Categories
Innovation in Compliance

Building a Stronger Culture of Compliance Through Targeted and Effective Training: Part 5 – The Role of the Board

Welcome to a special 5 part podcast series on building a stronger culture of compliance through targeted and effective training, sponsored by Diligent. Over this series, I will visit with Kunal Agrawal, Director of Customer Success at Diligent; Kevin McCoy, Customer Success Manager at Diligent; Jessica Czeczuga, Director, Compliance and Ethics at Diligent; Andrew Rincón, Client Director at Diligent; and David Greenberg, former CEO and Special Advisor at LRN and Director at International Seaways. Over this series, we will consider the importance of ongoing communications, the value of targeted training, training third parties, and the role of the Board of Directors. In this concluding Part 5, we consider the role of the Board of Directors in a compliance program with David Greenberg.

In this episode, Greenberg discusses the board’s legal obligations, emphasizing their duty to exercise reasonable oversight over potential misconduct and failures of compliance with law and policy. The podcast also delves into the importance of integrating compliance programs into a company’s overall strategy and developing strong relationships with senior management, such as the chief legal officer or chief compliance officer. Listeners will learn the importance of finding the right committee to oversee compliance obligations and utilizing outside experts for insight and guidance. This conversation is essential for board members and executives who want to ensure accountability, initiate change, and drive organizational success. Don’t miss out on this informative and engaging episode of “The Role of the Board” episode.

Key Highlights:

  • Legal obligations and oversight for corporate boards
  • Importance of integrating compliance into the company culture
  • Board Oversight and Relationship Building with CCO
  • The Significance of Outside Perspectives for Boards

Notable Quotes:

“There is a strong obligation on boards to exercise reasonable oversight over all potential misconduct and failures of compliance law and policy should a reasonable board has known and taken steps…should that body have known and should it have done more than it did.”

“Boards principally should be asking tough questions and following up on those questions.”

“Anything that is not integrated into the real levers and machinery of the business will not be successful.”

“That chief compliance officer who knows the head of the audit committee or compliance committee or governance committee is much more able and comfortable picking up the phone and saying to the chair, Houston, we’ve got a problem.”

For more information go to Diligent.com

Categories
2 Gurus Talk Compliance

2 Gurus Talk Compliance – Episode 5, The Taylor Swift Edition

What happens when two top compliance commentators get together? They talk compliance, of course. Join Tom Fox and Kristy Grant-Hart in their podcast, 2 Gurus Talk Compliance, as they tackle topics on behavior economics, OFAC settlement lessons, the importance of the user experience in compliance policy creation, and more. They also discuss incorporating behavioral sciences into compliance strategies and the exciting changes in compliance consulting services. With their expertise, they share insights on how data, behavioral science, and innovative approaches can improve compliance programs, business processes, and profitability.

Listen as they provide valuable insights on how to understand culture by starting a dialogue and the importance of finding someone to give a narrative. Lastly, they discuss the challenge of bribery and corruption and the need for compliance professionals to be innovative, accept failures, and be comfortable with experimentation. Take advantage of this exciting and informative podcast episode from two renowned compliance experts, Tom Fox, and Kristy Grant-Hart.

Highlights Include:

  • Document Geeks rejoice
  • BAT settlement from the Caremark/McDonalds perspective
  • New Directions for Cybersecurity
  • What is a corrupt payment?
  • Rachel Carson and leadership
  • Compliance industry growth
  • What’s on the mind of CCOs
  • Taylor Swift and compliance
  • Using AI to generate meeting notes

 Resources 

1.     New Direction for Cybersecurity.

2.     BAT export control settlement-$767MM is just the start of the costs.

3.     What is the profile of a corrupt payment?

4.     Rachel Carson and Leadership

5.     The 24-Hour Rule by Adrienne Bellehumeur.

6.     Three Graphs Explain the Compliance Industry’s Growth

7.     What is top-of-mind with CCO’s?

8.     8 Handy Tools to Get AI-Generated Meeting Notes

9.     Queen of Due Diligence

Connect with Kristy Grant-Hart on LinkedIn

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Categories
Daily Compliance News

April 22, 2023 – The Big Brother at Work Edition

Welcome to the Daily Compliance News. Each day, Tom Fox, the Voice of Compliance, brings you compliance-related stories to start your day. Sit back, enjoy a cup of morning coffee, and listen to the Daily Compliance News. All from the Compliance Podcast Network. Each day we consider four stories from the business world, compliance, ethics, risk management, leadership, or general interest for the compliance professional.

