In this episode, we discuss the key role Board of Directors around oversight of strategy and risk. Mutual of Omaha Insurance Company and Virtus Investment Partners. She is a thought leader, regular contributor, and speaker on governance, strategy, and leadership. Prior to her board service, Ms. Hooda held senior operating roles at TIAA, Credit Suisse Investment Bank, Thomson Reuters, and McKinsey & Co. across the US, Europe, and Asia/India. Ms. Hooda is a lifetime member of the Council on Foreign Relations and serves on boards focusing on Education, Women’s Empowerment, and Global Policy. The Board of Directors has a key role in the oversight of strategic risk for an organization.
Tag: Board of Directors
Oversight – What compliance expertise has been available on the board of directors?”, you need to have not only the structure of the Board Level Compliance Committee but also the specific subject matter expertise (SME) on the Board and on that committee.
Finally, recognizing that compensation can be a powerful motive to induce ethical and even business appropriate behavior the Board recommended that it use compensation to hold senior executives accountable by “incorporating ethical business practices, diversity and inclusion, and other values from Uber’s Business Code of Conduct into its executive compensation program. This compensation program would be coupled with training on the company’s revamped ethical business practices, diversity, inclusion and other key corporate values.
As is often the case, it is the editorial board at the FT which has some of the best advice for businesses, both in the UK and the US. In a piece entitled “At Uber, counting the cost of winner take all” the paper said, there are three groups which can influence the behavior for Uber going forward: the company’s owners, largely Kalanack and his cronies; the Board of Directors, think about Bonderman at this point; and its customers, IE., you and me. As to the final group, we can vote with our pocketbook by changing over to other ride-sharing companies such as Lyft.
Most importantly, the Uber ownership structure is a forbearer of ownership being concentrated in the hands of a few key founders. If they do not put compliance and ethics into the ethos of the company at an early phase, they cannot be forced to do so by shareholders or investors. This anomaly will make independent Boards of Directors more critical for getting such companies ready to go public. For if such companies cannot meet the requirements of a public company, everyone loses.
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What role did the Uber Board play in its culture disaster and what role must it play going forward?
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© Thomas R. Fox, 2017]]>
Show Notes for Everything Compliance-Episode 14
Topics from Matt:
- Trump Administration & FCPA enforcement— we have two declinations now; maybe a compare-and-contrast and speculation on what a tough Trump Admin enforcement WOULD look like;
- EU’s GDPR— Do EU regulators know what they want to do with the enforcement of this law; if they follow the lead of the anti-competition people whacking Google, it could be a big deal;
- Hui Chen’s departure from the Justice Department, both her public rebuke of Trump and the substance of how she believes her guidance has been misinterpreted; and
- Ethical leadership and the lack thereof; the menace of abusing perks and privilege, connecting my posts about Uber’s leaders and Chris Christie vacationing on a closed beach.
Topics from Jay:
- How do the Campaign Finance Laws mirror/or differ from the FCPA?
- Will the Russian Collusion Investigation reveal the ultimate FCPA violation?
- Regarding Walter Shaub’s departure from the Office of Governmental Ethics (OGE), does it matter? What is OGE supposed to do, and why did it work for the past 40+ years but fall on deaf ears with the Trump administration?
- Dovetailing with Matt’s question about a slow H1 for FCPA enforcement and in light of the just-released Gibson Dunn FCPA Mid-Year Report, does the current climate (and lack of vigorous enforcement) provide a perfect storm for companies to look the other way if they fall off the E&C wagon, or do we think that companies are still being vigilant despite a perception of decreased enforcement?
Rants follow this week’s episode. What do the two declinations in 2017 mean? The Everything Compliance panel of experts weighs in.
Best practices compliance program. The first in Hallmark No. 1 states, “Within a business organization, compliance begins with the board of directors and senior executives setting the proper tone for the rest of the company.” The second is found under Hallmark No. 3, entitled “Oversight, Autonomy and Resources,” which says the Chief Compliance Officer (CCO) should have “direct access to an organization’s governing authority, such as the board of directors and committees of the board of directors (e.g., the audit committee).” Further, under the US Sentencing Guidelines, the Board must exercise reasonable oversight of the effectiveness of a company’s compliance program. The DOJ Prosecution Standards posed the following queries: (1) Do the Directors exercise independent review of a company’s compliance program? and (2) Are Directors provided sufficient information to enable independent judgment?
The DOJ’s remarks drove home to me the absolute requirement for Board participation in any best practices or even effective anti-corruption compliance program. I believe that a Board must have a corporate compliance program in place and actively oversee that function.
