Tag: ECCP

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Ted Lasso Week: Part 1 – Ted Lasso: Ethical Leadership, Psychological Safety, and the Limits of Good Intentions

Season 4 of Ted Lasso has begun dropping (a new episode releases each Wednesday). Matt Kelly reposted a blog he wrote during the original run of the series, and he and I did a deeper dive into the show and its popularity for compliance professionals in an episode of Compliance into the Weeds. I decided to take a deep dive into five characters from the show and use them to explore compliance topics. Over the next 5 blog posts, I will consider team owner Rebecca Welton, Assistant Manager Nate Shelley, player and later coach Roy Kent, and social media influencer Keeley Jones. Today in Part 1, we begin with compliance lessons through the character of Ted Lasso.

Ted Lasso arrives at AFC Richmond with no meaningful knowledge of English football, a skeptical locker room, a hostile press, and an owner who secretly hired him to fail. On paper, he is an obvious control failure. In practice, he becomes the architect of Richmond’s cultural transformation.

For compliance professionals, that transformation is the point. Ted demonstrates how a leader can create trust, encourage candor, and turn values into daily behavior. He also demonstrates the limits of values-led leadership. Good intentions do not investigate misconduct. Empathy does not test a control. Forgiveness does not remediate a root cause.

The compliance lesson from Ted is not simply to “believe.” It is to build a culture in which accountability, information, controls, and oversight support belief.

Culture Is What the Leader Does

Ted’s first contribution is not tactical. It is behavioral. He learns names, asks questions, listens to people with little formal authority, and treats the kit man, Nate Shelley, as a colleague whose observations matter. In “Trent Crimm: The Independent” (Season 1, Episode 3), Ted recognizes that Jamie Tartt and other players are humiliating Nate. Rather than deliver a speech about respect and move on, Ted engages Roy Kent, the informal leader whose intervention can change locker-room conduct.

That is tone at the top connected to conduct in the middle. The DOJ Evaluation of Corporate Compliance Programs (ECCP) asks how senior leaders and managers have encouraged compliance through their words and actions. It states in part, “Beyond compliance structures, policies, and procedures, it is important for a company to create and foster a culture of ethics and compliance with the law at all levels of the company. The effectiveness of a compliance program requires a high-level commitment by company leadership to implement a culture of compliance from the middle and the top.”

The Principles of Federal Prosecution of Business Organizations (Justice Manual) likewise directs prosecutors to examine culture at all levels, including discipline, treatment of complaints, and incentives. 9.28.300 states in part that prosecutors shall consider “the pervasiveness of wrongdoing within the corporation, including the complicity in, or the condoning of, the wrongdoing by individuals in corporate management”. In Section 9-28.800, it directs the DOJ to review a “company’s culture of compliance”.

Ted understands instinctively that culture does not travel through posters. It travels through managers, peer leaders, everyday decisions, and the behavior an organization tolerates. A chief compliance officer can publish a code. Only operational leaders can make that code real during the meeting, on the sales call, and inside the locker room.

Psychological Safety Requires a Response System

Ted creates space for people to speak before they have status. He accepts tactical input from Nate, invites dissent from Coach Beard, and builds the Diamond Dogs as an informal forum for candid discussion. By “La Locker Room Aux Folles” (Season 3, Episode 9), Richmond can confront Colin Hughes’s sexuality and Isaac McAdoo’s reaction with empathy. Ted initially hears the team’s claim that Colin’s identity makes no difference, then corrects the underlying message: the team should care because Colin’s experience matters.

This is psychological safety in practice. Employees must be able to raise a concern, disclose vulnerability, or challenge a decision without humiliation or retaliation. Yet a compliance program needs more than an approachable leader. Equally importantly, a culture of Speak Up must be paired with a culture of Listen Up.

Richmond relies heavily on Ted’s availability and temperament. That is a strength while Ted is present and a key-person risk when he is absent. A mature speak-up program requires intake standards, anti-retaliation controls, escalation criteria, case tracking, trend analysis, and board reporting. An open door is valuable. It is not an operating system.

Accountability Must Apply to Stars and Friends

Ted’s strongest accountability moment comes in “Tan Lines” (Season 1, Episode 5), when he benches Jamie after the star player refuses to follow the team’s approach. Ted chooses collective standards over short-term performance. That is exactly the decision many organizations avoid when the employee at issue is a top salesperson, rainmaker, founder, or executive.

He is less decisive when loyalty clouds his judgment. In “All Apologies” (Season 1, Episode 9), Beard and Nate press Ted to confront Roy’s declining performance. Ted initially resists, even though the competitive risk is visible. He eventually has the necessary conversation and gives Roy a dignified path to support the team from the bench.

The contrast matters. DOJ asks whether discipline is applied consistently and whether the company tolerates misconduct by high performers. Compliance credibility collapses when consequences depend on revenue, rank, or personal affection. Ethical leadership is not the absence of hard decisions. It is the willingness to make them fair and explain the standard.

Forgiveness Is Not Remediation

Rebecca’s confession in “All Apologies” presents Ted’s greatest strength and clearest compliance blind spot. She admits that she hired him to fail, manipulated club decisions, and used people as instruments in her campaign against Rupert. Ted forgives her immediately.

At a human level, the scene is powerful. At an organizational level, forgiveness cannot close the matter. Richmond would still need to establish what happened, preserve evidence, identify affected decisions, assess financial and stakeholder harm, determine whether others participated, evaluate disclosure obligations, and strengthen governance.

The US Sentencing Guidelines require organizations to respond appropriately after misconduct and take steps to prevent recurrence. DOJ similarly focuses on root-cause analysis, remediation, and whether control improvements are tested. Ted offers grace, which can support rehabilitation. He does not create a record showing that the organization learned from the failure.

This distinction should matter to every CCO: mercy concerns the person; remediation concerns the institution. A company may do both. It cannot substitute one for the other.

Vulnerability Can Strengthen the Control Environment

Ted’s panic attacks show the cost of a culture in which even a supportive leader believes he must appear invulnerable. His attack during karaoke in “Make Rebecca Great Again” (Season 1, Episode 7) remains largely private. In “Headspace” and “Man City” (Season 2, Episodes 7 and 8), he finally engages with Dr. Sharon Fieldstone and begins addressing the trauma connected to his father’s suicide. After Nate leaks his panic attack to the press, Ted speaks honestly to the team and the public in “Inverting the Pyramid of Success” (Season 2, Episode 12).

Leaders retain legitimate medical privacy. The compliance point is not compelled disclosure. Organizations need trusted support channels, succession and contingency plans, and an environment where asking for help is not treated as weakness. Ted’s eventual candor reduces stigma. His earlier concealment creates an information vacuum that Nate weaponizes.

Within the COSO Internal Control Framework, Ted materially improves the control environment and information and communication. Richmond’s weakness is monitoring. Warning signs involving Nate, including humiliation of subordinates, resentment, and escalating hostility, do not reach a reliable response process before he leaks Ted’s health information and leaves for West Ham.

The Final Test Is Whether Culture Outlasts the Leader

By Season 3, Ted increasingly shifts from hero to system builder. “Sunflowers” and “The Strings That Bind Us” (Season 3, Episodes 6 and 7) show Richmond developing Total Football through shared learning, role flexibility, and trust. In “So Long, Farewell” (Season 3, Episode 12), Ted leaves, but Roy, Beard, Rebecca, Higgins, and the players can carry the culture forward.

That is the institutional test. A compliance program that depends on one charismatic executive is not sustainable. Caremark oversight principles require boards to make a good-faith effort to establish and monitor information and reporting systems, particularly around mission-critical risks, as the Delaware Supreme Court emphasized in Marchand v. Barnhill (the Bluebell Ice Cream case). Ted changes Richmond’s values. Governance must ensure that those values become repeatable processes, reliable information, and accountable decisions.

Practical Takeaways for CCOs 

Ted Lasso offers five questions for a CCO and compliance team:

  1. Do employees trust leaders, and can the organization demonstrate that concerns receive a consistent response?
  2. Are high performers held to the same behavioral standards as everyone else?
  3. When misconduct occurs, does forgiveness follow investigation and remediation rather than replace them?
  4. Are managers trained and monitored as culture carriers, especially after promotion?
  5. Would the speak-up culture and compliance program remain effective if a trusted leader departed tomorrow?

Ted’s enduring lesson is that ethical culture begins with human connection. Effective compliance begins there as well, but it cannot end there. Richmond becomes stronger when curiosity replaces judgment, candor replaces silence, and team standards replace individual entitlement. The next step for any real organization is to convert those behaviors into controls that can be tested, monitored, reported, and sustained.

Join us tomorrow in Part 2, as we turn to Rebecca Welton, whose decision to use AFC Richmond as an instrument of personal revenge reveals the risks created when concentrated authority operates without independent challenge. We will examine executive conflicts, institutional remediation, and Rebecca’s transformation from conflicted owner to accountable steward by requiring governance that can hold power to account.

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Institutional Justice and Fairness in Compliance: Lessons from Star Trek’s ‘The Cloud Minders’

Institutional justice and institutional fairness are not abstract ideals; they are operational requirements in a corporate compliance program. They define how policies are enforced, how decisions are made, and how employees perceive the integrity of their workplace. One of the most vivid illustrations of the dangers of systemic injustice and perceived unfairness comes from Star Trek: The Original Series in “The Cloud Minders.”

The DOJ’s 2024 Evaluation of Corporate Compliance Programs (ECCP) reinforces this point: for a compliance program to be effective, it must not only exist on paper but also operate fairly in practice. The DOJ expects companies to show that they apply compliance processes consistently across the organization, regardless of seniority, revenue generation, or personal connections.

Why the DOJ Cares About Justice and Fairness in Compliance

In the ECCP, the DOJ focused on institutional justice and institutional fairness as key mandates for the compliance function. Why? It was rooted in practicality: a compliance program that is seen as biased or inconsistent will fail. Employees will not report misconduct, will hide mistakes, and will disengage from ethics initiatives.

Prosecutors know that when misconduct occurs in such an environment, it’s often a symptom of deeper cultural problems. That’s why, during investigations, they ask:

  • Are policies applied equally to all levels of the organization?
  • Is discipline consistent and documented?
  • Do employees believe the process is fair?
  • Has the company addressed the underlying causes of misconduct?

If the answers to these questions are unsatisfactory, the DOJ is more likely to view the compliance program as ineffective, regardless of its written policies.

The Tale 

The Enterprise is sent to the planet Ardana to collect zenite, a mineral needed to stop a plague on another world. Captain Kirk and Mr. Spock beam down to Stratos, a floating city inhabited by the planet’s elite, only to discover a deep societal divide. The surface of Ardana is worked by “Troglytes,” a laborer class forced to mine zenite under hazardous conditions, denied access to the comforts and education of Stratos.