Stories we are following in today’s edition:

·       Big Brother joins the workforce.  (WSJ)

·       Rosin is legal until it’s not.  (WSJ)

·       Caremark claim against Fox News. (Reuters)

·       Did Fox News pay to continue corruption? (NYT)

Categories
Everything Compliance

Episode 111 – The Duty of Oversight Edition

Welcome to the only roundtable podcast in compliance as we celebrate our second century of shows. Everything Compliance has been honored by W3 as the top talk show in podcasting. In this episode, we have the quintet of Jay Rosen, Karen Woody, Jonathan Marks, Tom Fox, and Matt Kelly, who review the recent Delaware Court of Chancery decision creating a duty of oversight for corporate officers. We conclude with our fan-fav Shout Outs and Rants section.

1. Matt Kelly sets the stage for our discussion and poses a question about what it all means for CCOs going forward. He rants to the State of Texas Legislature for creating a ‘Gold Card’ for physicians who have over 90% of all requested procedures covered by insurance. (1:30)

2. Jonathan Marks looks at the case from the internal audit and corporate governance perspectives. He rants about the Pentagon’s failure to shoot down a Chinese spy balloon.

3. Tom Fox shouts out to Hindenburg Research and all other short sellers who help uncover fraud, waste, and abuse.

4. Karen Woody looks at the case from a legal perspective and unpacks the court’s legal reasoning. Woody shouts to Amtrak and asks us to ‘ride the train more often.’ (11:08)

5. Jay Rosen reviews the changes wrought for CCOs over the past year, from CCO certification to the Delaware court decision. He shouts out to his twin daughters on their 15th birthday. (41:13)

The members of Everything Compliance are:

•       Jay Rosen– Jay is Vice President, Business Development Corporate Monitoring at Affiliated Monitors. Rosen can be reached at JRosen@affiliatedmonitors.com

•       Karen Woody – One of the top academic experts on the SEC. Woody can be reached at kwoody@wlu.edu

•       Matt Kelly – Founder and CEO of Radical Compliance. Kelly can be reached at mkelly@radicalcompliance.com

•       Jonathan Armstrong –is our UK colleague, who is an experienced data privacy/data protection lawyer with Cordery in London. Armstrong can be reached at jonathan.armstrong@corderycompliance.com

•       Jonathan Marks is Partner, Firm Practice Leader – Global Forensic, Compliance & Integrity Services at Baker Tilly. Marks can be reached at jonathan.marks@bakertilly.com

The host and producer, ranter (and sometime panelist) of Everything Compliance is Tom Fox, the Voice of Compliance. He can be reached at tfox@tfoxlaw.com. Everything Compliance is a part of the Compliance Podcast Network.

Categories
Blog

The World Has Changed: McDonald’s and the Oversight Duty of Officers-Part 4

Over the past year, the role of the Chief Compliance Officer (CCO) has shifted in some very dramatic ways. The shifts have been from disparate groups and for a variety of reasons. Yet when put together, one can see a clear and bright line expanding and elevating the role of the CCO in the corporate world. From the announcement of the requirement for CCO Certification last year up to the announcement of the Delaware Court of Chancery’s decision in the case of In re McDonald’s Corporation Stockholder Derivative Litigation, it is now clear that the CCO has as wide a remit and responsibility as any corporate officer, other than the Chief Executive Officer (CEO) of a company.

I think the following announcements, changes in DOJ and SEC focus on Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) enforcement and now a court case out of Delaware will change the role of the CCO forever.

