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Daily Compliance News

Daily Compliance News: March 14, 2024 – The Farewell to Tik-Tok? Edition

Welcome to the Daily Compliance News. Each day, Tom Fox, the Voice of Compliance, brings you compliance-related stories to start your day. Sit back, enjoy a cup of morning coffee and listen to the Daily Compliance News.

All from the Compliance Podcast Network. Each day, we consider four stories from the business world: compliance, ethics, risk management, leadership, or general interest for the compliance professional.

In today’s edition of Daily Compliance News:

  • The House passes legislation to require the sale of Tik-Tok. (NYT)
  • Bank regulators weigh greater operational resiliency requirements.  (WSJ)
  • Boeing overwritten the video of safety work. (Axios)
  • The DoT wants South Africa to increase its fight against corruption. (Reuters)

For more information on the Ethico ROI Calculator and a free White Paper on the ROI of Compliance, click here.

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Daily Compliance News

March 28, 2023 – The Textbook Edition

Welcome to the Daily Compliance News. Each day, Tom Fox, the Voice of Compliance, brings you compliance-related stories to start your day. Sit back, enjoy a cup of morning coffee, and listen to the Daily Compliance News. All from the Compliance Podcast Network. Each day we consider four stories from the business world, compliance, ethics, risk management, leadership, or general interest for the compliance professional.

Stories we are following in today’s edition of Daily Compliance News:

·       Venezuela cracks down on corruption. (Reuters)

·       CFTC sues Binance.  (Reuters)

·       Fed says SVB case of ‘textbook mismanagement.’ (NYT)

·       Pissed off from pay transparency. (FT)

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Blog

Compliance Lessons from the SVB Failure

The recent events surrounding Silicon Valley Bank have been both shocking and eye-opening. From the depositors who faced near death experiences, the shareholders who lost all their money, and the taxpayers who supported the bailout, it’s clear that there were multiple levels of oversight that failed to stop this disaster from happening. In this week’s episode of Compliance into the Weeds, Matt Kelly and myself explored the roles of KPMG, the Board of Directors and management, institutional investors, and the regulators, to uncover the lessons the compliance professional can take away from this debacle.

There were three key areas that SBV and those who advised it failed in. They included:

  1. Failures in identifying the poor risk management practices and the lack of assurance around the bank’s ability to access emergency cash.
  2. Failures by the Board of Directors and senior in responding to the red flags raised by the BlackRock consultants.
  3. Failures by SVB who was not prepared with a plan to resolve the crisis when it occurred.

Poor Risk Management Practices

The first step in understanding the lack of assurance around the bank’s ability to access emergency cash is to identify its poor risk management practices. KPMG, the banks’s auditors, may have given an anodyne report that stated there was no material risk of misstatement, but they could not have predicted the strategic risks that SVB was taking.  SVB got into trouble around its financial assets,  namely low-interest rate loans that SVB issued in the late 2010s. When the Federal Reserve started jacking interest rates to cool down inflation, the value of those loans fell. It put the bank in a precarious position. It is not clear what the bank’s management did but whatever it was, it was clearly insufficient.

Board and Senior Management Failure to Address Red Flags

Both the Board and senior management failed to respond adequately to the red flags raised by the BlackRock consultants, who SVB hired in late 2020, to look at their risk management practices. According to the report, SVB failed 11 of 11 criteria for risk management, indicating that there were serious issues present. This assessment should have been a red flag for management and the board’s risk committee, which met 18 times in 2022. It is not clear whether they discussed the BlackRock consultants’ report, but it is clear that the risk of rising interest rates and the lack of hedging to offset these risks was ignored. Despite this, the bank declined to pursue the opportunity for improvements.

Moreover by this time, the San Francisco Fed had already given Silicon Valley Bank at least six citations for poor risk management practices and not doing enough to assure easy access to emergency cash. This should have been a warning sign to both regulators and investors, yet it seems that no one was prepared for the eventual collapse of the bank. This oversight deficit points to a lack of communication and assurance from the board and management to the public, which is a key compliance lesson for other organizations.

 Lack of a Plan

Clearly, SVB was not prepared with a plan to resolve the crisis when it occurred. There was a clear lack of communication between the board and management of Silicon Valley Bank, it’s audit firm, and the regulators. The board and management of Silicon Valley Bank were aware of the risks that their strategies posed, as evidenced by their hiring of BlackRock consultants to assess their risk management processes. However, they failed to take the necessary steps to address the issues identified by the consultants, leaving the bank exposed to the risk posed by rising interest rates. The auditors also failed to point out the strategic risk of the bank’s holdings, instead offering an anodyne report that did not indicate any risk of material misstatement or substantial doubt about the bank’s ability to continue as a going concern. Finally, the regulators, such as the San Francisco Fed, had raised multiple red flags about Silicon Valley Bank’s risk management practices and potential lack of access to emergency funding, yet they failed to create a plan to address these issues before the crisis occurred. As a result, the public, investors, and depositors were left in the dark, without a plan to respond to the crisis.