The elites justify this arrangement as necessary for stability, while the Troglytes see it as systemic exploitation. The episode becomes a study in the consequences of entrenched inequality, distrust, and the refusal to address legitimate grievances, exactly the kinds of dynamics that can erode trust in a corporate compliance program if not addressed.

From this story, we can extract five compliance lessons on institutional justice and institutional fairness.

Lesson 1: Consistency in Standards Is Non-Negotiable

Illustrated by: Stratos leaders apply rules differently depending on social status. The elite enjoy cultural and political freedoms, while Troglytes face restrictions and harsher punishments for similar conduct.

Compliance Lesson. The DOJ has repeatedly emphasized that policies and disciplinary measures must be applied consistently. If employees perceive that “rainmakers” or executives receive lighter sanctions, or none at all, for policy violations, trust in the compliance function evaporates. In The Cloud Minders, the double standard deepens resentment and drives conflict, precisely what can happen inside a company when justice is selective.

Why It Matters to DOJ: Prosecutors evaluate whether discipline is enforced “consistently across the organization, regardless of position or power.” Inconsistency is a red flag that the program is a paper exercise rather than a living system.

What should you do?

  • Establish clear, documented disciplinary protocols.
  • Apply them uniformly, with oversight from the compliance function.
  • Communicate to the workforce that no one is above the rules.

Lesson 2: Address Root Causes, Not Just Symptoms

Illustrated by: The Troglytes’ performance and health are impaired because mining zenite exposes them to toxic vapors. The elites interpret this as proof of inferiority, ignoring the environmental cause.

Compliance Lesson. Organizations sometimes treat compliance failures as isolated misconduct rather than symptoms of deeper issues, such as inadequate training, unrealistic sales targets, or flawed incentive structures. In Ardana, fixing the air quality in the mines would have solved much of the productivity gap, just as fixing systemic drivers of noncompliance prevents repeat issues.

Why It Matters to DOJ: The DOJ looks for root cause analysis after misconduct. They want to see whether the company took corrective action to address systemic issues, not just discipline the individuals involved.

What should you do?

  • Investigate not only “who” did something wrong, but “why” it happened.
  • Use findings to improve processes, incentives, and controls.
  • Share non-confidential lessons learned with the workforce to demonstrate fairness and transparency.

Lesson 3: Perceived Fairness Matters as Much as Actual Fairness

Illustrated by: Even when Kirk offers protective gear to the Troglytes, they are slow to trust his intentions. Years of mistreatment have convinced them that promises from the elites are empty.

Compliance Parallel: Employees judge compliance programs not only by their design but by how fair they feel in practice. If people believe investigations are biased or that whistleblowers will be punished, they will avoid reporting, even if the official policy says otherwise. On Ardana, the lack of trust kept both sides from pursuing good-faith solutions—something corporate leaders must avoid at all costs.

Why It Matters to DOJ: Prosecutors assess whether employees trust the compliance program enough to use it. A hotline no one calls is not evidence of a healthy culture—it may be proof of fear or cynicism.

What should you do?

  • Publicize examples where issues were raised and resolved fairly.
  • Protect whistleblowers from retaliation and make that protection visible.
  • Use employee surveys to measure trust in compliance processes.

Lesson 4: Leadership Must Model Ethical Behavior

Illustrated by: Stratos’s leaders speak about justice and stability, but are unwilling to live under the same risks or hardships as the Troglytes. Their detachment from the reality of mining life fuels the unrest.

Compliance Lesson. Leaders who preach ethics but cut corners for themselves undermine institutional fairness. Employees take cues from the top; if executives are exempt from rules, the rest of the organization will follow suit. In The Cloud Minders, the Stratos elite’s credibility collapses because they refuse to share the burdens of those they govern, a mistake no corporate leadership team should make.

Why It Matters to DOJ: The DOJ examines “tone at the top” and “conduct at the middle.” They want to see that leadership’s actions match their words and that managers reinforce the message through daily decisions.

What should you do?

  • Ensure executives participate in the same training and certifications as all employees.
  • Make leadership accountable for compliance metrics.
  • Publicly acknowledge when senior leaders are held to account for violations.

Lesson 5: Dialogue and Inclusion Are Tools for Justice

Illustrated by: Spock approaches the Troglytes with genuine respect, listening to their grievances and acknowledging their intelligence. His willingness to engage earns him credibility that Stratos leaders lack.

Compliance Parallel: Institutional fairness is strengthened when employees feel heard and included in shaping solutions. This doesn’t mean every request can be granted, but listening and considering input builds trust. Just as Spock bridged the divide on Ardana, compliance leaders can bridge trust gaps by treating all stakeholders with respect and dignity.

Why It Matters to DOJ: A compliance program is stronger when it incorporates feedback from the workforce. The DOJ favors companies that regularly assess the program’s effectiveness through interviews, surveys, and focus groups.

What should you do?

  • Include employee representatives in policy review committees.
  • Hold listening sessions for employees and other stakeholders after major incidents or policy changes.
  • Act on feasible suggestions and explain when ideas can’t be implemented.

Practical Compliance Takeaways from The Cloud Minders

  1. Apply Rules Equally: Avoid double standards by holding everyone—from the C-suite to front-line staff—to the exact requirements.
  2. Investigate Root Causes: Fix systemic issues, not just individual mistakes.
  3. Build Trust in the Process: Ensure employees perceive the program as fair and protective.
  4. Lead by Example: Leadership must model the ethical behavior expected of all.
  5. Listen and Include: Use dialogue to bridge divides and strengthen buy-in.

Final ComplianceLog Reflections

The Cloud Minders is more than a parable about class division; it is a warning for any institution that neglects fairness and justice. In Ardana, injustice created resentment, distrust, and rebellion. In a corporation, those same dynamics can lead to silent disengagement, hidden misconduct, and public scandal.

The DOJ’s message is clear: fairness and justice are not optional add-ons to compliance; they are the foundation of a program that works. As compliance leaders, our role is to be the “Spock” in the room, listening, respecting, and bridging divides while ensuring that the rules are fair, transparent, and consistently applied.

When we do that, we do not just comply with the DOJ’s expectations; we build organizations where people trust the system enough to make it work.

Resources:

⁠⁠Excruciatingly Detailed Plot Summary by Eric W. Weisstein⁠⁠

⁠⁠MissionLogPodcast.com⁠⁠

⁠⁠Memory Alpha

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THE BERKO TRIAL – PART 5: From Case Study to Control Test: A Berko Compliance Playbook for CCOs and Boards

Today we conclude our 5-part deep dive into the Asante Berko trial and guilty verdict, using the trial not simply as a case study but as a mechanism to pressure-test your compliance regime.

A compliance program is not effective because the company eventually exits a troubled transaction. It is effective when leaders can show how quickly the system identified the risk, who had authority to act, whether related conduct was contained, what the investigation established, and how the organization changed afterward.

That is the governance test presented by the Berko trial. Prosecutors built their case from emails, payment patterns, personal communications, compliance questions, recorded statements, and financial evidence. The defense attacked the missing last mile. The jury convicted Asante Berko on all three counts in just over three hours. For CCOs and boards, the final lesson is not to retry the case. It is to determine whether their own program could identify the same pattern, develop reliable facts, impose accountability, and respond at the speed enforcement policy now demands.

Start With the Three Questions That Matter

The DOJ Evaluation of Corporate Compliance Programs (ECCP) organizes program effectiveness around three questions. (1) Is the program well designed? (2) Is it applied earnestly and in good faith, with adequate resources and authority? (3) Does it work in practice? Those questions should frame the board’s review of the Berko fact pattern.

A written third-party policy answers the first question only in part. The second asks whether compliance can pause a revenue-producing transaction, obtain records, challenge senior employees, and reach the board without management filtering. The third asks for outcomes: when the warning signs appeared, did the organization find them, act on them, preserve the evidence, and fix the control weakness?

The governance failure is often not the absence of a rule. It is the gap between ownership and authority. Management owns business conduct and risk decisions. The CCO advises, challenges, monitors, and escalates. Internal audit provides independent assurance. The board oversees the system and management’s response. If every party assumes another function owns the hard decision, the control exists on paper but fails in operation.

Align Incentives, Conflicts, and Consequences

High-risk transactions require a clear view of personal incentives. Employees should disclose and pre-clear outside interests, referral compensation, client-paid benefits, expected success fees, and post-employment opportunities connected to current transactions. Offboarding should preserve relevant data, review pending payments, close access, identify continuing client contacts, and obtain certifications concerning outside interests and retained information.

Compensation deserves the same scrutiny as third-party payments. A bonus plan that rewards closing without measuring risk quality invites employees to treat compliance as a cost of delay. Risk-adjusted incentives should account for diligence completion, control compliance, escalation quality, and the durability of the business outcome. The ECCP asks whether companies use incentives for ethical conduct and apply discipline consistently across seniority, geography, and business unit. It also asks whether compensation can be deferred, reduced, canceled, or recouped when misconduct is established, subject to applicable law.

Consequence management must reach more than the direct actor. A credible process examines supervisory failure, tolerated red flags, obstruction, and failure to install or use safeguards. It applies the same decision framework to rainmakers and junior employees. The board should receive trend information showing investigation cycle times, substantiation rates, disciplinary consistency, repeat issues, and whether managers were held accountable for control failures.

Build Investigation and Speak-Up Readiness

The defense’s attack on the Berko evidence offers an investigation lesson. A source may have motives. A recording may require translation. Emails may lack a witness who can explain context. Payments may be traceable to an intermediary but not to an ultimate recipient. Those are reasons to investigate carefully, not reasons to dismiss an allegation.

Separate source credibility from objective proof. Preserve native emails, attachments, metadata, messaging records, payment instructions, approval histories, and device data. Trace funds beyond the first recipient. Document translation choices, dialect issues, investigative prompting, and competing interpretations. Interview witnesses who can explain both the transaction and the communications. Record what was established, what remained disputed, and why each conclusion was reached.

Design the process before the crisis. Define triage criteria, independence, privilege, preservation, scope approval, board escalation, investigation timing, root-cause analysis, and remediation ownership. Provide reporting channels that employees and third parties know, trust, and can use without retaliation. DOJ treats a trusted reporting mechanism and timely, properly scoped, objective, and documented investigations as hallmarks of an effective program.

Prepare the Disclosure Decision Before the Clock Starts

Voluntary disclosure should not be improvised during a board emergency. The company needs a protocol that identifies decision owners, the role of counsel, the facts required, preservation steps, the escalation path, and the method for assessing seriousness, pervasiveness, seniority, ongoing harm, and potential collateral consequences.