CCO Certification

This shift began with the speech by Kenneth Polite, Assistant Attorney General for the Criminal Division speech on May 17, 2022, at Compliance Week 2022; announcing the new requirement for CCO Certification of compliance programs for companies going through a Deferred Prosecution Agreement (DPA). This CCO Certification required the Glencore CCO to certify Glencore compliance program “is reasonably designed to detect and prevent violations of the FCPA and other anti-corruption laws” at the conclusion of the DPA.  Who is the only other person required to make a similar certification at the conclusion of a DPA? The CEO of the company.

This means the CCO (and CEO) are certifying the entire compliance program meets the standards of not simply best practices but also all the enhanced requirements set out in Attachment C of any DPA. While many have focused on the question of whether this would bring criminal liability to a long-gone (or even current) CCO; this question now seems to miss the mark. Recall what Polite said when announcing the new requirement “It is the type of resource that compliance officials, including myself, have wanted for some time, because it makes it clear that you should and must have appropriate stature in corporate decision-making. It is intended to empower our compliance professionals to have the data, access, and voice within the organization to ensure you, and us, that your company has an ethical and compliance focused environment.”

Monaco Memo and Changes in the Corporate Enforcement Policy

The 2022 Monaco Memo and 2023 announced changes in the DOJ’s Corporate Enforcement Policy (CEP) are bookends of a series of changes which began as far back as October 2021 when Deputy Attorney General Lisa Monaco first announced the revisions which would eventually be incorporated into the Monaco Memo and CEP. In many ways the Monaco Memo laid out the sticks while the CEP provided the carrots for current FCPA and other white-collar enforcements.

The Monaco Memo directed prosecutors to evaluate a corporation’s compliance program as a factor in determining the appropriate terms for a corporate resolution; as prosecutors should now assess the adequacy and effectiveness of the corporation’s compliance program at two points in time: (1) the time of the offense; and (2) the time of a charging decision.  Kenneth Polite further defined the effectiveness of a compliance program at the time of the offense as “At the time of the misconduct and the disclosure, the company had an effective compliance program and system of internal accounting controls that allowed the identification of the misconduct and led to the company’s self-disclosure.” This is the first time the DOJ has said that it is the detection of wrongdoing which defines the effectiveness of a compliance program. This means a company’s investment in a compliance program, CCO and corporate compliance team are all elevated in importance. This prong does not simply get you a discount, but it can put you on the road to the default position of the DOJ for a FCPA violation, a declination.

Moreover, when you couple the ABB FCPA resolution to the Monaco Memo, you see the carrots which appeared in the new CEP. ABB was the first, three-time FCPA recidivist yet was able to get an excellent resolution with the government and a fine of only $315 million despite clear aggravating factors including corruption up to and in the corporate office. From the ABB resolution, you begin to see how the role of the CCO increases dramatically.

Duty of Oversight

These trends were brought together in the Delaware Court of Chancery’s decision in the case of McDonald’s Corporation and its former Executive Vice President and Global Chief People Officer of McDonald’s Corporation, David Fairhurst in the case In re McDonald’s Corporation Stockholder Derivative Litigation, where for the first time, a Delaware court formally recognized the oversight duties of officers of Delaware corporations.

As I have previously noted, one of the most interesting parts of the court’s opinion is that it draws from the US Sentencing Guidelines and their creation of the Chief Compliance Officer position as both reasons for the decision and as a guide to how the CCO position will be impacted by this ruling. The judge pointed to the US Sentencing Guidelines as a key basis for the creation of the original Caremark Doctrine. The court stated that a prime reason for “recognizing the board’s duty of oversight was the importance of having compliance systems in place so the corporation could receive credit under the federal Organizational Sentencing Guidelines.” However, the Guidelines did not stop at the board level. The US Sentencing Guidelines mandated the creation of the CCO position.

The court noted that the CCO has a broad scope within an organization. The court stated “Although the CEO and Chief Compliance Officer likely will have company-wide oversight portfolios, other officers generally have a more constrained area of authority.” The responsibilities of the CCO are wide and sometimes varied. Here the court stated, ““[s]pecific individual(s) within the organization shall be delegated day-to-day operational responsibility for the compliance and ethics program. Individual(s) with operational responsibility shall report periodically to high-level personnel and, as appropriate, to the governing authority, or an appropriate subgroup of the governing authority, on the effectiveness of the compliance and ethics program.” But the Delaware court also provided CCOs with some additional ammunition in their quest for true influence in a corporation by stating that “to carry out such operational responsibility, such individual(s) shall be given adequate resources, appropriate authority, and direct access to the governing authority or an appropriate subgroup of the governing authority.”

