not to be renewed, her position is posted for job applicants. Apply for the position here. Andrew Weissman leaves as head of the Fraud Section to go Special Prosecutor’s staff.
  • Former PetroTiger General Counsel Gregory Weismann is banned from SEC practice. See article in the FCPA Blog.
  • Matthew Stephenson considers what a Wal-Mart settlement might look like. See his article in the Global Anti-Corruption Blog.
  • The federal judge who sentenced Samuel Mebiame, the bag man for Och-Ziff; criticized the DOJ for its lack of prosecution of any individuals from the company. See article by Sam Rubenfeld in WSJ Risk and Compliance Report.
  • Jay previews his weekend report.
  • Tom continues to talk about the release of his new book 2016 – The Year in Corporate FCPA Enforcement. For more information and to purchase, click here.
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