The March 2026 Department-wide Corporate Enforcement and Voluntary Self-Disclosure Policy (VSD) makes speed commercially significant. It provides a declination path when a company voluntarily self-discloses to the appropriate DOJ component, fully cooperates, timely and appropriately remediates, and lacks disqualifying aggravating circumstances, although prosecutorial discretion and the policy’s definitions still control. The policy also contains an exception for a whistleblower who reports both internally and to DOJ. A company may remain eligible if it reports as soon as reasonably practicable, no later than 120 days after the internal report, and satisfies the other requirements.

That is not a 120-day permission slip to wait. The operating standard is speed with discipline. The company must stop continuing harm, preserve evidence, protect privilege, develop facts, and keep decision-makers informed. A tabletop exercise should test whether the organization can do all five while the disclosure window is running.

Give the Board Evidence, Not Activity Counts

Boards do not need every hotline allegation or third-party file. They need a risk-based view of whether the system works. Reporting should cover high-risk transactions proceeding with incomplete diligence, unresolved politically exposed person relationships, payment holds, management overrides, aged investigations, remediation slippage, repeat control failures, off-channel communication exceptions, and risk acceptances by senior leaders.

Metrics should show speed, quality, and outcomes. Track time from red flag to triage, triage to transaction pause, allegation to investigation plan, finding to discipline, and remediation commitment to validated closure. Measure whether the company can match high-risk payments to legitimate services, verified beneficial owners, approved accounts, and evidence of performance. Show whether control testing changed behavior, not simply whether employees completed training.

The CCO should have regular direct access to the board or responsible committee, including private sessions when appropriate. The board should understand the CCO’s authority, resources, data access, and unresolved requests. DOJ asks what information directors examined, whether compliance concerns stopped or changed transactions, and whether compliance has the stature and autonomy to function effectively.

Run a 30/60/90-Day Berko Stress Test

Days 1 to 30: Replay one recent high-risk public-sector transaction against the Berko pattern. Inventory intermediaries, beneficial owners, politically exposed person relationships, success fees, conflicts, personal-email exceptions, cash exposure, payment destinations, incomplete diligence, and overrides. Identify which facts the current systems can retrieve and which depend on manual reconstruction.

Days 31 to 60: Close the most important design gaps. Add hard stops, fee benchmarking, conflict attestations, off-channel controls, evidence-preservation rules, payment analytics, investigation protocols, and an escalation matrix giving compliance documented pause authority. Assign one accountable owner and a deadline to each remediation item.

Days 61 to 90: Test the program. Sample transactions, trace selected payments end to end, test the hotline from intake through closure, and conduct an investigation and voluntary-disclosure tabletop. Present the results to senior management and the board, including accepted risks, overdue actions, resource needs, and evidence that completed remediation operates in practice.

The board should ask, “Which Berko warning signs would we detect today?” How quickly could we freeze a payment? Who may override compliance, and what evidence is required? Can investigators collect personal-device communications lawfully and preserve multilingual evidence? Which repeated control failures have affected compensation or promotion?

The CCO should ask one final question: Would our program find this pattern because the controls work, or only because an external source eventually brings it to us?

This Berko FCPA trial blog post series began with the prosecution’s evidentiary mosaic and the defense’s missing-last-mile challenge. It ends with a practical conclusion. Compliance evidence becomes trial evidence. A defensible program must create that evidence through authority, trusted reporting, disciplined investigations, consistent accountability, measurable remediation, and active board oversight. That is how a case study becomes a control test and how a control test becomes proof that the program works.

Resources:

United States v. Berko, No. 1:20-cr-00328-DG, Indictment, ECF No. 3 (E.D.N.Y. filed Aug. 26, 2020)

Stewart Bishop, “Goldman Jury Sees Cash Talk in Energy Deal Email Deluge,” Law360, Aug. 1, 2026; Stewart Bishop, “Goldman Exec Was Linchpin to Ghana Bribery Ploy, Jury Told,” Law360, Aug. 5, 2026.

Stewart Bishop, “Ex-Goldman Exec Convicted of Ghana Bribery Plot,” Law360, Aug. 6, 2026. Supplied trial reporting.

U.S. Attorney’s Office for the Eastern District of New York, “Former Goldman Sachs Investment Banker Convicted of Foreign Bribery and Money Laundering,” Aug. 6, 2026, DOJ Press Release.

Stewart Bishop, “Goldman Jury Sees Undercover Video as Bribe Trial Nears End,” Law360, Aug. 4, 2026. Supplied trial reporting.

Stewart Bishop, “Shady Power Deal Used in Goldman Compliance Prep, Jury Told,” Law360, July 29, 2026

Stewart Bishop, “Like Milli Vanilli, Goldman FCPA Case Is a Ruse, Jury Told,” Law360, July 28, 2026.

SEC Final Judgment against Asante Berko

SEC Complaint against Asante Berko

DOJ Evaluation of Corporate Compliance Programs

DOJ Corporate Enforcement and Voluntary Self-Disclosure Policy

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Connected Compliance: Part 5 – From Signals to Trust: Why Compliance Must Operate as One System

We conclude our series on various components of connected compliance by pulling them all together in an integrated whole. An effective compliance program is often described through its components: policies, training, risk assessment, reporting channels, investigations, discipline, and monitoring. That description is accurate, but incomplete. It tells us what the program contains. It does not tell us how the program works.

The deeper lesson from this series is that compliance effectiveness lives in the connections. Communication, risk sensing, investigations, and whistleblower programs are not separate workstreams that happen to sit under the same organizational chart. They are parts of one information-and-accountability system. Each part produces information that another part must receive, interpret, and convert into action.

That is the integrated argument. Compliance is truly connected because risk moves through an organization as a signal before it becomes an event. An employee question, customer request, control exception, supplier problem, unusual payment, new technology use, or hotline report may be the first indication that the company’s risk profile has changed. The program succeeds when it can move that information through a disciplined cycle: listen, assess, assign, investigate, remediate, communicate, and learn.

The program fails when the signal dies at a handoff.

The Seams Are Where Compliance Breaks

Most companies do not lack compliance activity. They lack reliable movement between activities. Training may be completed, but recurring questions never reach the risk assessment. A hotline may capture an allegation, but intake and investigation teams may use different priorities. An investigation may identify a control weakness, but the remediation owner may not be named. A new policy may be issued, but compliance may never test whether employees understand the change. Each function can report progress while the overall system remains ineffective.

This is why silos create more than inefficiency. They create control risk. A program can look mature by function and still fail as a system because no one owns the transfer of information, the decision deadline, or the feedback loop. Compliance professionals should therefore examine the seams: Who receives the signal? Who decides what it means? Who owns the response? What evidence confirms completion? Who tests whether the response worked? How does the lesson return to employees, managers, controls, and the risk assessment? Those are not administrative questions. They are the architecture of effectiveness.

Compliance Is an Information System

Communication is the first connection because it moves information in both directions. It tells employees what the organization expects, but it also tells compliance what employees are experiencing. Questions, requests for advice, training discussions, manager escalations, surveys, and workplace observations are all risk data. Communication becomes a control when it does more than broadcast. It creates a dependable exchange.

That information must then enter a dynamic risk process. Risk assessment is not merely a periodic exercise that ranks known categories. It is the organization’s method for deciding which signals require monitoring, immediate containment, deeper review, new controls, or additional resources. The quality of that decision depends on access to operational information across functions.

The Department of Justice (DOJ) makes this connection explicit in its 2024 Evaluation of Corporate Compliance Programs (ECCP). The ECCP asks whether periodic risk review is limited to a point-in-time snapshot or is based on “continuous access to operational data and information across functions.” It also asks whether the results lead to updates in policies, procedures, and controls. The enforcement lesson is straightforward: information must move, and it must change the program.

Compliance Is Also an Accountability System

Information alone does not create effectiveness. The organization must make decisions and assign responsibility. When a risk signal becomes an allegation, the investigation process establishes reliable facts. A credible investigation determines scope, protects evidence, preserves independence, treats witnesses fairly, reaches a supported conclusion, and identifies root causes. Its value is not limited to deciding whether one person violated a policy. It should reveal what the organization must change.

This is the point where accountability often weakens. A case may close when a report is issued, even though the control failure remains. Discipline may address the individual without addressing incentives, supervision, access rights, third-party oversight, or prior warnings. Recommendations may be accepted without an owner, deadline, testing plan, or escalation route.

A connected program treats investigation closure as the beginning of remediation. Findings should feed risk assessment, control design, training, management reporting, and resource allocation. Remediation should then be tested, and the result should be documented. If the company cannot show how a material finding changed the program, it has created a record of the past, not a control for the future.

Trust Is Both an Input and an Outcome

The whistleblower program completes the system because it determines whether critical information enters at all. A hotline provides access, but employees decide whether the reporting system is credible. Their decision is shaped by manager behavior, confidentiality practices, investigation quality, anti-retaliation protection, communication during the process, and what they observe after a concern is raised.

Trust is therefore not a soft cultural benefit sitting outside internal control. It is an operating condition for detection. Employees who believe that reporting is unsafe or futile will withhold information. The company then loses the opportunity to address misconduct early, protect people, preserve evidence, and reduce loss. Trust is also an outcome of the company’s response. A respectful intake, timely triage, fair investigation, consistent accountability, active anti-retaliation monitoring, and appropriate closure communication strengthen the next employee’s willingness to speak. A mishandled matter does the opposite. Every case affects the future supply of risk information.

The ECCP captures this end-to-end logic. It calls for an “efficient and trusted mechanism” for anonymous or confidential reporting, asks whether reporting and investigation information is analyzed for patterns and compliance weaknesses, and asks whether the company tests hotline effectiveness by tracking a report from start to finish. That is a systems test. It examines the full journey, not the existence of a vendor platform.

Think in Loops, Not Lines

Compliance professionals should stop viewing the program as a sequence that ends when a task is completed. Training does not end with completion. Risk assessment does not end with a heat map. An investigation does not end with a finding. A report does not end when the case is closed.

Each activity must create an output for the next decision and a feedback path to the earlier controls. Communication produces risk intelligence. Risk assessment prioritizes that intelligence. Reporting channels supply allegations and weak signals. Investigations convert allegations into facts and root causes. Remediation changes controls and accountability. Communication then explains the change, and monitoring tests whether it worked. The experience shapes culture and determines whether employees will use the system again.

This loop also changes the role of the compliance professional. The CCO does not need to own every business risk or perform every task. The CCO must help design and steward the system that connects them. That means establishing decision rights, information-sharing protocols, escalation thresholds, common taxonomies, remediation ownership, testing standards, and reporting that shows whether the loop is moving.

The practical objective is not centralization. It is coordinated accountability. Legal, human resources, internal audit, finance, security, procurement, technology, and business leaders may own different decisions. Compliance should ensure that the handoffs are explicit and that no material issue disappears between functions.