What Does It Mean?

This is the part where it gets interesting. Under the CCO Certification and the Delaware court’s ruling, it is the CCO who is 1B to the CEO’s 1A. The first step every company must make it to put the CCO in position to report up directly to the Board of Directors. It also means that the days of a CCO reporting to a Chief Legal Officer (CLO) or General Counsel (GC) are certainly numbered. The Delaware Court drove this point home by specifically naming  a CLO/GC as a person “responsible for legal oversight and for making a good faith effort to establish reasonable information systems to cover that area.” In other words, not responsible for the company wide remit such as the CCO.

The next area would come from the Hallmarks of an Effective Compliance Program as laid out in the FCPA Resource Guide, 2nd edition. In that document it states “In appraising a compliance program, DOJ and SEC also consider whether a company has assigned responsibility for the oversight and implementation of a company’s compliance program to one or more specific senior executives within an organization. Those individuals must have appropriate authority within the organization, adequate autonomy from management, and sufficient resources to ensure that the company’s compliance program is implemented effectively.” That means financial resources and head count.

I would add, a level of professionalism and expertise in compliance means more than simply ‘being a lawyer’. Under Chapter 9, Section 47 of the US Attorney’s Manual, the DOJ is mandated to evaluate “The quality and experience of the personnel involved in compliance, such that they can understand and identify the transactions and activities that pose a potential risk.”  Finally, the DOJ will also evaluate other factors such as CCO compensataion as commiserate with the position of being second in importance to the CEO.

The Delaware Court decision creating the Duty of Oversight was not designed to increase the scope, reach and importance of a CCO but the more I look at the case I believe that will be its most lasting legacy. When you look back over the past 12 months, you see that the CCO has more stature and responsibility than it has ever had before.

With a converse nod to Uncle Ben from Spiderman, with great responsibility must come great power.

Categories
Blog

The World Has Changed: McDonald’s and the Oversight Duty of Officers-Part 3

This week, we are exploring a shift in the duties of care owed by corporate officers to the corporation. This shift is coming through the Chancery Court of Delaware in the case of McDonald’s Corporation and its former Executive Vice President and Global Chief People Officer of McDonald’s Corporation, David Fairhurst and his part in the creation of an absolute toxic atmosphere of sexual harassment at the very highest levels of the organization. The case is styled In re McDonald’s Corporation Stockholder Derivative Litigation, and in it, the court formally recognizes the oversight duties of officers of Delaware corporations. Today we discuss the role of the Chief Compliance Officer (CCO) in both the reasoning for the decision and what it means for CCOs going forward.

Perhaps one of the most interesting parts of the court’s opinion is that it draws from the US Sentencing Guidelines and their creation of the Chief Compliance Officer position as both reasons for the decision and as a guide to how the CCO position will be impacted by this ruling. The judge pointed to the US Sentencing Guidelines as a key basis for the creation of the original Caremark Doctrine. The court stated that a key reason for “recognizing the board’s duty of oversight was the importance of having compliance systems in place so the corporation could receive credit under the federal Organizational Sentencing Guidelines.” However, the Guidelines did not stop at the board level. The US Sentencing Guidelines mandated the creation of the CCO position.

Specifically, the “Guidelines state that “[h]igh- level personnel of the organization shall ensure that the organization has an effective compliance and ethics program” and such senior person(s) “be assigned overall responsibility for the compliance and ethics program.” The Guidelines went on to define an organization’s “high-level personnel” as “individuals who have substantial control over the organization or who have a substantial role in the making of policy within the organization,” which includes “a director; an executive officer; an individual in charge of a major business or functional unit of the organization, such as sales, administration, or finance; and an individual with a substantial ownership interest.”