Further, if a company’s business plan includes a high-risk proposition, there should be additional oversight. In other words, there is an affirmative duty to ask tough questions. But it is more than simply having a compliance program in place. The Board must exercise appropriate oversight of the compliance program and the compliance function. The Board must ask hard questions and be fully informed of the company’s overall compliance strategy. Lawyers often speak to and advise Boards on their legal obligations and duties. If a Board’s oversight is part of effective financial controls under Sarbanes Oxley (SOX), that includes effective compliance controls. Failure to do either may result in something far worse than bad governance. It may directly lead to an FCPA violation and could even form the basis of an independent FCPA violation. A company must have a corporate compliance program in place and actively oversee that function. A failure to perform these functions may lead to independent liability of a Board for its failure to perform its allotted tasks in an effective compliance program. Internal controls work together with compliance policies and procedures and are interrelated control mechanisms. There are five general compliance internal controls for a Board or Board subcommittee role for compliance:
- Risk Assessment – A Board should assess the compliance risks associated with its business.
- Corporate Compliance Policy and Code of Conduct – A Board should have an overall governance document informing the company, its employees, stakeholders, and third parties of the conduct the company expects from an employee. If the company is global/multi-national, this document should be translated into the relevant languages as appropriate.
- Implementing Procedures – A Board should determine if the company has a written set of procedures that instructs employees on how to comply with the company’s compliance policy.
- Training – There are two levels of Board training. The first should be that the Board has a general understanding of what the FCPA is, and it should also understand its role in an effective compliance program.
- Monitor Compliance – A Board should independently test, assess and audit to determine if its compliance policies and procedures are a ‘living and breathing program’ and not just a paper tiger.
- There have been recent FCPA enforcement actions where the DOJ and SEC discussed the failure of internal controls as a basis for FCPA liability. With the questions about the Wal-Mart Board of Directors and their failure to act in the face of allegations of bribery and corruption in the company’s Mexico subsidiary, or contrasting failing even to be aware of the allegations, there may soon be an independent basis for an FCPA violation for a Board’s failure to perform its internal controls function in a best practices compliance program.
Three Key Takeaways:
- GTE compliance internal controls are low-hanging fruit. Pick them.
- Compliance with internal controls can be both detected and prevented controls.
- Good compliance with internal controls is good for business.
Board oversight of your compliance program can act as an internal control if properly documented. For more information on improving your internal controls management process, visit this month’s sponsor Workiva at workiva.com.
On June 16, 2017, the Department of Justice (DOJ) issued a Declination to Linde North American Inc. and Linde Gas North America LLC (collectively “Linde”). This is the first Declination issued by the DOJ in the era of the Trump Administration. For that reason alone, it was instructive and should be studied by the compliance profession. However, the case presented several interesting factors which merit consideration, so we are discussing in depth to present lessons to be learned for the Chief Compliance Officer (CCO) or compliance practitioner.
Lessons Learned
This was yet another Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) action where a company performed insufficient due diligence in the acquisition phase. The timing of the Linde purchase of Spectra Gases and Spectra Gases’ purchase of the income-producing assets is too close in time to be a coincidence. It would certainly appear that Linde purchased Spectra Gases to facilitate its acquisition of the boron column and other assets. If your company is going to make such a multi-step acquisition, you must perform due diligence on all the actors and the assets involved.
The Byzantine corporate structure created for the ownership of the boron column, its operation, and its management contract are clear red flags that any CCO should sniff out immediately. While I am sure the internal corporate excuse for this clear ruse was the ubiquitous ‘tax considerations,’ every such transaction should also be reviewed by compliance. Anytime there is more than one entity to accomplish one task, there is the possibility of fraud. Further, it is unclear how Linde could not have been aware of the company’s ownership interests that it ultimately controlled. It would seem that the company did not even make any inquiries.
Even in 2006, the Republic of Georgia’s reputation for bribery and corruption was quite high. The 2006 Transparency International-Corrupt Perceptions Index (TI-CPI) listed Georgia at 99 out of 176 countries, which warranted red flag scrutiny. Extra care is warranted if you are purchasing an entity in a country with such a well-known affinity for corruption. Perhaps in 2006, Linde did not view the FCPA as something it would deal with in such a situation.
Yet even with all the apparent miss-steps and non-steps of compliance, the company was able to secure a declination from the DOJ. While there may be some additional penalties or sanctions by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) for the failures of internal controls, the result obtained by Linde was certainly superior. The company has met the four pillars under the FCPA Pilot Program through (a) self-disclosure, (b) extraordinary cooperation, (3) full remediation, and (d) profit disgorgement. Interestingly, in this case, the profit disgorgement would have been beyond the five-year limitations for profit disgorgement under the recent Supreme Court decision in Kokesh. If the SEC brings an FCPA enforcement action, additional facts may be recited in any resolution documents.
Nevertheless, kudos are due to Linde and its counsel for obtaining this declination. Every CCO should study it for both the superior result received and underlying facts to see if you face anything similar in the Republic of Georgia or elsewhere.
For a full copy of the Linde Declination, click here.
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This Week in FCPA-Episode 56
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Jay Rosen can be reached:
Mobile (310) 729-6746
Toll Free (866)-201-0903
JRosen@affiliatedmonitors.com
Tom Fox can be reached:
Phone: 832-744-0264
Email: tfox@tfoxlaw.com]]>