Measure the Health of the Cycle

Traditional metrics often count isolated activity: training completions, policy attestations, number of reports, cases closed, or risk assessments performed. Those measures remain useful, but they do not show whether the system is connected. A stronger dashboard measures movement and learning. How long does it take to move a material signal to a decision? What percentage of remediation actions has a named owner, deadline, evidence requirement, and testing plan? How often do investigation findings change the risk assessment? Which recurring employee questions lead to policy or training changes? Are reporter updates timely? Are retaliation concerns monitored after closure? Do repeat issues decline after remediation?

These measures test whether compliance converts information into action and action into improved performance. They also expose stalled handoffs. A long delay between investigation closure and remediation, for example, is not simply a case-management issue. It is a weakness in the connected program.

From Culture to Credibility

The best compliance programs do not eliminate uncertainty, misconduct, or failure. They create a reliable way to identify change, surface concerns, establish facts, make accountable decisions, and learn. That reliability is what turns stated values into operating culture.

Compliance is truly connected because culture affects reporting, reporting affects risk visibility, risk assessment affects resource allocation, investigations affect accountability, remediation affects controls, and communication affects whether employees trust the system enough to use it again. No element can be fully effective on its own.

The final question for compliance professionals is therefore not whether every component exists. It is whether the components exchange information, preserve accountability, and improve one another. When they do, compliance becomes more than a collection of requirements. It becomes a business system that turns signals into decisions, decisions into controls, and controls into credibility.

Bonus Questions for Compliance Professionals

  1. Where are material compliance signals most likely to stall or disappear in the current program?
  2. Who owns the transfer from employee concern to risk decision, and from investigation finding to tested remediation?
  3. Can the organization trace a recent issue from first signal through final control improvement?
  4. Which functions use different taxonomies, priorities, or case thresholds in ways that weaken handoffs?
  5. What evidence shows that reporting and investigation data changed risk assessment, resources, policies, or controls?
  6. Do current metrics reveal system delays and repeat weaknesses, or only completed activity?
  7. How does the organization communicate lessons without compromising confidentiality?
  8. What recent employee experience strengthened or weakened trust in the compliance system?
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Connected Compliance: Part 4 – From Hotline to Trust

An effective compliance program is not a collection of disconnected policies, training modules, hotline reports, and investigation files. It is an operating system. Culture determines whether employees will use it. Risk assessment tells the organization where it must adapt. Investigations test whether the system responds credibly. Whistleblower programs reveal whether employees trust them enough to speak. In Blog Post 1, we considered communication as a compliance control. Blog Post 2 showed how operational signals create a dynamic risk radar. In Blog Post 3, we explained why every investigation is a test of governance and culture. This final installment examines the front door to the entire system: the reporting program.

A company can buy a hotline in an afternoon. It cannot buy employee trust. That distinction is the starting point for an effective whistleblower program. The platform, policy, telephone number, and case-management system are necessary infrastructure. They are not the program. The real program is the experience an employee anticipates before reporting and receives after doing so.

The answers do not come primarily from policy language. They come from what employees see happen to colleagues who raise concerns. A mishandled report can teach an entire workplace that silence is safer.

The First Report Is the Real Program Test

One of the easiest ways to discourage reporting is to do a poor job after a report arrives. An ignored allegation, confidentiality breach, unexplained delay, dismissive intake, or retaliation can do more damage than an outdated hotline poster.

This is why the reporting program and investigation process cannot be separated. Intake creates an expectation of action. Investigation determines whether that expectation is met. Follow-up determines what the reporter tells others about the experience. The process should begin with prompt acknowledgment. Whenever possible, a trained person should thank the reporter, gather clarifying information, explain next steps, and set realistic expectations. An automated receipt confirms that the technology worked. Personal contact demonstrates that the organization is listening.

What the DOJ Is Really Asking

The Department of Justice (DOJ) places confidential reporting within its evaluation of whether a compliance program is well designed. The 2024 Evaluation of Corporate Compliance Programs (ECCP) calls for an “efficient and trusted mechanism” for anonymous or confidential reports. The two words that matter most are efficient and trusted.

Efficiency requires accessible channels, proper routing, risk-based triage, qualified investigators, timely handling, documentation, and accountable remediation. Trust requires employees to believe that the company will take concerns seriously, limit information sharing, prevent retaliation, and respond consistently regardless of rank or commercial importance.

The DOJ asks whether employees know about the reporting mechanism, feel comfortable using it, and are willing to report misconduct. It also asks a difficult question: “Conversely, does the company use practices that tend to chill such reporting?” That directs compliance professionals beyond the hotline itself. Confidentiality agreements, manager behavior, performance systems, investigation delays, incentive structures, employment actions, and prior reporter experiences can all affect willingness to speak. The DOJ further asks whether the company tests hotline effectiveness by tracking a report from intake through disposition. This makes end-to-end testing a governance exercise, not a vendor-management task.

Design Channels Around the Workforce

A reporting system designed for headquarters may fail the people most likely to observe operational risk. Field employees, shift workers, remote personnel, contractors, and employees with limited computer access need channels that fit how they work. The answer is a meaningful choice. A mature program may include a telephone hotline, web portal, mobile access, email, QR codes, and in-person reporting to compliance, human resources, legal, internal audit, security, or management. Channels should be available in appropriate languages and accessible to employees with disabilities.

Placement matters. A QR code on an identification badge, break-room poster, or work-issued device may be more useful than a buried intranet link. A telephone line remains essential for employees who prefer to speak or lack reliable digital access. Many employees will first approach someone they trust. Compliance should analyze channel use by location, function, shift, language, and workforce type. A channel with no reports is not necessarily evidence that the location has no concerns. It may be evidence that the channel is unknown, inaccessible, or distrusted.

Make Speaking Up a Leadership Behavior

Tone at the top remains essential, but the employee’s immediate supervisor often controls the reporting climate. A chief executive may celebrate integrity while a frontline manager rolls their eyes, interrupts the employee, demands names, or warns that a report will hurt the team. The manager’s reaction becomes the company’s culture in that moment.

Managers need specific training. They should listen without investigating on the spot, avoid promises they cannot keep, preserve information, escalate promptly, and reinforce anti-retaliation expectations. A concern does not have to arrive through the hotline to require action. Leadership modeling should be visible. When leaders invite dissent, respond calmly to bad news, thank employees who identify risk, and communicate anonymized lessons, they show that speaking up protects the business. Regular field presence builds relationships, reveals access barriers, and provides context unavailable from a dashboard.

Tell the Truth About Confidentiality

Employees often use anonymity and confidentiality interchangeably, but they are different. An anonymous reporter does not disclose identity. Confidentiality means identity and related information are limited to people with a legitimate need to know. The company should never promise absolute secrecy when the facts make it impossible. In a small team, subject matter, timing, or witnesses may reveal who raised the concern. Overpromising creates a second breach of trust.

The better approach is candor. Explain that information will be restricted as far as reasonably possible, that some disclosure may be necessary to investigate fairly or meet legal obligations, and that retaliation is prohibited. Use role-based access, careful case notes, secure records, disciplined interview planning, and clear need-to-know rules. Confidentiality is not a slogan. It is an information-control process.

Communicate Without Compromising the Investigation

Silence during a long investigation can feel like indifference. Reporters do not need access to witness statements or confidential personnel decisions, but they do need evidence that the matter remains active. Set a communication cadence based on case risk and expected duration. Provide updates even when the update is that the review continues. Explain delays where appropriate, remind the reporter how to provide additional information, and repeat the anti-retaliation contact route.

At closure, confirm that the concern was reviewed and addressed as appropriate. Thank the reporter and reinforce anti-retaliation protection. The company may be unable to disclose findings or discipline, but it can close the human loop.

Treat Anti-Retaliation as an Active Control

An anti-retaliation policy is necessary, but it is not self-executing. Retaliation can be direct, such as termination, demotion, or loss of pay. It can also be subtle: exclusion from meetings, undesirable shifts, lost development opportunities, hostile supervision, damaged reputation, or social isolation. The company should assess retaliation risk throughout the matter. Compliance and human resources should preserve a baseline of the reporter’s role and treatment, monitor employment actions, schedule check-ins, and provide an escalation route outside the normal chain. Monitoring should continue after closure.

Protection does not mean immunity from legitimate performance management. It means employment decisions affecting a reporter receive appropriate review, are supported by contemporaneous evidence, and are not influenced by protected activity. When retaliation occurs, discipline should be prompt and visible enough, within confidentiality limits, to reinforce the rule.

Do Not Discredit the Difficult Messenger

Serial reporters and incomplete reports create operational challenges, but frequency, frustration, or poor drafting does not determine whether an allegation is true. Each concern should be assessed on its merits. A sparse report may still contain breadcrumbs. Investigators can review organizational charts, personnel changes, transactions, prior complaints, and control data before concluding that the matter cannot proceed. Multiple reports may reveal an unresolved environmental problem or weak earlier investigations.

Motivation can be relevant to credibility, but it should not replace evidence. Labeling someone a troublemaker is often an easy way to miss a difficult fact and an effective way to chill the next reporter.

Measure Trust, Not Just Volume

Hotline volume alone is a weak measure. A low number may reflect a healthy culture, a small risk population, inaccessible channels, fear, or lack of awareness. A rising number may reflect deteriorating conduct or growing confidence in the program. A useful dashboard combines volume with context: awareness and comfort survey results, reports by workforce segment, intake-to-acknowledgment time, triage time, case aging by risk, substantiation patterns, repeat allegations, reporter-update timeliness, retaliation concerns, remediation completion, and employee feedback after closure.

Compliance should test the entire system. Submit a controlled report, trace routing and access, review acknowledgments, confirm escalation rules, examine investigation handoffs, and verify closure and retention. Analyze whether reporting data changes risk assessment, controls, training, and resources. The objective is evidence that the program learns.

Closing the Connected Compliance Program

This four-part blog post series began with communication because employees cannot use a system they do not understand. It moved to dynamic risk assessment because organizations must recognize changing signals. It then examined investigations because allegations require independent facts, accountability, and remediation. Today we discussed whistleblower programs because none of those capabilities matter if people do not trust the company enough to speak. Join us tomorrow in our concluding Part 5 for a deeper discussion of how compliance truly is connected.

The connected compliance program is a loop. Communication builds awareness. Reporting supplies risk intelligence. Investigation converts allegations into reliable findings. Remediation improves controls. Feedback strengthens culture and makes future reporting more likely.

For the compliance professional, the final test is not whether the hotline exists. It is whether an employee facing a difficult choice believes that raising a concern will protect the organization, lead to a credible response, and not cost that employee a career. That is how a reporting channel becomes a trusted control and how culture becomes credibility.