The collapse of Silicon Valley Bank is a stark reminder that organizations need to take effective steps to ensure proper oversight and risk management. This includes both board and management members being aware of the risks posed by their strategies, engaging with auditors to assess the risks, and having a plan in place to deal with potential crises. The Silicon Valley Bank case serves as an example of what can happen when these steps are not taken and the consequences of such a failure. It is up to organizations to learn from this case and take the necessary steps to ensure that a similar disaster does not occur again. Despite the gravity of the situation, there is still hope that organizations can achieve the same level of compliance and oversight by following the lessons from this case.

Check out the full episode of Compliance into the Weeds, here.

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Compliance Into the Weeds

SVB Failure – Lessons for Compliance

The award winning, Compliance into the Weeds is the only weekly podcast which takes a deep dive into a compliance related topic, literally going into the weeds to more fully explore a subject. In this episode, Matt and I continue our exploration of the collapse of Silicon Valley Bank (SVB) and take a deeper dive into the compliance angles. Silicon Valley Bank had taken some big risks which led to depositors having a near-death experience, shareholders losing all their money, and taxpayers ultimately supporting the bank’s bailout. Despite the auditors giving an anodyne report on the bank’s risk management, the board, management and regulators all missed the big strategic risks. As a result, the bank collapsed, leaving Matt to question whether stakeholders were given the right assurance on the right things.

Key Highlights

·      What risk management strategies did SVB senior management and Board miss or ignore that could have prevented the financial disaster?

·      Why did SVB’s management decline to pursue improvements to their risk management practices after being warned by BlackRock consultants?

·      Did regulators miss the red flags raised by the San Francisco Fed examiners 18 months before the collapse of SVB?

Notable Quotes:

1.     “We should remember that really, the auditors’ report is going to give assurance on two points: Number one, is there a risk of material misstatement in the financial statements? And number two, does the audit firm have any substantial doubt about the organization’s ability to continue as a going concern for roughly the next twelve months or so? That’s how long it is. But it’s those two things.”

2.     “When you have Elizabeth Warren and conservatives both raising hell at the same time, it’s a valid issue to go and look at then because that does not happen too often.”

3.    “It’s like nobody had thought about this when really once we rolled back DoddFrank protections and supervisory constraints specifically for mid-sized banks, which Republicans pushed through in 2018, once that happened, that became the systemic risk that regulators had to think about.”

4.    “Everybody kind of sort of knew there was a problem, but a whole lot of finger pointing and not enough planning and assurance and communication to the public at large and to investors.”

 Resources

Matt  on LinkedIn

Matt on Radical Compliance

Tom on LinkedIn

Categories
The Compliance Life

Bridget Abraham- College & Early Career

The Compliance Life details the journey to and in the role of a Chief Compliance Officer. How does one come to sit in the CCO chair? What are some of the skills a CCO needs to success navigate the compliance waters in any company? What are some of the top challenges CCOs have faced and how did they meet them? These questions and many others will be explored in this new podcast series. Over four episodes each month on The Compliance Life, I visit with one current or former CCO to explore their journey to the CCO chair. This month, my guest is Bridget Abraham, CCO at Remitly, who had a decidedly non-traditional path to the CCO Chair.

Bridget was the first member of her family to go to college. She got a degree in Economics from Colorado State University and then obtained a Master Degree, also in Economics. Her Master’s degree focused agricultural economics, which was really about sustainability,  the environment that had the impact that it had in small rural America, and research focusing on the economics of small business and the importance of agriculture in those communities. After a brief stop in NYC, Bridget went to work at the Federal Reserve Bank where she presented her research at various forums. She began her career with the Federal Reserve Bank working on economic research, later moving into more of a banking supervision role. She dealt with compliance with the Patriot Act and the Bank Secrecy Act.

Resources

Bridget Abraham LinkedIn Profile

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Daily Compliance News

February 19, 2022 the Notorious Markets List Edition


In today’s edition of Daily Compliance News:
• FED rolls out stock trading restriction policy. (NYT)
• Banks used to fight Ottawa rogue truckers. (WSJ)
• China objects to Chinese e-commerce company designation. (Reuters)
• Crumbling and dissolving Hawaii ABC unit. (Honolulu Civil Beat)

Categories
FCPA Compliance Report

Eric Young on the Fed and DFS Components of the Goldman Sachs Corruption Enforcement


In this episode, I am joined by Eric Young, recently retired long-time compliance professional. We explore an under-looked aspect of the Goldman Sachs FCPA enforcement action; the independent enforcement actions by the Federal Reserve Bank and state of New York’s Department of Financial Services.
Some of the highlights include:

  • Why was the Fed involved in the Goldman Sachs FCPA resolution?
  • The Fed Order seemed critical of Goldman Sachs compliance function. Do you find this criticism warranted?
  • Is the ongoing oversight of the Fed typical for this type of case?
  • Why was the state the New York DFS involved in the Goldman Sachs FCPA resolution?
  • What were the separate reporting obligations of the Goldman Sachs compliance function discussed in the DFS Order? Do such obligations exist at the federal level?
  • Were the dates, timing and amounts of these 3 bond offerings red flags?
  • Were the money laundering allegations in funding equally as troubling as the bribery and corruption? 

Resources
Federal Reserve Cease and Desist Order
State of New York, Department of Financial Services Consent Order