The court somewhat dryly concluded “It would seem hard to argue that, simply by virtue of being an officer, the Chief Compliance Officer could not owe a duty of oversight. That, however, is the logical implication of Fairhurst’s position that only directors can owe a duty of oversight.”

The responsibilities of the CCO are wide and sometimes varied. Here the court stated, ““[s]pecific individual(s) within the organization shall be delegated day-to-day operational responsibility for the compliance and ethics program. Individual(s) with operational responsibility shall report periodically to high-level personnel and, as appropriate, to the governing authority, or an appropriate subgroup of the governing authority, on the effectiveness of the compliance and ethics program.” But the Delaware court also provided CCOs with some additional ammunition in their quest for true influence in a corporation by stating that “to carry out such operational responsibility, such individual(s) shall be given adequate resources, appropriate authority, and direct access to the governing authority or an appropriate subgroup of the governing authority.”

Finally, the CCO has a broad scope within an organization. Indeed the court noted, that only the Chief Executive Officer (CEO) has as broad a remit, stating “Although the CEO and Chief Compliance Officer likely will have company-wide oversight portfolios, other officers generally have a more constrained area of authority. With a constrained area of responsibility comes a constrained version of the duty that supports an Information-Systems Claim.”

Yet the breadth of this portfolio does not mean a CCO can be liable for every corporate failure, even those directly in culture or compliance. Here the standard of liability for the CCO is critical and standard is breach of the duty of loyalty through bad faith. The court noted, that in the decision of Stone v. Ritter, upholding the original Caremark decision, “the Delaware Supreme Court adopted the Guttman formulation and stated that a breach of the duty of loyalty, such as acting in bad faith, was a “necessary condition to liability.” After Stone, then-Vice Chancellor Strine acknowledged that Caremark duties carried overtones of care, but explained that “to hold directors liable for a failure in monitoring, the directors have to have acted with a state of mind consistent with a conscious decision to breach their duty of care.”

Rarely, if ever do you see a CCO engage in bad faith. There have been some instances but I can think or only one or two that rise to the level of bad faith. The good news for CCOs is that while there may be a new cause of action against them for a duty of oversight; if there is a compliance program in place and if that compliance program detects wrongdoing which is reported up to the Board; a CCO has most probably met their duty under this decision.

Please join me tomorrow as I explore how this court decision, together with the CCO certification mandate by the Department of Justice, the Monaco Memo and the new Corporate Enforcement Policy will all change the relationships and dynamics of Chief Compliance Officers in the corporate world.

Categories
Compliance Into the Weeds

McDonald’s and Duty of Corporate Officer Oversight

The award-winning, Compliance into the Weeds is the only weekly podcast that takes a deep dive into a compliance-related topic, literally going into the weeds to explore a subject more fully. In this episode, Matt and I dive deep into a recent decision by the Delaware Court of Chancery in the McDonald’s case, creating a duty of oversight for corporate officers.

Some of the highlights include:

·      Why can bad facts make bad laws?

·      The sordid facts of David Fairhurst during his tenure at McDonald’s.

·      The legal rationale.

·      What is Caremark, and how did it influence this decision?

·      What does it mean for CCOs?

·      How does this decision intertwine with the Monaco Doctrine, CCO certification, and the new Corporate Enforcement Policy?

 Resources

Tom with a multipart series on the FCPA Compliance and Ethics Blog

Matt Kelly with two posts in Radical Compliance

Categories
Blog

The World Has Changed: McDonald’s and the Oversight Duty of Officers-Part 2

This week, we are exploring a shift in the duties of care owed by corporate officers to the corporation. It is coming through the Chancery Court of Delaware in the case of McDonald’s Corporation and its former Executive Vice President and Global Chief People Officer of McDonald’s Corporation, David Fairhurst and his part in the creation of an absolute toxic atmosphere of sexual harassment at the very highest levels of the organization. It is styled In re McDonald’s Corporation Stockholder Derivative Litigation, and the court formally recognizes the oversight duties of officers of Delaware corporations. Today we consider the legal reasoning in the opinion.