Bonus Questions for Compliance Professionals

  1. Can every workforce segment access a reporting channel during the way and hours in which it actually works?
  2. Do employees know the available channels, understand external reporting rights, and say they feel comfortable using them?
  3. What happens during the first 24 hours after a report arrives, and who is accountable for acknowledgment, triage, and protection?
  4. Are managers trained to recognize and escalate concerns received outside formal reporting channels?
  5. Can the company show how reporter identity and case information are restricted to people with a legitimate need to know?
  6. How does the organization monitor direct and subtle retaliation during and after an investigation?
  7. Does the company communicate appropriately with reporters when an investigation is delayed and when it closes?
  8. Are serial, anonymous, and incomplete reports assessed on evidence and context rather than labels or assumptions?
  9. What reporting data has changed the risk assessment, controls, training, discipline, or resource allocation during the past year?
  10. Has the company recently tested one report from submission through routing, investigation, remediation, feedback, and retention?
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Connected Compliance: Part 3 – Why Every Investigation Is a Culture Opportunity for Your Organization

An effective compliance program is not a collection of disconnected policies, training modules, hotline reports, and investigation files. It is an operating system. Culture determines whether employees will use it. Risk assessment tells the organization where it must adapt. Investigations test whether the system responds credibly. Whistleblower programs reveal whether employees trust it enough to speak. In Blog 1, we examined communication as a compliance control. In Blog Post 2, we showed how those communications and other operational signals create a dynamic risk radar. Today in Blog Post 3, we ask what happens when a signal becomes an allegation as an introduction to how and why every investigation can be an opportunity to both pressure-test and build out your culture.

A hotline report, audit exception, control override, manager escalation, or unusual transaction may begin as just another compliance signal; once the company decides it requires investigation, the stakes change. The organization must establish what happened, protect people and evidence, make defensible decisions, and strengthen the program.

That makes an investigation more than a fact-finding exercise. It is a visible test of governance. Employees watch who is interviewed, how leaders behave, whether the process appears fair, whether high performers receive special treatment, and whether the company acts when misconduct is substantiated. Details should remain confidential, but the organization cannot erase the cultural impact. Every investigation sends a message.

Credibility Is Built Before the First Interview

The strongest investigations begin with disciplined triage. Before scheduling interviews or collecting data, the company should first identify the immediate risks that require action. Is anyone’s health or safety at risk? Could misconduct be continuing? Is evidence vulnerable? Does the allegation implicate financial reporting, government contracting, sanctions, corruption, product integrity, cybersecurity, privacy, or another obligation requiring prompt escalation?

Containment is not a conclusion. Suspending access, preserving records, pausing a payment, separating employees, or protecting a reporter may be necessary while the facts remain unresolved. The decision should be proportionate, documented, and revisited as evidence develops.

Triage should identify the functions that need to participate without turning the matter into a committee project. One person should own the process, one decision-maker should approve material scope changes, and communication lines should be defined at the outset.

What the DOJ Is Really Asking

The Department of Justice (DOJ) places investigations squarely inside its test of program effectiveness. The 2024 Evaluation of Corporate Compliance Programs (ECCP) asks, “How does the company ensure that investigations are properly scoped?” It then asks what steps the company takes to ensure investigations are “independent, objective, appropriately conducted, and properly documented,” as well as how the company determines who should conduct an investigation.

Those words provide a practical quality standard. Proper scope means the investigation addresses the allegation and reasonably connected issues without drifting into an unlimited inquiry. Independence means the investigator is free from conflicts and improper business pressure. Objectivity requires a search for facts that may confirm or disprove the allegation. Appropriate conduct includes lawful evidence collection, fair treatment of witnesses, and proportionate methods. Proper documentation allows the company to explain what it did, why it did it, and how it reached its conclusions.

DOJ also asks whether the company applies timing metrics, monitors outcomes, and ensures accountability for findings and recommendations. Later, the ECCP describes a working program as having an “appropriately funded mechanism for the timely and thorough investigations” of allegations or suspicions of misconduct. The point is not speed at any cost. It is disciplined responsiveness supported by adequate resources.

Scope the Question, Not the Desired Answer

A written investigation plan should define the allegation, relevant policy or legal issues, time period, business units, people, data sources, immediate risks, and proposed work. It should identify the standard used to reach findings and the expected form of the report. It should also record what remains outside scope.

The plan must be flexible. Evidence may reveal additional conduct, another geography, a control failure, or management involvement. The investigator should document the new information, assess its materiality, identify any additional resources or conflicts, and obtain appropriate approval for expansion.

This discipline prevents a scope narrowed to contain the issue and investigation drift that delays a conclusion. A credible process follows the evidence while preserving a clear line of sight to the original allegation.

Choose the Investigator for the Risk

Not every matter requires outside counsel, and not every matter should remain inside the company. The choice should turn on credibility and capability, not habit. Internal investigators may understand the business and manage routine matters efficiently. External counsel or specialists may be appropriate when allegations involve senior leadership, significant legal exposure, government reporting, material financial impact, technical evidence, cross-border restrictions, litigation, or concerns about internal independence.

The company should establish decision criteria before a crisis. Who determines whether compliance, legal, human resources, internal audit, security, or outside counsel will lead? What conflicts require recusal? When does the audit committee or another independent authority oversee the matter? Which technical experts may be needed, and how will their work be directed? An outside law firm’s letterhead does not create independence. It comes from clear authority, freedom from interference, sufficient resources, access to evidence, and an escalation route when investigators encounter resistance.

Protect the Privilege with Precision

The attorney-client privilege can protect confidential communications seeking or providing legal advice, but an investigation is not privileged simply because a lawyer attends. Privilege rules are jurisdiction-specific, and careless circulation, unclear roles, or unnecessary third-party involvement can create risk.

At the beginning, counsel should define the legal purpose, identify the client and team, establish communication and documentation protocols, and explain confidentiality expectations. Team members should know which communications seek legal advice, where documents will be stored, and who may receive them. Over-labeling every document as privileged does not create stronger protection. It can undermine discipline and complicate later disclosure decisions. The better approach is to use privilege deliberately, involve counsel where legal advice is genuinely required, and preserve a reliable factual record that supports the company’s decisions.

Treat Witnesses as People, Not Evidence Containers

Witness interviews often determine whether employees experience the investigation as fair. The investigator should explain the purpose of the interview, the investigator’s role, expectations for truthful cooperation, applicable confidentiality limits, and the company’s prohibition against retaliation. The interviewer should not promise complete secrecy, prejudge the allegation, coach testimony, or imply that raising concerns created the problem.

Respect improves evidence quality. Employees are more likely to provide complete information when questions are neutral, and the interviewer listens before challenging inconsistencies. Cultural, language, disability, and power dynamics may affect participation and should be addressed thoughtfully.

Anti-retaliation protection requires more than an opening statement. Compliance and human resources should identify foreseeable risks of retaliation, monitor employment actions and workplace behavior, provide a safe escalation channel, and respond quickly to concerns. Retaliation may be subtle: exclusion, schedule changes, lost opportunities, hostile supervision, or reputational harm. A technically sound investigation can still damage culture if the reporter or witnesses pay a price for participating.

Preserve Evidence and Measure the Right Clock

Evidence management must begin early. Relevant emails, collaboration messages, mobile communications, transaction records, system logs, personnel documents, and physical evidence all require preservation. Collection should follow applicable law, privacy requirements, company policy, and forensic protocols. The team should document sources, custodians, dates, gaps, and chain of custody where necessary. Always remember the first question the DOJ will ask after you self-disclose is, “Do you have the documents tied down? ”

Timeliness should be measured, but the metric must support quality. Useful measures include time from intake to triage, time to investigator assignment, aging by risk category, days awaiting business action, time from finding to remediation, and overdue reporter updates. A single average completion target can create pressure to close simple matters quickly or rush complex ones. Status reviews should ask what is delaying the matter, whether scope remains appropriate, whether interim protections still work, and whether new risks require escalation. The objective is a process that explains delay, removes bottlenecks, and prioritizes higher-consequence matters.

Move Beyond the Bad Actor

An investigation that identifies who violated a policy but not why the system allowed it has completed only half the work. DOJ asks whether investigations identify “root causes, system vulnerabilities, and accountability lapses,” including those involving supervisors and senior executives.

Root-cause analysis should examine incentives, performance pressure, control design, access rights, training, supervision, third-party oversight, data availability, prior warnings, and the consistency of discipline. Did the policy prohibit the conduct but the workflow reward it? Did a manager ignore a red flag? Did an exception process become the normal process? Did earlier reports reveal the same weakness?

The answer should drive remediation, including discipline, control redesign, policy revision, monitoring, training, leadership changes, third-party action, disclosure, or resource reallocation. Each action needs an owner, deadline, evidence, and testing. Otherwise, the investigation becomes a historical record rather than a compliance control.

Close the Case and the Cultural Loop

A reasoned closure record should state the allegation, scope, steps taken, evidence considered, credibility analysis, findings, and approved response. Discipline should be consistent across ranks and levels of commercial importance, with deviations documented. Investigation data should then feed the risk assessment, training plan, control testing, and management reporting.

The reporting party also matters. Without disclosing confidential personnel information, the company can acknowledge that the review is complete, thank the person for speaking up, restate anti-retaliation protections, and provide a contact for further concerns. Silence after intake encourages employees to conclude that nothing happened.

This is the connection across the series. Communication brings information into the program. Dynamic risk assessment helps the company recognize its significance. Investigation converts allegations into facts, accountability, and learning. Therefore, join us for Part 4 tomorrow, as we will demonstrate the front door to that process: how an effective whistleblower program gives employees safe, accessible ways to report and confidence that speaking up will lead to credible follow-through.

Bonus Questions for Compliance Professionals

  1. Who has authority to triage an allegation and order immediate containment or preservation measures?
  2. What written criteria determine who should lead an investigation and when independent oversight or outside counsel is required?
  3. Can the company show that recent investigations were properly scoped, independent, objective, timely, and documented?
  4. Which stages of the investigation create the greatest delays, and are those delays risk-based or simply unmanaged?
  5. How does the organization monitor subtle retaliation against reporters and witnesses?
  6. Do investigation reports identify control failures, incentives, supervisory accountability, and root causes in addition to individual misconduct?
  7. What evidence shows that completed investigations changed controls, training, discipline, resources, or risk assessment?
  8. How does the company communicate appropriate closure to reporters without compromising confidentiality?
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Connected Compliance: Part 2 – From Risk Register to Risk Radar

An effective compliance program is not a collection of disconnected policies, training modules, hotline reports, and investigation files. It is an operating system. Culture determines whether employees will use it. Risk assessment tells the organization where it must adapt. Investigations test whether the system responds credibly. Whistleblower programs reveal whether employees trust it enough to speak. Blog 1 examined communication as the control that connects those elements. In this Part 2, we examine what compliance must do with the intelligence that communication produces.

The traditional risk assessment was built for a world that moved more slowly. Compliance gathered a group of leaders, reviewed enforcement trends, scored familiar risks, produced a heat map, and returned to the exercise the following year. That process still has value, but it is no longer enough.

Today, a new market restriction, customer demand, artificial intelligence deployment, supply-chain disruption, sanctions measure, or data rule can alter the company’s risk profile before the annual plan is approved. The central question is therefore not whether the organization has a risk register. It is whether compliance has a risk radar that can detect change, decide what matters, assign ownership, and translate the signal into action.

Every Compliance Risk Has a Political Dimension

Compliance obligations do not develop in a vacuum. They reflect choices made by governments about national security, trade, technology, labor, privacy, corruption, competition, and corporate accountability. For a multinational company, those choices may conflict, overlap, or change with little notice. Particularly in this political age, the single most-used byword is volatility.

That makes geopolitical awareness a compliance capability. It does not require the CCO to become a foreign-policy analyst. It requires the compliance function to understand how political priorities can become legal obligations, enforcement pressure, customer expectations, or operational constraints. Export controls can reshape product access. Sanctions can alter payment and counterparty risk. Forced-labor requirements can reach deep into a supply chain. AI rules can change how a business collects data, develops products, and makes decisions.

The practical lesson is that legal change is often the last stage in a longer policy development process. Compliance should monitor the earlier signals: legislative proposals, agency speeches, enforcement patterns, trade measures, customer questions, supplier difficulties, and operational workarounds. These indicators do not all demand a program change, but they should enter a disciplined triage process.

What the DOJ Is Really Asking

The Department of Justice has made dynamic risk assessment part of the effectiveness inquiry. The 2024 Evaluation of Corporate Compliance Programs (ECCP) directs prosecutors to consider “emerging risks as internal and external circumstances impacting the company’s risk profile evolve.” This risk profile can change due to factors outside a company’s control or its own business decisions. Moreover, the ECCP language moves risk assessment beyond a scheduled document and into continuous management.

DOJ then asks: “Is the company’s approach to risk management proactive or reactive?” The distinction is critical. A reactive program updates controls after a failure, enforcement action, or audit finding. A proactive program uses operational information across functions to identify change before misconduct occurs. The ECCP also asks whether periodic review is merely a point-in-time exercise or draws on continuing access to operational data, and whether the results lead to updates in policies, procedures, and controls.

The enforcement question is not whether the company predicted every development. No program can. The question is whether the company had a reasonable process for identifying material changes, directing resources to higher-risk areas, documenting its decisions, and revising the program over time.

Build the Risk Radar From Multiple Signals

A dynamic risk process begins with a wider field of vision. Regulatory alerts and outside counsel updates are useful, but they show only part of the environment. Some of the earliest warnings come from inside the business. Sales may see unusual customer demands in a new market. Procurement may find suppliers unable to provide origin information. Finance may identify payment routes that no longer fit the expected transaction. Information security may discover employees using unapproved AI tools. Human resources may raise concerns about retaliation or pressure related to performance targets. Audit may identify recurring exceptions. Hotline reports and investigations may reveal a pattern that a heat map missed.

Compliance should bring these signals together through a repeatable cadence. A quarterly cross-functional review can examine changes in the business model, geography, products, third parties, technology, enforcement, and employee concerns. High-velocity risks may require monthly or event-driven review. The objective is not to create another committee. It is to establish a reliable place where weak signals are compared, challenged, and assigned.

Or simply look at the changes wrought by the Trump Administration in 2026 alone. Venezuela is now open for business. How about the Democratic Republic of Congo? See here and here. Of course there is Iran, but you have to ask what week it is and are we doing business with Iran or are we at war with Iran.

Give One Person the Clock

Emerging risks often fall between organizational boxes. Legal understands the rule. Compliance sees the control issue. Operations owns the process. Procurement controls the supplier relationship. Technology owns the system. To use a well-worn maxim, if everyone is in charge, no one is in charge. In the corporate world, when everyone is generally responsible, no one is specifically accountable. This is both why and where compliance needs to step up its game.

Every material risk needs a named owner with the authority to convene the necessary functions, set deadlines, escalate disagreements, and report on the disposition. That person does not perform every task. The owner keeps the clock, maintains the decision record, and ensures that the issue does not disappear between meetings.

Governance should also define escalation triggers. A credible framework identifies which developments require immediate executive attention, which can be handled through a working group, and which should remain under observation. Without thresholds, organizations either under-escalate material risk or flood leadership with undeveloped issues.

Use a Two-Speed Assessment

Not every signal requires an enterprise-wide risk assessment. Compliance needs two speeds. The first is rapid triage. A small group of subject-matter experts identifies the potential legal obligation, affected operations, time horizon, severity, available data, current controls, and immediate containment needs. This is where AI can play a key role in compliance, essentially superforecasting risks to enable quick, efficient risk management strategies when volatility hits. Additionally, such an approach may lead to a decision to monitor, take interim action, or launch a deeper review.

The second is formal assessment. Complex or high-impact risks may require structured interviews, data analysis, control testing, external counsel, forensic support, or scenario planning. The deeper process should be proportionate to the exposure, not triggered simply because the issue is new. This two-speed model protects agility without sacrificing rigor. It also creates evidence that the company made a reasoned decision. A short written triage record can show what information was considered, who participated, why the company chose its response, and when the issue will be reviewed again.

Convert Assessment Into Real Controls

The most common failure is not the inability to identify risk. It is the failure to convert assessment into a viable risk management strategy and then to implement, monitor, and improve your business operations. A new questionnaire, certification, or policy may create documentation, but documentation alone does not mitigate the underlying exposure.

Consider third-party risk. A supplier questionnaire can identify missing information, but the control lies in what happens next: enhanced diligence, contractual protection, source verification, payment restrictions, audit rights, monitoring, remediation, or a decision not to proceed. The same principle applies to AI. An AI-use policy matters, but effective governance also requires an inventory of use cases, approval gates, data controls, human oversight, testing, monitoring, and accountability.

Each response should identify the control objective, owner, implementation date, evidence, and testing method. Compliance should also ask what existing control can be adapted before building a separate program. Strong governance, escalation, training, data access, and investigation processes are reusable infrastructure across risk domains.

Resource allocation is part of that conversion. If a changing risk profile calls for deeper third-party monitoring, faster export review, or additional AI oversight, the organization must decide what people, technology, and budget will support the response. Compliance cannot claim to be risk-based when yesterday’s priorities continue to dictate today’s resources. The allocation decision, including any accepted constraint, should be visible and documented.

Treat Change Management as a Control

A technically correct response can still fail if employees do not understand it or the business cannot implement it. New requirements frequently collide with established incentives, systems, customer commitments, and local practice. Change management should therefore be part of the control design. Explain why the risk changed. Identify which decisions and workflows are affected. Train the employees and gatekeepers who must act differently. Provide a practical escalation route. Test understanding. Gather feedback. Then revise the process when implementation exposes friction or unintended consequences. For a full discussion of change management as a compliance control, listen to the podcast Ronnie Feldman and I did with Caveni Wong on this episode of Creativity and Compliance.

This is where blog post 1’s communication discipline comes into play. Compliance cannot adapt to risk through broadcast messages alone. It needs a two-way channel that tells employees what changed and tells compliance whether the response works in practice.

Measure Adaptation, Not Activity

The number of risk meetings or completed assessments says little about effectiveness. Better measures test whether the organization moves from signal to decision and from decision to control. Useful indicators include the time required to triage a material development, percentage of actions with named owners and deadlines, overdue remediation, control implementation and testing results, repeat exceptions, unresolved ownership disputes, and lessons incorporated from investigations.

Compliance should also examine whether resources shifted when risk shifted. A program that identifies a higher risk but leaves staffing, monitoring, and controls unchanged has produced analysis without management. The result should be a closed loop: detect, assess, assign, mitigate, test, and learn. That loop turns risk assessment from an annual artifact into a management process.

That transition is where program credibility is tested. Join us tomorrow as we consider how organizations scope investigations, preserve independence, establish consistency, document decisions, and convert findings into remediation. A dynamic risk process helps the company see the signal. A credible investigation determines what happened and what the organization must do next.

Bonus Questions for Compliance Professionals

  1. Which internal and external signals can change the company’s risk profile between formal assessments?
  2. Who has specific ownership for emerging risks that cross legal, compliance, operations, procurement, finance, and technology?
  3. What criteria determine whether an issue is monitored, triaged, escalated, or formally assessed?
  4. Can the company show how a recent risk assessment changed a policy, control, resource allocation, or business decision?
  5. Do substantive mitigation and ongoing monitoring support questionnaires and certifications?
  6. How quickly can the organization move from a weak signal to a documented decision?
  7. What recent investigation finding should change the current risk assessment?
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Connected Compliance: Part 1 – Communication as the Operating System of Compliance

An effective compliance program is not a collection of disconnected policies, training modules, hotline reports, and investigation files. It is an operating system. Culture determines whether employees will use it. Risk assessment tells the organization where it must adapt. Investigations test whether the system responds credibly. Whistleblower programs reveal whether employees trust it enough to speak. Over this four-part blog post series, we will examine those connections, beginning with the discipline that makes every other element work: communication.

Compliance professionals often describe communication as one element of a program. That description is too narrow. Communication is the operating system through which employees learn expectations, seek advice, identify risk, report concerns, and judge whether management means what it says. If that system is slow, generic, inaccessible, or untrusted, even well-designed controls can fail in practice.

This matters because a compliance program does not become effective when a policy is published or training is completed. It becomes effective when an employee facing pressure knows what to do, understands where to go, and believes that asking for help will not create a career problem. Communication is therefore not simply messaging. It is a preventive control, a detection mechanism, and a source of management information.

Communication Is a Control, Not a Campaign

Many organizations still approach compliance communication as a calendar exercise. They send a Code of Conduct message, deliver annual training, publish a hotline reminder, and count distribution. Those activities may be necessary, but they do not establish whether the message reached the employee at the moment of risk.

An effective communication control has four characteristics.

  1. It is accessible, so employees can find guidance without having to navigate a maze.
  2. It is relevant, so examples reflect the decisions employees actually face.
  3. It is interactive so that employees can ask questions and test judgment.
  4. It is responsive, so the organization uses employee feedback to improve policies, training, and controls.

These distinctions are important. A campaign pushes information out. A control creates a reliable exchange of information. That exchange gives compliance an early view of confusion, pressure, process weakness, and emerging misconduct. It also gives employees a practical path to lawful and ethical decisions.

What the DOJ Is Really Asking

The Department of Justice has moved the compliance discussion away from paper design and toward operational effectiveness. The three fundamental questions in the 2024 Evaluation of Corporate Compliance Programs (ECCP) examine the program’s design, empowerment, and whether it works in practice.