Yesterday we began a discussion on the legal reasoning. Most compliance practitioners point to the 1996 Caremark decision as the one which set a Board’s duty around compliance. However, there has long been a duty of oversight in Delaware law, for Boards of Directors since at least the 1960s but for officers as well. In 1963, the Delaware Supreme Court established a Board duty when red flags are brought to its attention in the case of Graham v. Allis-Chalmers Manufacturing Co., which held that directors have an obligation to respond if information reached them, but created no affirmative duty to set up an information system to learn about issues within the company. A limited duty of oversight arose only if the directors had already learned enough to suspect that there were issues that needed overseeing. This was termed a “Red-Flags Claim” or a “Red-Flags Theory” of liability. This is also known as “Prong-One” Board liability.

Caremark created that affirmative duty for Board’s to engage in oversight. The Caremark court formulated a “more functional terminology, that species of claim can be called an “Information-Systems Claim” or an “Information- Systems Theory” of Board liability, also known as “Prong-Two” Board liability. In this type of case, a plaintiff typically pleads a prong-two Caremark claim by alleging that the board’s information systems generated red flags indicating wrongdoing and that the directors failed to respond. In McDonald’s Corp we now see both Prong-One and Prong-Two liability expanded to officers.

The Court of Chancery listed three key sources for expanding this duty from Boards to officers.

  1. Management runs a company. While Board’s oversee management, “most corporations are managed ‘under the direction of’ the board.” Moreover, “In the typical corporation, it is the officers who are charged with, and responsible for, running the business of the corporation.” Finally, “Because of this reality, “[m]onitoring and strategy are not exclusively the dominion of the board. Actually, nondirector officers may have a greater capacity to make oversight and strategic decisions on a day-to-day basis.”
  2. Boards depend on information from management. Here the court noted that “For relevant and timely information to reach the board, the officers who serve as the day-to-day managers of the entity must make a good faith effort to ensure that information systems are in place so that the officers receive relevant and timely information that they can provide to the directors.” From this, “it follows that officers must have a duty to make a good faith effort to establish an information system as a predicate to fulfilling their obligation to provide information to the board.”
  3. Compliance systems required under the USSG. The US Sentencing Guidelines (USSG) mandate that “[h]igh- level personnel of the organization shall ensure that the organization has an effective compliance and ethics program, as described in this guideline.” This requirement includes that “Specific individual(s) within high-level personnel shall be assigned overall responsibility for the compliance and ethics program.” The USSG goes on to define an organization’s “high-level personnel” as “individuals who have substantial control over the organization or who have a substantial role in the making of policy within the organization,” which includes “a director; an executive officer; an individual in charge of a major business or functional unit of the organization, such as sales, administration, or finance; and an individual with a substantial ownership interest.” This has the added benefit of putting compliance professionals directly in the path of liability created in this decision.

Interestingly since the Delaware courts had not explicitly expanded the duty of oversight to offices, the court looked at some bankruptcy court decisions for guidance. Here the Delaware court found, there were both Prong-One Red Flag claims and Prong-Two Information Systems claims available against officers under certain circumstances. The Delaware court concluded this section with the following “All of the foregoing authorities start from the premise that officers owe the same duties as directors. Because directors owe a duty of oversight, these authorities reason that officers owe a duty of oversight. That logic is sound.”

In a section I found very interesting, the Delaware court noted that officers have fiduciary duties to the corporation akin to those duties agents owe their principals. Here the court pointed to a prior Delaware decision, which “recognized a standard of conduct at the officer level that included a duty to act carefully, loyally, and in good faith to gather and provide information, with the standard of liability for the care dimension of the duty measured by gross negligence. By recognizing the duty to provide information, Hampshire lays the foundation for an officer-level duty consistent with an Information-Systems Theory.” The Court also found there is officer accountability to the Board which supports this extension of the duty of oversight to officer.

With this legal underpinning in place, please join me tomorrow to explore how this decision will impact Chief Compliance Officers.