For culture, the DOJ asks, “Does the company seek input from all levels of employees?” It then asks, “What steps has the company taken in response to its measurement of the compliance culture?” Those questions place two obligations on compliance. First, the company must listen across levels, functions, and locations. Second, it must demonstrate that listening changed something. Data without response is observation, not effectiveness.

The ECCP also directs prosecutors to examine policy accessibility, training effectiveness, the availability of guidance, and whether employees know when to seek advice. Taken together, these questions make communication evidence. A company should be able to show not only what it said but also who could access it, whether employees understood it, how they used it, and what management learned from it.

Build Channels Around Employee Behavior

Employees do not experience the company through a single channel. They communicate through managers, messaging platforms, internal websites, employee groups, town halls, mobile devices, and informal workplace networks. A compliance program that relies on one formal channel will miss important signals.

The practical response is a channel portfolio. Policies should be searchable and written in language employees can use. Guidance should be available through live compliance contacts and appropriate digital tools. Reporting options should include the hotline, web intake, direct contact with compliance or human resources, and management escalation. Communications should reach operational employees who may not sit at a computer, as well as global employees who may face language or cultural barriers.

Compliance also needs to listen where employees are already speaking. That may include internal collaboration channels, employee surveys, focus groups, office visits, and patterns in questions received by the compliance team. Any monitoring must be consistent with law, privacy expectations, company policy, and records-management requirements. The goal is not surveillance. The goal is to understand the employee experience before a cultural weakness becomes a control failure.

Face-to-face contact remains especially valuable. A visit to a business unit can reveal whether employees understand a policy, whether managers create pressure, and whether the local process matches the written procedure. It also changes how employees see compliance. A familiar adviser is easier to contact than a distant function that appears only during training or an investigation.

Replace Training Completion With Decision Readiness

Completion rates answer whether an employee opened a course. They do not answer whether the employee can recognize a conflict, challenge a questionable payment, escalate an export-control concern, or pause the use of an unapproved AI tool. As Hui Chen continually reminds us, it is about results, not inputs.

Training should therefore be built around decision readiness. Scenario-based sessions allow employees to work through realistic gray areas and explain why one course of action is safer than another. Shorter, targeted modules can address risk by role. Experienced employees may be able to demonstrate proficiency through testing, while supervisors may require additional training because they receive concerns and translate policy into daily conduct.

Relevance is a control feature. Employees are more likely to retain training that reflects their workplace, business model, and actual risk. A procurement team needs different scenarios from a sales team. A manager needs to understand retaliation and escalation. An engineer needs clear boundaries around data, cybersecurity, and AI. Localization must also address more than translation. Examples, delivery methods, and escalation paths should make sense in the local operating environment. The measurement should move beyond completion. Useful indicators include questions asked after training, repeat areas of confusion, scenario performance, requests for advice, policy-page use, control exceptions, and whether similar misconduct declines over time.

Make Leadership Visible and Consistent

Tone at the top loses force when it sounds scripted or appears only once a year. Employees judge leadership commitment through repeated choices: which risks receive attention, whether high performers are disciplined, whether managers welcome questions, and whether business pressure routinely overrides control requirements.

Compliance communication is stronger when leaders explain expectations in their own voices and connect them to business responsibilities. The chief executive can frame integrity as part of strategy. Finance can address books and records. Human resources can speak to respect, retaliation, and accountability. Business leaders can explain why escalation protects customers and sustainable growth.

Middle management is equally important. Most employees experience culture through their direct supervisor. Managers should be trained to receive concerns, avoid promises they cannot keep, protect confidentiality, escalate promptly, and prevent retaliation. If employees hear an ethical message from senior leadership but experience dismissal from a supervisor, the local message will win. Consistency completes the control. The organization must apply standards across rank, geography, and commercial importance. Unequal treatment communicates more powerfully than any policy statement.

Use Data Without Losing the Human Signal

Technology can help compliance measure reach and engagement. Policy-page analytics can show whether employees use key resources. Digital guidance tools can identify common questions. Investigation and reporting data can reveal trends by issue, region, or function. Training results can show where judgment remains weak.

These data points should be treated as signals, not verdicts. High question volume may indicate confusion, but it may also show that employees trust compliance. An increase in reports may reflect more misconduct, a successful awareness campaign, or greater confidence in the reporting process. Low reporting may indicate a healthy environment, or it may be a warning that employees believe speaking up is futile.

The best analysis combines quantitative and qualitative evidence. Compliance should compare usage data with employee interviews, survey responses, investigation themes, audit findings, exit information, and observations from business partners. It should protect privacy, limit access, and avoid metrics that encourage the wrong behavior. A target that simply seeks fewer reports can suppress the very information the company needs.

Convert Listening Into Action

The strongest evidence of culture is not the survey itself. It is what the company does next. If employees cannot find a policy, redesign access. If repeated questions reveal ambiguity, rewrite the guidance. If a region reports little despite known risk, test for fear or channel barriers. If investigations identify manager misconduct, adjust training, incentives, supervision, and discipline.

This requires a closed-loop process. Gather information. Analyze it for themes and root causes. Assign ownership for action. Document the decision. Communicate appropriate changes. Then measure whether the change worked. That process turns communication into continuous improvement and creates a defensible record of program evolution.

It also connects this first installment to the rest of the series. Employee questions and reporting patterns are early risk indicators. Investigation quality tells employees whether the company acts on what it hears. Whistleblower-program credibility determines whether critical information enters the system at all. Each element depends on the others.

From Culture to a Shifting Risk Environment

Communication gives compliance something more valuable than reach. It provides intelligence. Questions about a new market, an AI application, a third party, a customer demand, or a supply-chain disruption may be the first evidence that the risk environment has changed.

Join us tomorrow for our next installment, where we will examine how compliance can convert those signals into dynamic risk assessment, clear ownership, and adaptive controls. A shifting risk environment cannot be managed by an annual exercise alone. It requires the listening discipline established here.

Bonus Questions for Compliance Professionals

  1. Can employees find practical guidance at the moment they face a risky decision?
  2. Which groups, locations, or shifts are least engaged with compliance resources, and why?
  3. What evidence shows that employee feedback has changed the program?
  4. Are managers prepared to receive concerns, escalate them, protect confidentiality, and prevent retaliation?
  5. Do current metrics reward learning and trust, or do they unintentionally reward silence?
  6. What recent employee question should be treated as an emerging-risk signal?
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What Scoular Teaches About Off-Channel Communications, Investigations, and Compliance Program Effectiveness

WhatsApp was not a footnote in The Scoular Company FCPA resolution. It was part of the operating system of the alleged bribery scheme. According to the Department of Justice Press Release (we are still waiting on the DPA and Criminal Information), Scoular Company employees communicated about shipments and bribes through WhatsApp and other means. Today I want to explore the issue of off-channel communication and what it means for your compliance program.

The compliance lesson is not simply that Scoular Company employees used WhatsApp. It is that an informal communications channel became embedded in a high-risk business process involving customs officials, third-party brokers, payment approvals, and financial records. Once that happens, messaging governance is no longer an information technology issue. It is an anti-corruption control.

Off-Channel Became the Business Channel

The phrase “off-channel” can be misleading. If employees regularly use WhatsApp to authorize payments, direct third parties, and solve customs problems, the application is not outside the business. It is where the business is being conducted. That distinction matters.

A company may have excellent controls inside its enterprise resource planning system. It may require purchase orders, segregation of duties, invoice matching, and documented approvals. Those controls can be bypassed if the substantive decision is made in a private chat and the formal system merely records the result. At Scoular Company, the reinspection invoice was one side of the control failure. The WhatsApp discussion was the other one.

The invoice gave the payment a facially legitimate description. The messaging channel allegedly supplied the knowledge, direction, and authorization behind it. Compliance teams should test both sides together. A recurring round-dollar customs charge becomes more significant when matched to a message asking a broker to get a train released. A failed inspection becomes more significant when followed by an off-channel approval and immediate border clearance. Communications analytics and transaction analytics should not operate as separate disciplines.

Enforcement Priorities Can Change. Evidence Does Not.

In my podcast with Matteson Ellis, Member and Latin America Practice Lead at Miller & Chevalier, we addressed the shift in federal enforcement attention surrounding off-channel communications. Ellis made the more durable point: even when a regulator changes its emphasis, WhatsApp messages remain evidence of knowledge, intent, authorization, concealment, and circumvention of control.

Ellis observed that the DOJ press release suggests Scoular’s internal investigation obtained access to relevant WhatsApp communications. That access was important because retrieving such data can be difficult, particularly when employees use personal devices, local privacy law limits review, or messages have not been retained. His conclusion should command the attention of every CCO. The off-channel issue may have become quieter, but the Scoular resolution can be read as bringing it back to the center of corporate investigations. A prosecutor does not need a standalone recordkeeping case to use a WhatsApp message as proof of an FCPA violation.

The 2024 ECCP Provides the Road Map

The DOJ’s 2024 Evaluation of Corporate Compliance Programs (ECCP) does not demand a single technology solution. It asks whether the company’s approach is reasonable for its business needs and risk profile. That is the correct standard because messaging use varies by country, function, and commercial reality. The ECCP organizes the inquiry around three practical areas:

  • Communication channels. What electronic channels do employees actually use? How does use vary by jurisdiction and business function? What retention and deletion settings apply, and why did the company permit them?
  • Policy environment. Can the company preserve communications when devices are replaced? What do privacy, security, employment, and bring-your-own-device rules permit? Can the company review business messages on personal devices, and are employees required to transfer business records into company systems?
  • Risk management. Has the company ever exercised its access rights? What happens when an employee refuses access or violates the policy? Has messaging use impaired an investigation or the company’s response to prosecutors?

These are effectiveness questions. A written prohibition will not satisfy them if the business routinely ignores it, managers approve transactions in private chats, and the company cannot retrieve the records when misconduct surfaces.

A Defensible Program Starts With Commercial Reality

Ellis explained that an outright WhatsApp ban may not be practical in Latin America, where the application is widely used for business. A policy that conflicts with how employees, customers, and third parties actually work may drive communications further underground. The better approach is to define what may occur on the platform.

Ellis suggested limiting WhatsApp to logistical and administrative communications while keeping substantive commercial transactions and approvals inside controlled systems. That distinction is particularly important for customs payments, discounts, government interactions, third-party instructions, and exceptions to standard procedures.

A defensible framework should include the following controls:

  • Map actual use: Survey high-risk functions and jurisdictions to determine which applications, devices, disappearing-message settings, and informal groups employees use.
  • Classify communications: Separate low-risk logistics from approvals, commitments, payment decisions, government interactions, and other substantive business records.
  • Build technical access: Use company-managed devices or approved enterprise integrations where appropriate so business communications can be retained, searched, placed on legal hold, and produced.
  • Address local law: Analyze privacy, employment, consent, monitoring, and data-transfer requirements before an investigation begins. The access right must be lawful and operational.
  • Create preservation protocols: Define what occurs when an employee changes devices, leaves the company, becomes subject to a legal hold, or refuses access to business communications.
  • Enforce the rules: Test compliance, investigate violations, apply consequences consistently, and examine whether supervisors tolerated or encouraged off-channel approvals.