Categories
31 Days to More Effective Compliance Programs

Day 5 – The Board and Operationalizing Compliance

The most significant development for Boards and compliance continues to come from the Delaware courts, which have been expanding the civil law obligations of Boards through a series of court decisions involving the expansion of the Caremark Doctrine for the past several years. These developments began with the Marchand (Blue Bell Ice Cream) decision which required Boards to manage the risks their organizations face. Next was Clovis Oncology which required ongoing monitoring by the Board. Finally, the Boeing case stands for the continuing proposition that a Board cannot simply have the trappings of oversight, it must do the serious work required and have evidence of that work (Document, Document, and Document).


The decision in Boeing is yet a further expansion of the Caremark Doctrine, once again beginning with MarchandBoeing also states that a company must assess its risks and then manage them right up through the Board level. Finally, a Board must be aggressive in their approach and not passively take in what management has presented to them.
The DOJ has also made clear its thoughts on the role of the Board of Directors. The role of the Board is different than that of senior management. The 2020 Update and DOJ Antitrust Division’s 2019 Evaluation of Corporate Compliance Programs in Criminal Antitrust Investigations were even more explicit in announcing their expectation for robust Board oversight of a corporate compliance function.

Name any of the most recent corporate scandals; Wells Fargo, Theranos, Volkswagen, Boeing, FTX, etc., and there was no compliance expertise on the Board. It is now enshrined as a best practice for companies to have a seasoned compliance professional on the Board. I would also add that the DOJ may soon expect a Compliance Committee separate from the Audit Committee.
The DOJ continually speaks about the need for companies to operationalize their compliance programs. Businesses must work to integrate compliance into the DNA of their organization. Having a Board member with specific compliance expertise or heading a Compliance Committee can provide a level of oversight and commitment to achieving this goal. The DOJ enshrined this requirement in the FCPA Corporate Enforcement Policy. This means that when your company is evaluated by the DOJ, under the factors set out in the 2020 Update and FCPA Corporate Enforcement Policy, to retrospectively determine if your company had a best practices compliance program in place at the time of any violation, you need to have not only the structure of the Board-level Compliance Committee but also the specific subject matter expertise on the Board and on that committee.

This means that every Board of Directors needs a true compliance expert. Almost every Board has a former Chief Financial Officer, former head of Internal Audit, or persons with a similar background. Often, these are also the Audit Committee members of the Board. Such a background brings a level of sophistication, training, and SME that can help all companies with their financial reporting and other finance-based issues. So why is there no such SME at the Board level from the compliance profession?

Three key takeaways:

1. The 2020 Update required active Board of Director engagement and oversight around compliance.
2. Board communication on compliance is two-way, both inbound and outbound.
3. The Delaware courts have been expanding Board’s roles through the expansion of the Caremark Doctrine.

Categories
Role of the Board of Compliance

Caremark

Tom Fox and Jonathan T. Marks kick off the series with a deep dive into the 1996 Caremark decision, the 2006 Stone v. Ritter resolution, and the compliance lessons companies and board members can learn from the facts and patterns of these fundamental cases.

▶️ Caremark with Tom Fox and Jonathan T. Marks

Key points discussed in the episode:

  1. Tom Fox gives a brief background on the Caremark case.
  2. Jonathan T. Marks describes how ethical behavior is the backbone of an organization and how this case defined the importance of having proper oversight monitoring.
  3. Tom Fox lays out Caremark’s penalties. He describes the Stone v. Ritter facts, how the bank was sued for failure to perform due diligence on fraudulent investors and violating the Bank Secrecy Act. These schemes follow a pattern that has been seen repeatedly. It has also defined the duties of board members: avoiding negligence and arising from failures.
  4. Jonathan T. Marks explains how fundamentals made their way into compliance laws in other countries, how guidelines are warning shots for companies to clean up, and urging companies to step up.
  5. The Caremark doctrine later refined two conditions for director liability and emphasized why boards must actively engage in oversight.
  6. Board members must get down to the nitty-gritty of what is truly happening in their organizations, ask tough questions, do a deeper self-assessment, and stop refusing to avoid problems and the ugly truth.

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Do you have a podcast (or do you want to)? Join the only network dedicated to compliance, risk management, and business ethics, the Compliance Podcast Network. For more information, contact Tom Fox at tfox@tfoxlaw.com.