Investigations Must Be Ready Before the Message Disappears

Off-channel governance is tested in the first hours of an investigation. The company must identify relevant custodians, devices, applications, group chats, backup settings, linked desktops, and cloud accounts. It must issue a preservation notice that employees understand and implement. It must also determine whether consent, works council consultation, or another local-law step is required before collecting data.

The investigative team should not examine messaging data in isolation. It should connect communications to:

  • Accounts-payable records
  • Customs broker invoices
  • Inspection results
  • Shipment identifiers
  • Clearance times
  • Approval logs
  • Bank data

This is where Scoular Company FCPA enforcement action becomes a model for a broader control lesson. The message can explain the invoice, and the invoice can corroborate the message. Ellis emphasized the value of having protocols ready before access is needed. That is critical. Negotiating employee consent, locating backups, and determining ownership of a device after a subpoena or whistleblower allegation arrives is not a defensible strategy. It is a delay, and delay can destroy evidence and cooperation.

Boards Should Treat Messaging as a Governance Risk

Boards do not need to select the retention platform or approve device settings. They do need assurance that management understands how high-risk business is actually conducted and can preserve the evidence required to investigate misconduct. The board should receive more than confirmation that a policy exists. It should receive information on:

  • Policy exceptions
  • Control testing
  • Employee violations
  • Disciplinary outcomes
  • Collection failures
  • Investigation delays
  • High-risk jurisdictions and functions

For companies operating across the U.S.-Mexico border, customs, logistics, sales, procurement, and government-facing teams deserve particular attention. This is an oversight issue. If management cannot retrieve communications involving payments to government-facing third parties, the company may be unable to determine what occurred, identify responsible individuals, remediate the control failure, or cooperate effectively with prosecutors.

Questions for CCOs

  1. Which messaging platforms do employees and third parties actually use in our highest-risk markets?
  2. Can an employee approve a customs payment, direct a broker, or authorize an exception through WhatsApp?
  3. Can we lawfully and promptly preserve and retrieve business messages from company and personal devices?
  4. Have we tested those capabilities through a mock investigation or legal hold?
  5. Do transaction-monitoring reviews incorporate relevant messaging evidence when an anomaly is escalated?
  6. Have we disciplined employees and supervisors for circumventing approved channels?

The Bottom Line

Scoular Company did not become an off-channel communications case because employees happened to use WhatsApp. WhatsApp mattered because employees allegedly used it to facilitate and discuss a bribery scheme that operated through customs brokers and disguised invoices for six years. That is the compliance lesson. The channel, the payment, the third party, and the business outcome must be viewed as one control environment.

Companies should not ask whether WhatsApp is good or bad. They should ask whether the communications occurring there are permitted, preserved, accessible, monitored on a risk basis, and connected to the company’s formal approval and financial systems. If the company cannot answer those questions, its most important business records may be sitting on the device it controls least.

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The Odyssey and Compliance, Part 5 – Peace in Ithaca: Building the Program After the Crisis

Today, we conclude our five-part series on some of the intersections of. On Monday, we began with the Trojan Horse as a control failure. On Tuesday, we looked at The Lotus-Eaters: Culture Drift and the Comfort of Forgetting. On Wednesday, Circe’s Island: Third-Party Influence and Culture Capture. On Thursday, we reviewed The Cattle of Helios, Non-Negotiables, and Control Breaches. Today, we conclude with Odysseus making his way home to Ithaca and to his wife, Penelope, and their son, Telemachus, in the tale of Peace in Ithaca: Building the Program After the Crisis.

Odysseus finally makes it home. After ten years of war and ten more years of wandering, he returns to Ithaca, confronts the suitors, reclaims his house, and restores his position. The bow is strung. The suitors are defeated. The great crisis is over. Roll credits, cue heroic music, and let everyone go back to normal. Except, of course, that is not how governance works.

The story does not really end when Odysseus wins. Ithaca still has to be governed. The household has to be restored. Trust has to be rebuilt. Loyalties have to be sorted out. The damage done by years of disorder has to be addressed. Penelope, Telemachus, the servants, the suitors’ families, and the broader community all have to live with what comes next.

That is the overlooked compliance lesson at the end of The Odyssey: winning the confrontation is not the same as rebuilding the system. For corporate compliance, Ithaca is the company after an enforcement action, a scandal, a cyber breach, a restatement, a leadership crisis, a whistleblower investigation, a failed audit, or a major control breakdown. The dramatic event may be over. The press release may be issued. The investigation may be closed. The bad actors may be gone. But the real question remains: what changes must be made so that the same story does not happen again?

The Corporate Translation

Every organization wants to believe that removing the wrongdoer solves the problem. Terminate the employee. Discipline the manager. Replace the vendor. Restate the numbers. Settle the matter. Announce new leadership. Launch a refreshed values campaign. Hold a town hall. Add a slide to the annual training deck. All of those may be necessary.

None of them is sufficient. A crisis reveals more than individual misconduct. It reveals how the organization enabled the misconduct, overlooked it, tolerated it, rationalized it, or failed to respond sooner. It exposes weaknesses in governance, incentives, supervision, reporting, monitoring, controls, culture, and accountability.

That is why post-crisis remediation cannot be treated as corporate housekeeping. It is not the ceremonial sweeping of the hall after the suitors have been removed. It is the hard work of rebuilding Ithaca so the suitors do not return wearing different badges. The corporate lesson is simple: winning the investigation is not the same as rebuilding trust.

“Works in Practice” Is the Hard Question

The DOJ’s Evaluation of Corporate Compliance Programs (ECCP) asks three core questions: whether the program is well designed, whether it is adequately resourced and empowered to function effectively, and whether it works in practice. The ECCP makes clear that prosecutors consider how a company’s program performed at the time of misconduct and at the time of a charging decision or resolution.

That third question—does it work in practice? —is the Ithaca question. It is one thing to have a Code of Conduct. It is another thing to know whether employees believe it. It is one thing to have a hotline. It is another thing to know whether people trust it. It is one thing to discipline misconduct. It is another matter to know whether discipline is consistent across ranks, geographies, and revenue contributions.

A compliance program does not work because it is beautifully documented. A compliance program works when it changes decisions, identifies risks, encourages escalation, supports ethical behavior, and improves when reality proves that the initial design was not enough. Odysseus could reclaim the palace in a day. Rebuilding confidence in the palace would take longer. So it is with compliance.

Remediation Is Not a Memo

One of the great corporate temptations after a crisis is to confuse activity with remediation. There will be committees. There will be project plans. There will be executive updates. There will be dashboards in shades of green, yellow, and red. There will be a new policy with a title long enough to require its own table of contents. But the question is not whether the company became busier. The question is whether the company has become better.

Effective remediation begins with root cause analysis. What happened? Why did it happen? Who was involved? Who should have known? Which controls failed? Which controls did not exist? Were employees trained? Were managers supervising? Were incentives distorting behavior? Were prior warnings ignored? Were similar issues found elsewhere?

Then, remediation must move from diagnosis to design. Policies may need to change. Controls may need to be strengthened. Reporting channels may need to be rebuilt. Training may need to be targeted. Third-party relationships may need review. Compensation systems may need adjustment. Governance committees may need clearer authority. Data analytics may need to identify patterns earlier.

And then comes the part companies sometimes skip: testing and ongoing monitoring. A control is not considered remediated just because someone wrote that it was. A control is remediated when it has been implemented, tested, validated, and shown to work. Otherwise, Ithaca has merely repainted the door.

Monitoring and Testing: Trust, but Verify Ithaca

After a crisis, leadership often wants to move on. That impulse is understandable. No one wants to live forever in the investigation report. Employees are tired. Managers are defensive. The board wants assurance. Customers want stability. Regulators want evidence. The business wants to get back to business. But moving on too quickly is how organizations repeat themselves.

Monitoring and testing are the tools that keep memory alive without keeping the organization trapped in the past. Monitoring asks, “What are we seeing now? Testing asks, “Do the controls actually work?” Together, they turn compliance from a promise into evidence.

This is where ISO 37301 offers a useful management-system lens. ISO describes ISO 37301 as a compliance management systems standard for establishing, developing, implementing, evaluating, maintaining, and improving an effective and responsive compliance management system. That language matters because it treats compliance as a cycle, not a shrine. Establish. Implement. Evaluate. Maintain. Improve.

Culture Reset Requires More Than New Words

After misconduct, companies often rediscover culture with the enthusiasm of a traveler who has just realized the map was upside down. Suddenly, everyone wants to talk about values. Tone at the top. Speak-up culture. Accountability. Transparency. Trust.

But a culture reset requires more than new words from senior leadership. Employees are sophisticated consumers of corporate messaging. They know when a town hall is sincere and when it is theater. They know whether leaders who caused the pressure are still being rewarded. They know whether people who raised concerns were protected or isolated. They know whether the company wants the truth or merely closure.

A real culture reset asks hard questions. Are managers rewarded for ethical leadership? Are employees comfortable escalating concerns? Are investigations fair and timely? Are lessons learned communicated without unnecessary secrecy? Are senior leaders held accountable? Are compliance and audit findings taken seriously? Are business goals achievable without cutting corners? Culture is not reset by announcing that trust has been restored. Trust is restored when employees see different behavior over time.

Governance After the Storm

Ithaca’s problem was not only that the suitors behaved badly. It was the governance structure that allowed them to occupy the house for too long. That is a corporate issue as well.

After a crisis, boards and executive teams should examine whether governance failed. Did the right committees receive the right information? Did compliance have sufficient independence? Were risk owners clearly identified? Did internal audit, legal, HR, finance, security, and compliance coordinate effectively? Were red flags escalated? Did leadership understand the risk, or were they receiving sanitized reporting?

Governance redesign is not glamorous. It lacks the narrative thrill of Odysseus stringing the bow. But it is what prevents the next group of suitors from discovering that no one is really watching the door.

The Compliance Takeaway

The end of The Odyssey is not just about return. It is about restoration. That distinction matters for compliance officers and business leaders. After a crisis, the organization must resist the urge to declare victory too soon. The investigation may identify what happened. Discipline may address who was responsible. But remediation must answer the deeper question: what will be different? A mature compliance program uses a crisis as evidence. It monitors. It tests. It learns. It redesigns governance. It strengthens controls. It resets culture through action. It measures whether the program works in practice, not merely whether it exists on paper.

Odysseus came home and won back Ithaca. The compliance challenge is harder. You have to make Ithaca governable again.